People v. Hannon

• Decision Date: 08 July 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 15461
• Citation: 96 Cal.Rptr. 35,486 P.2d 1235,5 Cal.3d 330
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 486 P.2d 1235 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael John HANNON, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 35

96 Cal.Rptr. 35

5 Cal.3d 330, 486 P.2d 1235

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael John HANNON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 15461.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 8, 1971.

O. D. McClanahan, Huntington Beach, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the superior court sentencing him to state prison after his rejection by the California Youth Authority. We are called upon to construe Penal Code section 17 to determine if a juvenile offender, convicted of a crime alternatively punishable as a felony or misdemeanor, and committed to the Youth Authority, may thereafter be sentenced to state prison.

Defendant was charged with two counts of forcible rape upon a female under the age of 18 (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. 3) in November of 1967. At trial defendant withdrew his not guilty pleas and pleaded guilty to two counts of the lesser offense of violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision 1, statutory rape. Penal Code section 264 provides, inter alia, that 'when the defendant pleads guilty of an offense under subdivision 1 of Section 261 of the Penal Code the punishment shall be in the discretion of the trial court, either by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison for not more than 50 years.' ¹

Because defendant was aged 20 at the time of his conviction, the trial court in February 1968 committed him to the Youth Authority 'for the term prescribed by law.' However, in December 1969, after serving almost two years, defendant was returned to the trial court by the Youth Authority thority pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737.1. ² At a hearing on March 31, 1970, at which defendant testified, he was denied probation and sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. Pursuant to section 1737.1, he was given credit against his prison term for the time during which he was committed to the Youth Authority.

Defendant now contends that the trial court did not have discretion to impose felony punishment upon him, the court having previously denominated his offense a misdemeanor when it committed him to the Youth Authority. He relies on Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(2), which provides: '(b) When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances: * * * (2) When the court commits the defendant to the Youth Authority.' ³

Our task is to determine whether section 17 requires that a defendant convicted of a felony-misdemeanor offense, once committed to the Youth Authority, may only be subjected to misdemeanor punishment thereafter. As defendant interprets section 17, commitment to the Youth Authority reduces an alternatively punishable offense to a misdemeanor in the same manner as would a sentence to the county jail.

The People contend that section 17 should be given the following construction: an alternatively punishable offense is a misdemeanor '(w)hen the court commits the defendant to the Youth Authority' and thereafter so long as such commitment continues in effect; when the term of commitment has been properly served, the classification becomes final. But when the term of commitment is terminated due to the defendant's misconduct, the misdemeanor classification no longer prevails, and the court is restored to the sentencing options it had initially. Such a construction, we are told, is consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of the Youth Authority Act as stated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 1700, ⁴ and denies to defendant any benefit for the misbehavior which prompted his return to the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737.1.

It is plain that the literal meaning of the words used in section 17, subdivision (b)(2), comports with the construction sought by defendant. An alternatively punishable offense 'is a misdemeanor for all purposes * * * (w) hen the court commits the defendant to the Youth Authority.' Defendant was convicted of an alternatively punishable offense and the trial court chose to commit him to the Youth Authority. Had it desired to do so, the court could have sentenced defendant to state prison, thereby denominating his crime a felony; or the court might have granted him probation without imposing sentence and thus retained discretion to impose felony or misdemeanor punishment at a later date (see, e.g., People v. Esparza (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 362, 364, 61 Cal.Rptr. 167; People v. Griffin (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 125, 25 Cal.Rptr. 667); or the court might have sentenced defendant to a term in county jail which would have rendered his crime a misdemeanor.

The defendant having been committed to the Youth Authority, there is nothing in the language of section 17 to suggest that his offense was only conditionally denominated a misdemeanor, subject to his successful completion of his Youth Authority term. Neither subdivision (b)(2) nor any of the other subparagraphs of section 17 indicate that the classification of a crime as a misdemeanor may be conditioned upon the defendant's good behavior, or subject to defeasance for later misconduct. Once the trial court exercises its discretion by taking action which characterizes an alternatively punishable offense as a misdemeanor, defendant's subsequent conduct will not convert his crime to a felony and subject him to state imprisonment. Thus, for example, if a trial court had sent a minor misdemeanant to county jail for one year and the youth became a discipline problem at the institution, section 17 would provide no basis for withdrawing the misdemeanor sentence and resentencing to state prison.

Of course, as the People explain, a literal interpretation of a statute is not necessarily controlling and will be rejected if it leads to an absurdity. (People v. Darling (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 615, 620, 41 Cal.Rptr. 219.) Such an absurdity exists, it is contended, when a defendant benefits by his misbehavior after commitment to the Youth Authority. The Attorney General paints a dismal picture of youthful defendants being committed to the Youth Authority, intentionally misbehaving and thus compelling their return to the trial court under section 1737.1, and then being rewarded for their misconduct by a maximum sentence of one year in the county jail.

The anti-rehabilitative impact of a literal construction of section 17 is overstated. The Youth Authority has a wide variety of means at its disposal to deal effectively with youthful offenders, and it cannot be said with accuracy that the agency is at the mercy of incorrigible minors. The Authority has access to all state and private correctional facilities (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1753), and it may even transfer problem cases to the state prisons. (See, e.g., In Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 215--217, 74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174; In re Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 525, 42 Cal.Rptr. 921; People v. Scherbing (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 736, 740--741, 209 P.2d 796.) Furthermore, the Authority may continue to hold a misdemeanant until he is 23 years old (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1770) and thereafter apply to the trial court for two-year extensions of his detention if he is deemed a danger to the public because of physical or mental abnormality (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 1800--1803). ⁵ Thus, a 20-year-old misdemeanant who chose to reject his rehabilitative opportunities and to create disciplinary problems in Youth Authority institutions might face five years of incarceration in state prison. And, if the Authority chose to return him to the trial court under section 1737.1, he might still face a year in the county jail. Therefore, a literal interpretation of section 17 should not result in encouraging misconduct by Youth Authority inmates.

It is true that, if the Authority were to exercise its discretion under section 1737.1 every time an offender creates a disciplinary problem, a literal construction of section 17 might induce some misguided minors convicted of alternatively punishable offenses to engage in misconduct in order to limit their sentences to a maximum of one year in the county jail. However, that response certainly would not be pervasive since good behavior could produce an earlier release without any county jail sentence. Furthermore, return to the trial court pursuant to section 1737.1 is deemed to be a last resort alternative after the Authority has exhausted the other means available. (See People v. Scherbing (1949) supra, 93 Cal.App.2d 736, 741, 209 P.2d 796.) Because of the potential severity of the Authority's available disciplinary measures, most persons returned pursuant to section 1737.1 will not likely be those who intentionally misbehave in order to take advantage of a misdemeanor county jail sentence. Rather, such persons will generally be those for whom Youth Authority treatment is found to be inappropriate, and they may then be sentenced according to the nature of their offenses.

We need not rely solely upon the language of section 17 in our effort to determine the legislative purpose in its enactment; the legislative history of the section provides us an additional persuasive index. As does its language, the history of the section supports the construction for which the defendant contends.

Between 1874 and 1947, section 17 remained unchanged and its treatment of alternatively punishable offenses was the following: 'When a crime, punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison, is also punishable by fine or imprisonment in a County Jail, in the discretion of the Court, it shall be deemed a misdemeanor for all...