People v. Wiley
Decision Date | 04 May 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 336898, No. 338870,336898 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher WILEY, Defendant-Appellant. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Lawrence Rucker, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jon P. Wojtala, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Peter Jon Van Hoek ) and Deborah LaBelle for Christopher Wiley.
Robert Tomak and Deborah LaBelle for William L. Rucker.
Amicus Curiae: Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Laura Moody, Chief Legal Counsel, and B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, for the Attorney General.
Before: Boonstra, P.J., and Beckering and Ronayne Krause, JJ.
These appeals arise in the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court's proclamation that mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes are unconstitutional with respect to juvenile offenders and the Michigan Legislature's enactment of MCL 769.25a in an attempt to retroactively rectify the problem. In Docket No. 336898, defendant Christopher Wiley appeals by right the trial court's order resentencing him under MCL 769.25a to 25 to 60 years' imprisonment for his 1995 conviction of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316. In Docket No. 338870, defendant William Lawrence Rucker appeals by right the trial court's order resentencing him under MCL 769.25a to 30 to 60 years' imprisonment for his 1993 conviction of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316.1 Both defendants allege on appeal that MCL 769.25a(6) unconstitutionally deprives them of having earned disciplinary credits applied to their term-of-years sentences. These appeals were consolidated by order of this Court.2
We affirm the sentences defendants received at the time of their resentencings, but we agree with their contention that MCL 769.25a(6) is unconstitutional. Put simply, we agree with the analysis of our federal colleague Judge Mark A. Goldsmith in Hill v. Snyder , 308 F.Supp.3d 893 (E.D. Mich., 2018), in which he concluded that MCL 769.25a(6) runs afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and Michigan Constitutions.
As alluded to above, these appeals arise following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), and our Legislature's concomitant enactment of MCL 769.25a.
The Miller Court held, in relevant part:
[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory-sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. [ Miller , 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455.]
Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized that the ruling in Miller had resulted in some confusion and disagreement among various state courts about whether Miller applied retroactively. Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 725. In determining that Miller was to be afforded retroactive application, the Court subsequently explained:
After Miller but before Montgomery , our Legislature enacted MCL 769.25, which set forth the procedure for resentencing criminal defendants who fit Miller 's criteria, provided either that their case was still pending in the trial court or that the applicable time periods for appellate review had not elapsed. In other words, MCL 769.25 applied only to cases that were not yet final; MCL 769.25 did not retroactively apply Miller to cases that were final. See 2014 PA 22, effective March 4, 2014.
However, in anticipation of the possibility that Miller might be determined to apply retroactively, our Legislature simultaneously enacted MCL 769.25a, which set forth the procedure for resentencing defendants who fit Miller 's criteria even if their cases were final. See 2014 PA 22, effective March 4, 2014. In other words, if Miller were determined to apply retroactively, MCL 769.25a would apply it retroactively to cases that were final. MCL 769.25a states:
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