People v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 01 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 384 Mich. 669,187 N.W.2d 404
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Van Leroy HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 404

187 N.W.2d 404

384 Mich. 669

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Van Leroy HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 1, 1971.

Robert F. Leonard, Pros. Atty., Genesee County, by Donald A. Kuebler, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Flint, for plaintiff-appellant.

John F. Sopt, Flint, for defendant-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

SWAINSON, Justice.

Defendant Hampton, charged with assault with intent to commit murder, was convicted by a jury in Genesee county circuit court. Subsequently, on April 1, 1966, he was sentenced to 7 1/2 to 20 years. Defendant had interposed the defense of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime. Counsel for the defendant requested that the jury be given a Lyles instruction (Lyles v. United States (1957), 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725). This would inform the jury that if defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would not thereby be released, but rather committed to a suitable institution for treatment. The trial court refused to give the instruction requested. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed based on People v. Cole (1969), 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354, and People v. Herrera (1970), 383 Mich. 49, 173 N.W.2d 202. See People v. Hampton (1970), 23 Mich.App. 190, 178 N.W.2d 551.

The Court of Appeals held that the Lyles instruction applied to all cases on appeal as of the date of the filing of the Cole opinion which had properly preserved such issue for appeal. From this decision, the People were granted leave to appeal (383 Mich. 795).

The issue before the Court is whether the rule laid down in People v. Cole (1969), 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354, should apply only prospectively (to cases commenced after December 2, 1969) or should extend to cases which had properly preserved the issue for appeal.

I.

The issue as to whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively or only prospectively is one which the courts have discussed in detail in innumerable cases. ¹ The United States Supreme Court held in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. (1932), 287 U.S. 358, at page 364, 53 S.Ct. 145, at page 148, 77 L.Ed. 360:

'We think the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases intimating, too broadly * * *, that it Must give them that effect; but never has doubt been expressed that it May so treat them if it pleased, whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted.'

This position has been consistently adhered to and this Court is under no constitutional compulsion to apply the Cole rule, either prospectively or retrospectively.

The United States Supreme Court has discussed various factors to be used in determining whether a law should be applied retroactively or prospectively. There are three key factors which the court has taken into account: (1) The purpose of the new rule; (2) The general reliance on the old rule; and (3) The effect on the administration of justice. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott (1966), 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453.

In order to determine the purpose behind the Cole rule, we must first look at the Lyles Case. In Lyles v. United States, Supra, defendant was charged with grand larceny, robbery and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. He had been adjudged not competent, by reason of insanity, to stand trial in February 1955. Another hearing was held in November 1955, and at that time he was adjudged competent to stand trial. He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, by reason of insanity. At the trial, the grand larceny charge was dismissed by the prosecution. A jury found the defendant guilty of robbery and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the District of Columbia circuit court sitting en banc affirmed his conviction. The trial judge had instructed the jury that if the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, the court would commit him to St. Elizabeths Hospital. Six of the nine judges felt that this instruction was required. Judges Prettyman and Burger stated in a joint opinion (103 U.S.App.D.C. p. 25, 254 F.2d p. 728):

'The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. Jurors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning. As a matter of fact its meaning was not made clear in this jurisdiction until Congress enacted the statute of August 9, 1955 (69 Stat. 610, D.C.Code § 24--301 (1951) (Supp. V)). It means neither freedom nor punishment. It means the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. We think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.'

Our Court adopted this rule in the case of People v. Cole, Supra. The defendant in Cole had been convicted of murder in the second degree. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction (McGregor, J., with Gillis, J. concurring and T. G. Kavanagh, J. dissenting on the ground that the jury should have been given a Lyles type instruction) 8 Mich.App. 250, 154 N.W.2d 579. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. A review of the opinions filed indicates that perhaps inadmissible evidence as to defendant's sanity had been introduced. However, a majority felt that it was error not to have given the Lyles instruction. Justice T. M. Kavanagh stated in the majority opinion (382 Mich. pp. 720--721, 172 N.W.2d p. 366):

'We feel that Lyles v. United States, Supra, is the better reasoned authority and hold that in all criminal trials or retrials taking place after the date of the filing of this opinion, where the defense of insanity is present and that issue is made submissible by the proofs, the defendant, upon his own timely request, or upon request of the jury, shall be entitled to an instruction in accord with the rule of Lyles.'

It is clear that the primary purpose of this instruction is to insure that a defendant will not be found guilty because the jury fears that he will be set free if an insanity verdict is returned. Thus, this decision goes to the very heart of our jury trial system. The United States Supreme Court has applied decisions retroactively where the guilt or innocence of the defendant was at stake. Thus, in Roberts v. Russell (1968), 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100, the court held that Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, which excluded a defendant's extra-judicial confession implicating a co-defendant at a joint trial, is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to cross- examination and should be applied retroactively both to State and Federal prosecutions.

See, also, McConnell v. Rhay (1968), 393 U.S. 2, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2, applying the decision of Mempa v. Rhay (1967), 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336, retroactively; and Arsenault v. Massachusetts (1968), 393 U.S. 5, 89 S.Ct. 35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5, applying White v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193, retroactively.

The People have pointed out numerous instances where the Supreme Court has applied decisions prospectively. However, an analysis of these opinions clearly indicates that they do not involve rules which go to the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott (1966), 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, the court held that Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, did not apply retroactively and thus the adverse comment of a prosecuting attorney did not require reversal of the conviction. The court stated (382 U.S. p. 416, 86 S.Ct. p. 465):

'By contrast the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth.'

See, also, Linkletter v. Walker, Supra, where the Supreme Court held that Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, applies prospectively, and Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, where the court held that United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, applies prospectively.

The second and third factors can be dealt with together, because the amount of past reliance will often have a profound effect upon the administration of justice. The question of a Lyles type instruction was first raised in the Cole Case. Justice T. M. Kavanagh stated, 'It is a matter of first impression in Michigan.' Thus, the Supreme Court was not overruling an earlier rule the trial judges had relied on for many years. In Linkletter v. Walker, Supra, one of the main points of the United States Supreme Court in not applying Mapp retroactively was that law enforcement officers had relied on the rule as set down in Wolf v. Colorado (1949), 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782, for over a decade in all parts of the country. That is not the situation here, and no such large scale reliance has occurred.

The People contend:

'There may well be a great...