People v. Haris, Docket Nos. 149872

• Decision Date: 22 June 2016
• Docket Number: 149873,150042.,Calendar No. 2.,Docket Nos. 149872
• Citation: 499 Mich. 332,885 N.W.2d 832
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HARRIS. People v. Little. People v. Hughes.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

499 Mich. 332

885 N.W.2d 832

PEOPLE

v.HARRIS.

People

v.Little.

People

v.Hughes.

Docket Nos. 149872

149873

150042.

Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 4, 2015.

Decided June 22, 2016.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and David A. McCreedy, Lead Appellate Attorney, for the people.

Steven Fishman and Pamella Szydlak for Sean Harris and William Little.

Goldpaugh & Associates, PC, Detroit (by John J. Goldpaugh ), for Nevin Hughes.

Douglas M. Gutscher and Frank A. Guido, Redford, for the Police Officers Association of Michigan.

Thomas R. Zulch, Brendan J. Canfield, and Megan Boelstler, Royal Oak, for the Police Officers Labor Council.

ZAHRA

, J.

In these three consolidated cases, we address the difficult question of whether defendants' false statements made while serving as law enforcement officers during an internal affairs investigation can be used against them in criminal proceedings. We conclude that under the disclosures by law enforcement officers act (DLEOA), MCL 15.391 et seq.

, false or inaccurate information cannot be used against a law enforcement officer in subsequent criminal proceedings. To hold otherwise would defeat the Legislature's stated intent to preclude the use of “any information,” MCL 15.393, a law enforcement officer is compelled to provide “under threat of ... any ... employment sanction,”¹ MCL 15.391(a). And while we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted in Garrity v. New Jersey² does not compel this result, states may provide protections greater than those secured under the United States Constitution, and that is exactly what the Michigan Legislature did when it enacted the DLEOA in 2006. Simply stated, the DLEOA bars the use in a subsequent criminal proceeding of all information provided by a law enforcement officer under threat of any employment sanction. The act does not distinguish between true and false statements. Although the Legislature is free to amend the DLEOA to change the policy enacted, we are not. No matter how we view the policy, we must follow the language chosen by the Legislature. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the orders of dismissal entered in the district court.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This case arises out of a disturbing encounter between Dajuan Hodges–Lamar and defendants, who at the time were police officers for the city of Detroit. While on duty in November 2009, defendant Hughes approached Hodges–Lamar while he was seated in a car at a gas station. Hughes initially appeared to question Hodges–Lamar, but quickly proceeded to assault him while defendants Harris and Little, who were also on duty, stood by and did nothing to stop the assault. Hodges–Lamar filed a complaint with the Detroit Police Department, which spurred an internal investigation by the Detroit Police Department's Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI). All three defendants were called to testify at a Garrity hearing.

The OCI presented defendants with an advice-of-rights form drafted by the Detroit Police Department. In relevant part, the form broadly stated:

4. If I refuse ... to answer questions ... I will be subject to departmental charges which could result in my dismissal from the police department.

5. If I do answer ... neither my statements or any information or evidence which is gained by reason of such statements can be used against my [sic] in any subsequent criminal proceeding.

The language of this form, like the language of DLEOA, did not expressly require truthful answers or truthful statements.³ Defendants also received a reservation-of-rights form drafted by the Detroit Police Department, which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

It is my belief ... that this Statement and the Preliminary Complaint Report will not and cannot be used against me in any subsequent proceedings other than disciplinary proceedings within the confines of the Department itself. For any and all other purposes, I hereby reserve my Constitutional rights to remain silent under the FIFTH and FOURTEENTH AMMENDMENTS [sic] to the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, and Article I, Section 17 of the MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION

.

