People v. Guthrie

• Decision Date: 22 September 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 327385.
• Citation: 894 N.W.2d 711,317 Mich.App. 381
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GUTHRIE.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

317 Mich.App. 381

894 N.W.2d 711

PEOPLE

v.GUTHRIE.

Docket No. 327385.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 13, 2016, at Detroit.

Decided Sept. 22, 2016, at 9:05 a.m.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Law Offices of Raymond A. Correll PC, Southfield (by Raymond A. Correll ) for defendant.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MARKEY and RIORDAN, JJ.

RIORDAN, J.

The prosecution appeals by leave granted¹ the circuit court order reversing the district court order that denied defendant's motion for destruction of his arrest record and biometric data.² We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2014, defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (person under 13 years of age). The following day, he was arraigned in district court. In December 2014, after a preliminary examination was held, the prosecution requested entry of an order of nolle prosequi, which the district court granted.³

In January 2015, defendant filed a motion in the district court requesting destruction of his fingerprints and the return of his arrest card, arguing that MCL 28.243(8) required destruction of his fingerprints and arrest record because an order of nolle prosequi had been entered. Although he acknowledged that MCL 28.243(12) contains an exception to the destruction requirement for crimes involving criminal sexual conduct, defendant noted that language in a former version of the statute stated that the exception only applied to defendants who were "arraigned in circuit court or the family division of circuit court."⁴ Thus, because he was never arraigned in circuit court, defendant argued that he was entitled to destruction of his arrest card and fingerprint images.

In response, the prosecution argued that defendant's motion should be denied in light of a 2012 amendment of MCL 28.243(12), which deleted the phrase "in circuit court or the family division of circuit court."⁵ Because the current version of MCL 28.243(12) only states that the destruction requirement does "not apply to a person who was arraigned for any of the following [crimes]" and defendant was arraigned in district court on October 29, 2014, the prosecution contended that defendant was not entitled to the destruction of his records. In his reply, defendant urged the district court to read MCL 28.243 in its entirety in order to properly determine the Legislature's intent, arguing that the prosecution's position was inconsistent with other provisions of the statute.

Following a hearing, the district court denied defendant's motion for destruction of his arrest record and fingerprints, reasoning that it did not have discretion to grant the motion as a result of the 2012 amendment of the statute.

In February 2015, defendant appealed the district court's order in the Wayne Circuit Court. In his brief on appeal, defendant contended that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that it was without discretion to order destruction of his arrest card and biometric data. He asserted, inter alia, that even though MCL 28.243(12) states that the provisions in MCL 28.243(8) requiring destruction do not apply to defendants who were arraigned for certain crimes, the statute does not state that a court is without discretion to order destruction of those documents in the interest of justice. Defendant argued that while law enforcement may not be required by statute to destroy biometric data and arrest cards once a defendant has been arraigned in district court, the statute does nothing to limit or prohibit a court from so ordering. In response, the prosecution again emphasized that MCL 28.243(12) states that the requirement to destroy arrest records and biometric data is inapplicable to certain enumerated offenses. It argued that if the Department of State Police fails to carry out its legal duty, a defendant may file an action for mandamus in circuit court. The prosecution reasoned that defendant improperly filed a motion for the destruction of his biometric data and arrest record in the district court. Nevertheless, the prosecution concluded that defendant was not entitled to destruction of his arrest record and biometric data.

During the hearing on defendant's appeal, the circuit court ruled that it did, in fact, have jurisdiction to rule on the destruction of defendant's arrest card and biometric data and that a mandamus action was not required. Ultimately, the circuit court granted defendant's motion, hypothesizing that the Legislature's deletion of the phrase "arraignment in circuit court" was most likely the result of "just some stocker trying to clear up language." Likewise, relying heavily on its examination of committee reports and bill analyses related to the 2012 amendment of the statute, the court speculated that the Legislature only intended to change the word "fingerprinting" to "biometric data" and to require the collection of biometric data at the point of arrest rather than at the point of conviction. Therefore, the court ruled that defendant was entitled to the destruction he requested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal raises issues of first impression concerning the proper application of MCL 28.243(12). "Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." People v. Droog, 282 Mich.App. 68, 70, 761 N.W.2d 822 (2009).

