People v. Guthrie

• Decision Date: 01 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 12SA80.,12SA80.
• Citation: 286 P.3d 530,2012 CO 59
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Suzanne Elizabeth GUTHRIE, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

286 P.3d 530

2012 CO 59

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Suzanne Elizabeth GUTHRIE, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12SA80.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Oct. 1, 2012.

Daniel H. May, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District, Adam Bailey, Deputy District Attorney, Doyle Baker, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Earl W. Cook, Jr., Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenges an order of the El Paso County District Court granting defendant Suzanne Guthrie's motion to suppress evidence of an illegal narcotic discovered during a routine inventory search of her personal effects after a judge of the El Paso County Court, in a prior proceeding, ordered a deputy sheriff to jail her for direct contempt of court.¹

¶ 2 In the present prosecution for Guthrie's possession of illegal drugs, the district court suppressed evidence discovered during the inventory search as an ad hoc remedy for the due process violation it deemed the county court judge to have committed when conducting the contempt proceeding pursuant to C.R.C.P. 407. We hold that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred here. The inventory search the police carried out resulted directly from the county court's order to the deputy sheriff, based on a finding of criminal contempt of court, to jail Guthrie. Appeal of the summary contempt conviction, which might or might not result in reversal, would be the proper recourse for the county court's alleged due process violation. Suppressing evidence of the illegal narcotic discovered as a result of the valid inventory search here would not be an appropriate remedy even if the county court erred in convicting Guthrie of direct contempt of court.

I.

¶ 3 In the prior proceeding in which the county court issued the contempt order, Guthrie came to the courthouse on a summons for Driving Under the Influence, section 42–4–1301, C.R.S. (2011). In the hallway outside the courtroom, the prosecution and defense worked out a plea agreement to that charge. Guthrie signed the plea agreement paperwork, and counsel obtained a sentencing date from the court clerk. Defense counsel then escorted Guthrie to the probation department to arrange an alcohol evaluation and left the courthouse.

¶ 4 A clerk smelled alcohol on Guthrie's breath while she was filling out paperwork in the probation department waiting area. Guthrie consented to a preliminary breath test that revealed her blood alcohol concentration to be .099. The probation office informed the county court of her elevated blood alcohol, and, in response, the judge directed a deputy sheriff to escort Guthrie into the courtroom. This was Guthrie's first appearance before the court that day.

¶ 5 Without defense counsel present, the county court judge summarily held Guthrie in contempt of court due to her intoxication and sentenced her to two days in jail. The judge ordered the deputy sheriff to arrest Guthrie. The deputy handcuffed her and escorted her to the booking area of the courthouse. Pursuant to department policy, the deputy inventoried Guthrie's possessions prior to placing her in a holding cell. During the inventory search of her purse, the deputy discovered Oxycodone Hydrochloride. Guthrie lacked a prescription for the drug.² The prosecution subsequently charged Guthrie with felony Possession of a Controlled Substance—Schedule II, section 18–18–403.5, C.R.S. (2011), and Guthrie moved to suppress the evidence derived from the inventory search.

¶ 6 Following the suppression hearing, the district court determined that “[t]he Deputy who escorted the Defendant to the Courtroom and who subsequently did an inventory search following the contempt hearing acted in good faith and his actions were not violative of due process.” Nonetheless, the district court suppressed evidence of the illegal narcotic gained from the inventory search.

¶ 7 The district court based its suppression order on the theory that suppression would remedy the due process violation it perceived the county court to have committed by summarily ordering Guthrie jailed for contempt of court. The district court reasoned that:

the Judge in this case violated Defendant's right to due process. The Judge found Defendant in direct contempt for what clearly was not direct contempt. This error was compounded by sentencing the Defendant without her lawyer being present. The Record is devoid of any effort by the Judge to contact Defendant's lawyer who had been in the Courtroom earlier in the same case. The Judge acted as police, prosecutor, and Judge. The result is an abandonment of the traditional role of neutral judicial officer.... The Court finds [this] is a significant violation and not a technical violation. The Court finds this wrong requires a remedy. The Court finds the drugs discovered in Defendant's purse or on her person were fruits of the poisonous tree. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Suppress.

¶ 8 In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution argues that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence derived from the inventory search. We agree.

II.

¶ 9 We hold that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred here. The inventory search the police carried out resulted directly from the county court's order to the deputy sheriff, based on a finding of criminal contempt of court, to jail Guthrie. Appeal of the summary contempt conviction, which might or might not result in reversal, would be the proper recourse for the county court's alleged due process violation. Suppressing evidence of the illegal narcotic discovered as a result of the valid inventory search here would not be an appropriate remedy even if the county court erred in convicting Guthrie of direct contempt of court.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 We review a trial court's suppression order with deference to that court's findings of historical fact and will not overturn those findings if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo.2011). However, whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in the case is a question of law we review de novo. Id. Our analysis is not constricted by only those facts that were the subject of the trial court's order; we also consider the undisputed facts evident in the record. People v. Elmarr, 181 P.3d 1157, 1161 (Colo.2008).

B. Inventory Search Subsequent to a Summary Contempt Conviction

¶ 11 This case presents unusual circumstances. We have discovered only one analogous persuasive precedent regarding a summary court order of contempt followed by an inventory search. “[W]ithout reaching the issue of the legality of the contempt order,” the Supreme Court of Vermont determined that evidence of contraband (marijuana and a switchblade) derived from an inventory search of the defendant incident to his incarceration for summary criminal contempt was not subject to suppression. See State v. Robinson, 165 Vt. 351, 683 A.2d 1005, 1006 (1996).

¶ 12 An inventory search made necessary by a summary contempt conviction presents a special circumstance due to the “unique nature of summary contempt.” Id. at 1007. A court brings its contempt power to bear with the specific objective of maintaining the dignity, authority, and functionality of the court. People v. Aleem, 149 P.3d 765, 781 (Colo.2007). Because “[t]he charge and determination of guilt are collapsed into a single act, and the offended judge acts as victim, prosecutor, judge and jury ... [g]uilt is established in one fell swoop.” Robinson, 683 A.2d at 1007. As a result, “the contemnor may challenge the grounds for the [contempt] order in a subsequent appeal, [but] the effect of the order, when made, is a finding of guilty and the imposition of a sentence.” Id. Therefore an inventory search carried out subsequent to a summary contempt order “is analogous to a post-conviction inventory search prior to incarceration [and] [e]vidence found during such an inventory search is not subject to suppression even if the conviction is ultimately overturned on appeal.” Id.

¶ 13 The United States Constitution protects against unreasonable government searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; accordColo. Const. art. II, § 7. When police obtain evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from introducing that evidence against the aggrieved individual in either state or federal criminal contexts. People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo.2009). The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right but a judicially created remedy intended to enforce the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. Therefore, courts reserve its application for those circumstances in which both an unreasonable search or seizure occurred and suppression would likely deter similar violations in the future. Id.

¶ 14 An “inventory search is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). Therefore, it implicates neither “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement ... nor ... the related concept of probable cause.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), reversing People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411 (Colo.1985). An inventory search derives its reasonableness from serving a broad range of legitimate governmental interests that outweigh the intrusion on an individual's expectation of privacy. People v. Inman, 765 P.2d 577, 579 (Colo.1988) (citing Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646, 103 S.Ct. 2605). These interests center on the “practical necessities of routine jail administration,” Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645, 103 S.Ct. 2605, and include: (1) protecting an arrestee's...