All three defendants made false statements at the Garrity hearing. Defendants Harris and Little denied that Hughes had any physical contact with Hodges–Lamar. Hughes admitted that he removed Hodges–Lamar from Hodges–Lamar's car during questioning, but Hughes maintained that he did not use any unnecessary force against Hodges–Lamar. A video recording of the incident surfaced after defendants had made their statements. The video recording was provided to the OCI.⁴

The video recording is wholly at odds with the statements provided by defendants. The prosecutor charged Hughes with common-law felony misconduct in office, MCL 750.505

, misdemeanor assault and battery, MCL 750.81, and obstruction of justice, also under MCL 750.505. Defendants Harris and Little were each charged with one count of common-law obstruction of justice, MCL 750.505. The obstruction-of-justice charges were based on allegations that the officers lied during the initial investigation.

Defendants brought motions in district court to dismiss the obstruction-of-justice charges.⁵ The district court concluded that defendants' statements were protected by the DLEOA, even if the information provided was false or misleading. The court determined that without defendants' statements the obstruction-of-justice charges could not be sustained and dismissed those charges. The prosecution appealed in the circuit court, which concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the obstruction-of-justice charges.

The prosecution filed applications for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals with regard to all three defendants. In a published opinion, a divided panel reversed the lower courts and reinstated the obstruction-of-justice charges.⁶ The majority recognized that its holding conflicted with People v. Allen,⁷ which held that “the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' benefits of freedom from [a] coerced waiver of the right to remain silent ... must be respected,” even in a subsequent perjury prosecution. After noting that Allen was not binding precedent under MCR 7.215(J)(1)

, the majority concluded that “in light of the post-Garrity caselaw permitting a witness's statements to be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal prosecution for a collateral offense such as perjury or obstruction of justice, we expressly disavow Allen 's reasoning.”⁸ The majority further concluded that “[t]he district court ... abused its discretion by excluding defendants' false statements under MCL 15.393

....”⁹ The majority reasoned that “the statute internally limits the phrase ‘involuntary statement’ to include true statements only, and that false statements and lies therefore fall outside the scope of the statute's protection.”¹⁰

Judge WILDER dissented from the majority's determination that false statements fall outside the DLEOA's scope of protection. Relying on the plain meaning of the words of the act, Judge WILDER reasoned that the protection granted law enforcement officers under the DLEOA applies to all information garnered from an officer during a compulsory internal police investigation.

Defendants filed separate applications for leave to appeal in this Court, each arguing that the Court of Appeals majority erred by concluding that the DLEOA's scope of protection did not encompass defendants' false statements. On February 4, 2015, we granted the applications, directing the parties to brief “whether the Disclosures by Law Enforcement Officers Act, MCL 15.391, et seq.

, precludes the use of false statements by a law enforcement officer in a prosecution for obstruction of justice[.]”¹¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo constitutional issues and matters of statutory interpretation.¹²

III. ANALYSIS

We must determine whether Michigan law provides these defendants with more protections than those provided under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.¹³ While we touch on the constitutional right against self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment and the corresponding provision of the Michigan Constitution, this case does not turn on those constitutional provisions. Defendants do not maintain the protection they seek comes from Garrity or its progeny under federal or Michigan caselaw.¹⁴

Rather, defendants argue that the Legislature, in enacting the DLEOA, chose to afford law enforcement officers greater protection than that available under the Fifth Amendment and that statutory protection requires dismissal of the obstruction-of-justice charges brought against them. This protection, defendants argue, is found in the plain language of the DLEOA, specifically MCL 15.393

, which provides:

An involuntary statement made by a law enforcement officer, and any information derived from that involuntary statement, shall not be used against the law enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding.

The DLEOA defines the term “involuntary statement” as follows:

“Involuntary statement” means information provided by a law enforcement officer, if compelled under threat of dismissal from employment or any other employment sanction, by the law enforcement agency that employs the law enforcement officer.^{[15 ]}

The prosecution argues this language does not preclude the use in later criminal proceedings of false or misleading information obtained through a Garrity hearing. The prosecution characterizes the language as nothing more than a codification of the Garrity rule as it has been developed through federal caselaw. Thus, the prosecution argues that the DLEOA only provides the protection afforded under the Fifth Amendment. Because the Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment...