People v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 10 February 2022
• Docket Number: C093270
• Citation: 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 177,74 Cal.App.5th 1092
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Danny HAMPTON, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

74 Cal.App.5th 1092

290 Cal.Rptr.3d 177

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Danny HAMPTON, Defendant and Respondent.

C093270

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed February 10, 2022

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

Robie, J.

A jury found defendant Danny Hampton guilty of first degree murder and two counts of robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 33 years to life. This court affirmed the judgment. ( People v. Hampton (Dec. 29, 2009, C056867) 2009 WL 5136012 [nonpub. opn.] ( Hampton ).)¹ The jury could not reach a verdict on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, and that allegation was dismissed on the People's motion for insufficient evidence.

Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code ² section 1170.95 and requested appointment of counsel. The trial court granted the petition finding the dismissal of the special-circumstance allegation for insufficient evidence was equivalent to an acquittal. The People appeal contending the dismissal of the special-circumstance allegation was not an acquittal. We affirm the order granting the petition for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

ARelevant Facts Underlying Conviction

Defendant and three of his friends planned a robbery of defendant's marijuana dealer, Larry Elliott. Defendant did not want to participate in the robbery, but the codefendants told him he had no choice. The plan included defendant setting up a pretextual drug buy to determine how much marijuana Elliott had at his home. Defendant and codefendant Camitt Doughton went to Elliott's house and were there for about eight minutes, smoking marijuana and listening to music with Elliott and his two guests. Then, codefendants Edward Quintanilla and Deandre Scott burst into the garage, wearing masks, all black clothing, and armed with firearms. They ordered everyone onto the ground and pistol-whipped Elliott. Defendant pleaded with the codefendants to stop assaulting the victims and tried to reassure the victims they were safe. Quintanilla and Scott went into the home and searched for things to steal. Defendant remained in the garage. He was not armed. When Scott came back into the garage from the house, he had a shotgun and an assault rifle. Quintanilla and Scott ordered defendant to take a bucket containing marijuana and leave the garage. Defendant did. As he was running from the scene, he heard a gunshot. Doughton had shot Elliott in the back of the head. When defendant met back up with codefendants, he received some of the marijuana, Quintanilla and Scott kept the money and guns. ( Hampton, supra , C056867.)

There was also evidence that defendant knew his codefendants planned to be armed, had handled one of the guns earlier on the day of the robbery, and that one of his codefendants indicated a willingness to shoot the victims, if necessary.

BRelevant Procedural Background Original Trial

At close of evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss the special-circumstance allegation under section 1118.1, contending there was insufficient evidence he acted with reckless indifference to life. The trial court denied the motion stating: "[T]he evidence presents that [defendant] was involved in a discussion with his confederates and that guns were essentially brought out during that discussion, and that [defendant] actually handled one of those guns in advance of going to Mr. Elliott's home, and further discussion was that they may not leave any witnesses, there is at least a pretty strong implication from those set of facts that, in fact, the person is acting in reckless disregard."

On the second day of deliberations, the jury indicated it had reached a verdict, except as to the special-circumstance allegation. The court provided additional instruction and allowed counsel to conduct additional argument focused on the issue the jury had indicated it was divided on. After additional deliberation, the jury remained unable to reach a verdict. They were split six to six. The court declared a mistrial as to the special-circumstance allegation. The court asked the prosecutor what he wanted to do regarding the allegation and the prosecutor requested the issue be put over to the time of sentencing.

The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and two counts of robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life for the murder, plus one year for the firearm enhancement, a consecutive midterm of six years on one robbery conviction, plus one year for each firearm enhancement, and an identical term on the other robbery conviction stayed under section 654, for an aggregate term of 25 years to life plus eight years. He was granted 1,008 days of credit for time served.

After sentencing, the People stated: "With respect to the special circumstances charge that the Court had declared a mistrial on ... the People would move to dismiss that for insufficient evidence." The trial court responded: "All right. The special circumstance charge will be dismissed for insufficient evidence."

C Section 1170.95 Petition

In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court reviewed the section 1170.95 petition, found defendant had made a prima facie case, and set an order-to-show-cause hearing. The court requested briefing explicitly addressing the effect of the trial court's order dismissing the special-circumstance allegation upon the jury's inability to reach a verdict and at the request of the People.

Defendant argued the dismissal of the special-circumstance allegation for insufficient evidence on the People's motion barred any relitigation of the issue as a violation of double jeopardy. Defendant also argued "the prosecution concluded, as a matter of law, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the special circumstance allegation. They cannot now reverse course and assert the opposite."

The People argued given the prior denial of the section 1118.1 motion, and the record as a whole, it was clear neither the People nor the court considered the record in the light most favorable to the People and concluded that no reasonable jury could find defendant was a major participant acting with reckless indifference. Thus, the dismissal was not an acquittal. The People also asserted when the prosecutor moved to have the allegation dismissed he "was not claiming that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the special circumstances allegation. Rather, the prosecutor was simply dismissing the special circumstance so that the jury's first degree verdict could stand. Whether the evidence could be legally sufficient to meet the People's burden was not actually litigated to decision, thus it is incorrect to state as a matter of law the evidence was insufficient."

In ruling on the section 1170.95 petition, the court considered the murder-robbery jury instructions given and the People's motion to dismiss the special-circumstance allegation for insufficient evidence. The court concluded "that the dismissal of that special circumstance for insufficient evidence is equivalent to a finding that the defendant did not act with reckless indifference. Consequently the People have failed to carry their burden of proving ineligibility." The court then proceeded to resentencing, vacated the murder conviction, and lifted the stays on the robbery convictions, leaving a sentence of seven years.

DISCUSSION

IGeneral Legal Background

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended "the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The bill amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address felony-murder liability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.) It also added section 1170.95, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder premised on either a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory can petition for retroactive relief, if the changes in the law would affect their previously sustained convictions; that is, if "[t]he petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; § 1170.95, subd. (a).)

If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief ( § 1170.95, subds. (b) & (c) ), the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts ( § 1170.95, subd. (d)(1) ). At the hearing the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is ineligible for resentencing. ( § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)

As relevant here, since there is no dispute defendant was not the actual killer and did not act with intent to kill, to now be convicted of murder the prosecution was required to prove defendant "was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2." (Stats. 2018, ch. 15, § 3.) If there was a prior finding by a court or jury that defendant did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the felony the court was required to vacate the conviction and...