III. ANALYSIS

A. MANDAMUS

The prosecution first argues that defendant's appeal in the circuit court of the district court's decision regarding the destruction of his arrest card and biometric data was improper. It contends that defendant was required to file a mandamus action against the Michigan State Police seeking destruction of that documentation. We disagree.

While this Court has considered at least one appeal from a trial court's entry of a writ of mandamus concerning the return or destruction of fingerprints and arrest cards, see McElroy v. Mich. State Police Crim. Justice Info Ctr., 274 Mich.App. 32, 33–35, 38–39, 731 N.W.2d 138 (2007), it also has considered appeals from court orders granting or denying a defendant's motion for the return or destruction of this documentation. See, e.g., In re Klocek, 291 Mich.App. 9, 11, 805 N.W.2d 213 (2010) ; People v. Benjamin, 283 Mich.App. 526, 527, 769 N.W.2d 748 (2009) (holding that the defendants who were granted deferral status and probation were not entitled to destruction of their fingerprints and arrest cards); People v. Cooper (After Remand), 220 Mich.App. 368, 370–372, 559 N.W.2d 90 (1996) (interpreting a previous version of MCL 28.243 ); People v. Pigula, 202 Mich.App. 87, 88–91, 507 N.W.2d 810 (1993). It is clear from these cases that the courts of this state routinely recognize a defendant's ability to file a motion in a criminal case for the return or destruction of his or her biometric data and arrest card pursuant to MCL 28.243.⁶

Moreover, MCR 3.936 expressly states that, under certain circumstances, if a juvenile defendant's arrest card and biometric data are not destroyed in accordance with MCL 28.243(7) and (8), "the court, on motion filed pursuant to MCL 28.243(8), shall issue an order directing the Department of State Police, or other official holding the information, to destroy the fingerprints and arrest card...." MCR 3.936(D) (emphasis added). See also In re Klocek, 291 Mich.App. at 11, 805 N.W.2d 213. While MCR 3.936 applies to juvenile proceedings, it clearly recognizes that a motion for the destruction of biometric data or an arrest card may be filed under MCL 28.243(8), and it demonstrates the authority of a court to require destruction of arrest cards and biometric data in cases other than actions for mandamus relief. Likewise, MCL 28.243(12)(h) —by stating that MCL 28.243(8) does not apply to an individual "who has a prior conviction, other than a misdemeanor traffic offense"—specifically contemplates the authority of "a court of record, except the probate court," to "order[ ] the destruction or return of the biometric data and arrest card" in those cases. In Pigula, 202 Mich.App. at 91, 507 N.W.2d 810, we also stated, in the context of interpreting a former version of MCL 28.243, that "[t]he circuit courts continue to have jurisdiction to enforce" the provision of the statute stating that the return of fingerprints and arrest cards shall not apply in specified cases.

Finally, we have held that "[t]he general rule is that a writ of mandamus is not to be issued where the plaintiff can appeal the error."

Keaton v. Village of Beverly Hills, 202 Mich.App. 681, 683, 509 N.W.2d 544 (1993). In this case, after the district court denied defendant's motion for destruction of his arrest card and fingerprints, defendant had the right to appeal the district court's decision in the circuit court. Defendant subsequently exercised this right, at which time the prosecution raised its mandamus argument for the first time.

For these reasons, we reject the prosecution's claim that defendant was required to file an action for mandamus rather than a motion in the district court seeking the destruction of his fingerprints and arrest card.

B. DESTRUCTION OF ARREST CARD AND BIOMETRIC DATA

The prosecution next argues that the circuit court erroneously granted defendant's request for destruction of his arrest card and biometric data, contrary to MCL 28.243(12), because it lacked authority to order destruction given that defendant was, in fact, arraigned in district court. We agree.

The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. We begin this task by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning

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