People v. Harden
| Decision Date | 11 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | D078191 |
| Citation | 291 Cal.Rptr.3d 323 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Yolanda HARDEN, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
David M. McKinney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This appeal illustrates the appropriate use of a prior appellate opinion's resolution of an issue of law in determining whether a petitioner has established a prima facie case under Penal Code section 1170.95.1
In 2001, a jury convicted Yolanda Harden of murdering 85-year-old Alfred P. during a residential burglary and robbery. This court affirmed her conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances in a partially published opinion, People v. Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 ( Harden I. ).) Among other things, Harden I rejected a claim of instructional error because there was no evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Harden was an aider and abettor. ( Id. at p. 864, fn. 11, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105.) Harden I concluded, "a rational jury could not reasonably infer that ... any person other than Harden[ ] was Alfred's actual killer."
Now some 20 years later, asserting she "did not kill anyone" but merely "crept in and stole" property, Harden filed a petition to vacate her conviction under section 1170.95. The trial court, which did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309 ( Lewis ), denied the petition on the grounds that her claim is "completely inconsistent" with the facts recited in Harden I.
We affirm, although on slightly different reasoning. In reviewing the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, a trial court is not permitted to engage in " ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ " ( Lewis, supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 972, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) The relevant inquiry at this stage is not whether factual findings recited in the prior appellate opinion are inconsistent with the petitioner's claims. Rather, the key question is whether legal determinations in the prior opinion refute those claims as a matter of law.
As we explain, Harden I conclusively established as law of the case that Harden's first degree murder conviction was based on a theory that she was the actual killer. Because, as the actual killer, she would still be convicted of first degree murder even under recent amendments to the murder statutes that narrow liability for the crime, the trial court correctly denied her 1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause.
In October 2000, Alfred and Marion P., then in their 80's, lived in a retirement community. ( Harden I, supra , 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 851, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105.) Harden tricked her way inside on the pretext of needing to use their telephone to call a taxi. Once inside and while Marion was asleep, she stole jewelry and credit cards. After Harden left, Marion awakened to find Alfred dead in the living room. He had been strangled. ( Id. at pp. 851– 852, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105.)
Marion's stolen credit card was used that day to place telephone calls to Harden's family members and boyfriend. ( Harden I, supra , 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 852–853, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105.) Later the same day, Harden pawned Marion's jewelry. ( Id. at p. 853, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105.)
At trial, the court instructed the jury on deliberate and premeditated murder ( CALJIC No. 8.20 ) as well as felony murder ( CALJIC No. 8.21 ). The jury was also asked to determine whether the killing occurred during "special circumstances"—namely, burglary and/or robbery.2
The jury convicted Harden of first degree murder with special circumstances. It also found that she personally inflicted great bodily injury on Alfred.3 The court sentenced Harden to life in prison without the possibility of parole, to be served consecutively to an aggregate term of six years four months for other convictions. ( Harden I, supra , 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 855, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105.)
In February 2019, Harden filed a petition to vacate her convictions and for resentencing under section 1170.95.4 The trial court denied the petition a month later without issuing an order to show cause. Harden did not timely appeal that ruling.
In August 2019, Harden filed another section 1170.95 petition. Her accompanying declaration states she "did not kill anyone in the commission of any felony." She claimed to have entered Alfred and Marion's home through an open door, saw "what looked like a man sleeping on the couch," and "crept in and stole various items of property." She asked the court to appoint counsel.
The People filed an "initial response," primarily asserting that having been convicted of first degree murder with "found-true" special circumstances, Harden could not establish a prima facie case. In the reply, defense counsel maintained that Harden's declaration established a prima facie case, despite being contradicted by facts recited in Harden I.
The court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause because Harden's declaration was "completely inconsistent" with trial testimony showing "[Harden] as the killer, not anyone else."
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). It provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 477 P.3d 539.) The Legislature also amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that "[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." ( § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Under section 1170.95, a person convicted of felony murder or murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine may petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if she could not have been convicted of murder because of these statutory changes. (See Lewis, supra , 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) A section 1170.95 petition must show that: ( § 1170.95, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
If the section 1170.95 petition contains all the required information, including a declaration by the petitioner that she was convicted of murder and is eligible for relief, section 1170.95, subdivision (c) requires the court to appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested; to direct the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit the petitioner to file a reply; and to determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that she is entitled to relief. ( Lewis, supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 961, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) If the petitioner has made such a showing, the trial court "shall issue an order to show cause" and conduct an evidentiary hearing. ( § 1170.95, subds. (c) & (d).)
The prima facie inquiry under section 1170.95 is "limited." ( Lewis, supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 971, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) The court " ‘ ’ " ( Ibid. ) "In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ " ( Ibid. ) ( People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 811–812, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 893.)
Nevertheless, the court may appropriately deny a petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. " ‘[I]f the record, including the court's own documents, "contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition," then "the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner," ’ " thereby deeming him or her ineligible. ( Lewis, supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 971, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 491 P.3d 309.) For example, if the record shows that the jury was not instructed on either the natural and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. ( People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677, 271 Cal.Rptr.3d 591, review granted Feb. 24, 2021, S266336 and dism. Dec. 1, 2021.) A finding of ineligibility at the prima facie stage may also be based on a legal holding...
To continue reading
Request your trial