People v. Harflinger

• Decision Date: 18 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76--101,76--101
• Citation: 6 Ill.Dec. 928,363 N.E.2d 875,49 Ill.App.3d 31
• Parties: , 6 Ill.Dec. 928 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfred Earl HARFLINGER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 875

363 N.E.2d 875

49 Ill.App.3d 31, 6 Ill.Dec. 928

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfred Earl HARFLINGER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76--101.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

May 18, 1977.

Michael J. Rosborough, Deputy State Appellate Defender, A. Michael Kopec, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Mount Vernon, for defendant-appellant.

James E. Dull, State's Atty., Mount Vernon, Bruce D. Irish, Principal Atty., Keith P. Vanden Dooren, Staff Atty., Ill. State's Attys. Assn., Prosecutors' Appellate Service, Mount Vernon, of counsel on supplemental brief for plaintiff-appellee; Bruce D. Irish, Special State's Atty., Jefferson County, James R. Sanders, Ill. State's Attys. Assn., Statewide Appellate Assistance Service, Mount Vernon, of counsel on original brief.

GEORGE J. MORAN, Justice:

Defendant Alfred Harflinger appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Jefferson County entered after a jury found him guilty of murder, attempt murder, armed robbery and burglary. His sole contention in this appeal is that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

On the night of October 10, 1971, the home of Mr. and Mrs. William Edmison was burglarized and Mr. Edmison was shot and wounded. Marvin Allen, a neighbor, was shot and killed when he went into his back yard to investigate a noise. The police found a trail of stolen articles leading from the Edmison residence past the Allen residence. Mr. Edmison identified two people from a photo line-up as the intruders, but they were later cleared.

On November 9, 1971 Richard Christensen made a statement of F.B.I. agents which gave the details of the incident of October 10 and the names of the people involved. On March 22, 1973 defendant's former wife gave a statement to the St Louis police which included details of defendant's confession to her on October 11, 1971, the day after the incident.

Defendant was charged by complaint filed in the circuit court of Jefferson County on March 27, 1972 with the offenses of murder, attempt murder, armed robbery and burglary and warrants were issued for his arrest. Defendant was indicted on all four offenses on May 19, 1972. No further action was taken until March 7, 1975, when a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was issued, directing that the defendant be produced from the Federal Corrections Institution in Texas. Another such writ was issued on April 3, 1975. On April 11, 1975 defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the charges for want of prosecution.

Warrants of arrest were re-issued on June 20, 1975. On the same day defendant was paroled by federal authorities to a State of Illinois detainer. On July 7, 1975 defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his arrest under the Illinois warrants. After a hearing was held on July 21, 1975, an order was issued denying the defendant's petition and remanding him for delivery to the State of Illinois. Subsequently, a jury trial was had and defendant was found guilty of all charges on November 25, 1975.

The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is among those fundamental constitutional rights made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).) In determining whether the speedy trial right has been violated the Supreme Court has outlined a balancing test in which four factors are to be assessed: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. (Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).) It must be kept in mind that

'* * * none of the four factors * * * (is) either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.' 407 U.S. 514, 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2193.

The length of the delay is a triggering mechanism to the operation of the test. Defendant was indicted on May 19, 1972 and the State of Illinois first issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on March 7, 1975. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, refused to waive extradition and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the Illinois warrants for his arrest. Thus the delays after March, 1975 were attributable to the defendants. However, excluding the period after March, 1975, the delay was approximately 34 months--nearly three years. This delay is of sufficient length to trigger an inquiry into the other facts that go into the balancing test.

The State assigned two reasons for the delay in bringing the defendant to trial. It is pointed out that the defendant was in federal custody from the time the charges were filed in March, 1972 until June, 1975, after extradition proceedings were initiated. During the first year of defendant's federal incarceration he was a witness in federal proceedings and was twice granted immunity for his testimony. The State contends that it is unlikely that federal authorities would have allowed defendant to be turned over to Illinois for prosecution because they would have wanted defendant to be available to testify whenever necessary. The defendant in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969), was also in a federal penitentiary and indicted on state charges. The United States Supreme Court there held that Texas had a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring defendant to trial on the state charges. The Supreme Court has reiterated this affirmative duty of the state to bring a defendant to trial. (Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970); Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973).) The State in the present case made no such effort to secure defendant's presence in Illinois for trial. Thus, the fact that defendant was in federal custody was not a justifiable excuse for the delay.

The State's second reason for the delay involves William Edmison, one of the victims of the defendant's crimes. Edmison was indicted May 19, 1972, the same day defendant was indicted, for obstructing justice. This charge apparently stemmed from Edmison's refusal to identify the defendant as one of those who had entered his home on the night of October 10, 1971. Edmison had identified two people from a photo lineup as the perpetrators of the crime, but they were later cleared. The State claims that Edmison would probably have refused to testify against the defendant because he...