People v. Hanrahan

• Decision Date: 11 July 1889
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HANRAHAN.

42 N.W. 1124

75 Mich. 611

PEOPLE v. HANRAHAN.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 11, 1889

Certiorari to recorder's court of Detroit; LOOK Recorder.

The Attorney General, J. W. McGrath, City Atty., and Geo. F. Robinson, Pros. Atty., for the People.

James H. Pound, (Chas. W. Casgram, of counsel,) for respondent.

CHAMPLIN J.

For many years prior to 1887 there existed a statute relating to offenses against chastity, morality, and decency, which reads as follows: "Every person who shall keep a house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars." How. St. � 9286. At the last session of the legislature this section was amended so as to read as follows: "Every person who shall keep a house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, and every person who shall solicit, or in any manner induce, a female to enter such house for the purpose of becoming a prostitute, or shall by force, fraud, deceit, or in any like manner procure a female to enter such house for the purpose of prostitution, or of becoming a prostitute, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the state-prison not more than five years, or in the county jail not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." Pub. Acts 1887, p. 32. The charter granted by the legislature to the city of Detroit in 1883, among other provisions, contained the following: "The common council may prohibit, prevent, and suppress the keeping and leasing of houses of ill fame, or assignation, or for the resort of common prostitutes, disorderly houses, and disorderly groceries. It may restrain, suppress, and punish the keepers thereof, and the owners and lessors of such premises." Local Acts 1883, c. 7, � 47, p. 611. Section 54 of the same chapter provides that "the common council shall have power to provide for the imprisonment and confinement in houses of correction, at hard labor or otherwise, of all persons liable to be imprisoned or confined under this act or any act relating to said city, or any ordinance of the common council. *** Said council shall also have power, except as herein otherwise specified, to provide for the punishment of all persons offending against this act, or any law relating to said city, or any ordinance of the common council enacted under this or any other act of the legislature, by imposing fines, penalties, forfeiture, and costs, and by imprisonment in the house of correction of said city. *** If only a fine, penalty, forfeiture, or costs be imposed, the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment until the payment thereof, for a term not exceeding six months. *** No penalty or forfeiture shall exceed one thousand dollars, no fine shall exceed five hundred dollars, and no imprisonment shall exceed the period of two years." Under the authority claimed to have been conferred by the foregoing provisions of the charter the common council passed an ordinance entitled "Disorderly House," section 1 of which provides that "no person shall keep within the limits of the city of Detroit any house of ill fame, house of assignation, or house for the resort of common prostitutes, *** or shall in any manner contribute to the support, carrying on of any such house or place." Section 4 provides that "any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars, and costs of prosecution; and the offender may be sentenced to be imprisoned in the house of correction until the payment thereof: provided, however, that the term of such imprisonment shall not exceed six months." Daniel Hanrahan, the respondent, pleaded guilty in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit to a complaint made against him under said ordinance of keeping and maintaining a certain house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness, and was sentenced by the recorder to pay a fine of five hundred dollars forthwith, and in default thereof be committed to the Detroit house of correction, and therein safely kept and employed according to the laws thereof until said fine, and the costs of commitment, one dollar, be paid; provided, however, that said term of imprisonment shall not exceed the term of six months. The fine was not paid, and he was committed, whereupon he sued out a writ of certiorari, and has brought the record here for review.

He assigns as error the want of power and authority of the recorder's court to impose the sentence; that the ordinance under which the proceedings were had is not, in effect, within the title of such ordinance; that the general statutes of the state covered the offense charged, and provided for its punishment; that the amendment of 1887 entirely superseded the ordinance; all of which went to the jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence. There is no merit in the objection relating to the title of the ordinance, and it needs no discussion. The constitutional provisions relating to laws passed by the legislature does not apply to ordinances enacted by a common council of a city. Under our constitution the power to enact laws is vested in the legislature. But the legislature is authorized by article 4, � 38, to confer upon organized townships, incorporated cities and villages, and upon the board of supervisors of the several counties, such powers of a local, legislative, and administrative character as they may deem proper. The object was to secure to local municipalities the power of self-government in matters of purely local concern. The nature and extent to which the legislature may confer this legislative power upon municipalities within their territorial limits is entirely within the discretion of the legislature. In exercising the power conferred of passing such laws of a local character as the wants of a particular community calls for, it must happen that very many of the lesser crimes and misdemeanors which are punished under general laws must come under the police regulations of such municipalities, because they are more liable to be perpetrated by the vicious class who congregate in cities than elsewhere; and the peace and good order of the municipality requires that they should be more promptly and summarily dealt with than they could be under the state law. I have no doubt that it was competent under the constitution for the legislature to confer upon the common council of the city of Detroit the authority contained in the sections of the charter above quoted. The ordinance appears to have been authorized by the charter. That the suppression of houses of ill fame in a city is a matter of great local concern there can be no question. That it can be dealt with more effectively by the city authorities than by the state, I think is plain. It would be contrary to the fact to assert that houses of ill fame in the midst of a city are not dangerous and revolting nuisances. They contaminate the morals of society, and render respectable neighborhoods obnoxious to decent people by their presence. Their suppression demands the closest attention of the guardians of the peace, and the most stringent police regulations to accomplish the object. These considerations, and others that might be suggested, show that the power conferred upon the common council was wise, and should be sustained, if there be no constitutional objection.

There is a great want of harmony in the decisions of the courts of last resort in the several states upon the power of municipalities to enact ordinances covering the same subject of the criminal laws of the state, and the effect of a prosecution under such ordinances as a bar to a prosecution under the state law. The subject is exhaustively treated, and the authorities cited by Mr. Dillon in his work upon Municipal Corporations, in the chapters devoted to "Ordinances" and "Municipal Courts," and also in Horr & Bemis on Municipal Ordinances. One of the strongest arguments to which my attention has been called against the exercise of this power by a municipality in case of a criminal nature is that the criminal laws of the state ought to be uniform in the elements which go to constitute the crime, the penalty or punishment imposed for the commission of the offense, and in forms and mode of procedure to prosecute the offender; that it is the province of the legislature to declare what shall constitute crime, and to prescribe punishment therefor; that an offense against the criminal laws of the state is the same offense in whatever locality it is committed, and should subject the offender to the same punishment. But the considerations are not fundamental. The legislature has power to declare that certain acts committed in a particular locality shall constitute a criminal offense, and shall be punished as a felony; while the same act, if done in another locality or section of the state, would not be a criminal offense at all. Such are the laws which prohibit fishing in certain waters, and many other laws which the legislature declares shall only be operative in certain designated portions of the state. There is no provision in our constitution, as there is in some of the states of the Union, that all laws shall be uniform and equal throughout the state, and consequently the legislature is not prohibited from legislating for particular localities.

Another argument has been urged with great force. It is asserted that the clause in the constitution which authorizes the legislature to confer upon organized townships, incorporated cities...