People v. Hamilton
| Decision Date | 18 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 83SA120,83SA120 |
| Citation | 666 P.2d 152 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Boyd Vestle HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Nolan L. Brown, Dist. Atty., John E. Byron, Sr. Deputy Dist. Atty., Alan C. Shafner, Deputy Dist. Atty., Golden, for plaintiff-appellant.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Sue Ann Fitch, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.
The People have filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 seeking reversal of the trial court's order suppressing items seized incident to defendant's arrest. The order was based on the trial court's conclusion that in executing an arrest warrant Golden Police Department officers had no authority to arrest defendant in the City and County of Denver. While we agree that the officers had no such authority, we reverse the suppression order under the circumstances of this case.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. During the early evening of July 19, 1982, Golden Police Department officials were informed by a Jefferson County resident that the defendant had sexually assaulted her earlier that day. A warrant for defendant's arrest was obtained on July 20. 1
At 9:00 a.m. on July 28, 1982, an informant telephoned Golden police detective Lamb and reported that defendant would visit the First Interstate Bank in downtown Denver sometime that morning. Lamb and Lt. Foulke, another Golden police officer, immediately went to the bank and awaited defendant's arrival. At 10:49 a.m. defendant entered the bank, at which time the two officers arrested him and seized certain items of personal property incident thereto. Lamb and Foulke then contacted Denver police officers, and a Denver police officer subsequently transported defendant to Denver City Jail. Concluding that the Golden officers had no authority to execute the arrest warrant in Denver, the trial court ordered the seized evidence suppressed.
On appeal, the People assert that any Colorado peace officer acting pursuant to a valid arrest warrant may arrest the person named therein anywhere in Colorado. Whatever policy concerns may be advanced in support of the argument that peace officers should possess such broad authority to execute arrest warrants, we conclude that the General Assembly has adopted a quite different policy with regard to the extra-territorial arrest authority of Colorado peace officers.
The common law of nineteenth century England recognized that the authority of a public official to execute a warrant was limited to the jurisdiction of the judicial officer issuing the warrant, and that unless the warrant itself specifically named a particular official to execute it, a public official could not execute a warrant outside the geographic boundaries of the political entity employing such official. See, e.g., Rex v. Weir, 1 Barn. & C. 288, 107 Eng.Rep. 108 (1823); Gladwell v. Blake, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 636, 149 Eng.Rep. 1235 (1834). See also 2 Chitty's Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, ch. 19, p. 236 n. 8 (1874). Early American cases also recognized that a peace officer was prohibited from executing arrest warrants beyond the geographic boundaries of the political entity by which the officer was employed. See, e.g., Lawson v. Buzines, 3 Harr. 416 (Del.1842); York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360 (1884); Butolph v. Blust, 41 How.Pr. 481, 5 Lans. 84 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1871); Copeland v. Islay, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 505 (1837); Page v. Staples, 13 R.I. 306 (1881). 2
In Colorado, as elsewhere, the authority of peace officers to effectuate arrests is now defined by legislation. The General Assembly has dealt specifically with the arrest authority of peace officers in Article 3, Part 1 of Title 16, C.R.S.1973. Section 16-3-102, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), states as follows:
In defining the three sets of circumstances authorizing peace officer arrests, the section does not impose territorial arrest limitations on the authority of peace officers to execute arrest warrants. However, section 16-3-106, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), contains the following critical restrictions upon the arrest authority of peace officers:
"When any peace officer is in fresh pursuit of any alleged offender, having a warrant for his arrest or having knowledge that such warrant has been issued, or, in the absence of an arrest warrant, when the offense was committed in the officer's presence or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged offender has committed a criminal offense, and the alleged offender crosses a boundary line marking the territorial limit of his authority, such peace officer may pursue him beyond such boundary line and make the arrest, issue a summons and complaint, or issue a notice of penalty assessment."
When construing two statutes respecting the same or similar subject matter, full effect must be given to both legislative provisions. Buck v. District Court, 199 Colo. 344, 608 P.2d 350 (1980). This court has previously recognized that in enacting section 16-3-106 the General Assembly intended to limit the exercise of the arrest authority delineated by section 16-3-102. People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213 (Colo.1981). 3
In combination, these two statutes in effect prohibit a police officer "having a warrant" for a person's arrest from crossing the boundary line marking "the territorial limit" of the officer's authority unless the officer "is in fresh pursuit" of the alleged offender. Thus, contrary to the People's assertion, a Colorado peace officer armed with a Colorado arrest warrant has no greater authority to effectuate an arrest pursuant thereto than a peace officer acting on probable cause without such warrant. The statute thus recognizes that in many situations citizens of a particular community may best be served by the requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods accompany peace officers from other jurisdictions seeking to arrest a defendant allegedly present in the community.
Similar statutory limitations on the arresting authority of peace officers prevail in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fla.Stat.Ann. § 901.04 (West 1983 Cum.Supp.); La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 204 (West 1966). It is true that statutes in some jurisdictions expressly authorize extra-territorial execution of arrest warrants by peace officers. See, e.g., Official Code of Ga.Ann. § 17-4-25 (Michie 1982) ("an arresting officer may, in any county without regard to the residence of the arresting officer, arrest any person charged with a crime."); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 594:7 (1974) (); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-407 (1979) (). See also State v. Clingerman, 180 Neb. 344, 142 N.W.2d 765 (1966).
Our General Assembly has expressly provided that peace officers executing search warrants may do so throughout the state. Section 16-3-305(3), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). 4 The absence of any such language in either section 16-3-102 or section 16-3-106 indicates a deliberate legislative choice to limit the general authority of peace officers to effectuate extra-territorial arrests based upon Colorado arrest warrants. See 2 W. Ringle, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 23.4(b)(1) (2d ed. 1982).
This court consistently has recognized the requirement that officers acting outside their territorial jurisdictions must obtain the aid of local officers who do have authority to make arrests in the "foreign" jurisdiction, absent fresh pursuit exigencies. In People v. Lott, 197 Colo. 78, 589 P.2d 945 (1979), we affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Wheat Ridge Police Department officials who at approximately 3:00 p.m. learned that a burglary suspect would be found at a Denver location at 6:00 p.m. had no authority to arrest the suspect in Denver at 6:00 p.m. Recognizing that the Wheat Ridge officers had no warrant, we pointed out in footnote 1 to that opinion that, assuming the existence of probable cause, a warrantless arrest might have been effectuated by Denver police officials. Contrary to the People's argument here, our approval of the trial court's ruling in Lott did not suggest that the presence of an arrest warrant in and of itself would authorize an extra-territorial arrest by peace officers, absent fresh pursuit.
In People v. Schultz, 200 Colo. 47, 611 P.2d 977 (1980), we again emphasized the importance of the presence of peace officers authorized to make arrests in the jurisdiction in which the arrest occurs. We there held that it was immaterial who actually executed an arrest warrant when authorized peace officers participated in the arrest process. Finally, People v. Wolf, supra, again emphasized our recognition of the General Assembly's prohibition of unilateral extra-territorial arrests by peace officers. These decisions recognize that a peace officer seeking to effectuate an arrest in a jurisdiction other than the one employing such officer must, absent fresh pursuit, obtain assistance from local officers with appropriate arresting authority.
The People argue that Crim.P. 4 authorizes a peace officer possessing an arrest warrant to execute the warrant anywhere within the state....
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