People v. Harris

• Decision Date: 30 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–10–0678.,1–10–0678.
• Citation: 2012 IL App (1st) 100678,364 Ill.Dec. 902,977 N.E.2d 811
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Annette HARRIS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 100678
977 N.E.2d 811
364 Ill.Dec. 902

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Annette HARRIS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–10–0678.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Fourth Division.

Aug. 30, 2012.

[977 N.E.2d 813]

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Benjamin Overby, State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Atty., Alan J. Spellberg and Sarah L. Simpson, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, IL, for the People.

OPINION
Presiding Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[364 Ill.Dec. 904]¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Annette Harris was found guilty of felony murder predicated on armed robbery and was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. Defendant raises three contentions on appeal. First, defendant contends police failed to videotape her initial custodial interrogation in violation of section 103–2.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/103–2.1 (West 2008)), rendering her inculpatory statements presumptively inadmissible. She argues the court therefore erred in denying her motion to suppress the statements. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements made later during her incarceration because although she had invoked her right to counsel, the custodial interrogation did not cease. Defendant finally argues the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the predicate felony of armed robbery and thus her murder conviction cannot stand. Defendant also requests that we correct the mittimus to reflect her felony murder conviction rather than intentional first-degree murder.

¶ 2 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant, age 39, was arrested, then charged with the first-degree murder and armed robbery of Errland “Sweets” Willams, age 69. In early April 2007, police discovered the victim, beaten and bloody, with a clothing-iron cord wrapped around his neck, in the basement of his two-flat apartment at 7446 South Champlain Avenue, Chicago. Williams, who was dependent upon social security, was known to be generous with this meager income, consorted with prostitutes and previously had been the victim of several robberies of this income. The State's case rested almost entirely on defendant's inculpatory statements made to detectives over the course of several weeks. Detectives questioned defendant at a police facility from April 20–21, 2007. Defendant first indicated involvement in the crime on April 21. From April 30 to May 2, police again questioned defendant. On May 1 and 2, defendant fully inculpated herself as Williams' murderer.

¶ 4 Prior to trial, defendant filed a two-part motion to suppress that evidence. Defendant first alleged that statements made during her initial April 20–21 detention were not videotaped, in violation of section 103–2.1 of the Code. She alleged that, as a result, any inculpatory statements made then and thereafter should be suppressed. As defendant noted, section 103–2.1 provides that a statement of an [364 Ill.Dec. 905]

[977 N.E.2d 814]

accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention is presumed inadmissible as substantive evidence in a murder prosecution unless it is electronically recorded; all statements made thereafter are also presumed inadmissible. 725 ILCS 5/103–2.1 (West 2008). Defendant added that the State could not fulfill its burden of proving the statements voluntary and reliable. In part two of defendant's motion to suppress, she alleged that she had unambiguously invoked her constitutional right to counsel during her later custodial interrogation, but this request was not honored and the interrogation did not cease. This, she argued, violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its plentiful progeny.

¶ 5 A. Motion to Suppress Part I: Statement Not Videotaped

¶ 6 At the motion to suppress, defendant called Detective Brian Forberg to establish only the requisite custody under section 103–2.1. Detective Forberg testified that he proceeded to the crime scene at 7446 South Champlain on April 3, 2007, to investigate Williams' death. Once there, he learned that a witness named Antoinette Briggs had found Williams dead and that both Briggs and several other witnesses had seen Williams with an unknown prostitute in the days before his death.

¶ 7 Following this initial investigation, Detective Forberg learned that Briggs was actually the defendant, Annette Harris, and, therefore, that it was defendant who had discovered Williams' body. Various individuals from the neighborhood identified defendant as Williams' companion and stated she had “a reputation for beating” Williams. A police department data report showed defendant as the named perpetrator of an offense against Williams.

¶ 8 Detective Forberg began a 10–day search for defendant once he discovered defendant was no longer at her last known address. On April 20, 2007, Detective Forberg found defendant at her friend Sam Coffey's residence. Driving in an unmarked squad car, Detective Forberg transported defendant to Area 2 detective division headquarters for questioning regarding Williams' death. Further details regarding the time and content of these interviews were revealed at trial and will be more fully set forth later in this opinion.

¶ 9 For the purposes of the pretrial hearing on custody, Detective Forberg testified that he did not believe defendant was handcuffed and further did not know if the car doors were locked. Upon arrival at Area 2, defendant was taken to an interview room, where the door was “probably” locked. Detective Forberg did not convey that defendant could decline to answer questions or was free to leave. He also did not offer at any time to return her to her friend's residence. Defendant admitted she presented police with a false name because there was a warrant for her arrest for a probation violation. To Detective Forberg, this meant that he could not release defendant. When Detective Forberg confronted defendant regarding her reported prior offense against Williams, she claimed it was a misunderstanding, but agreed to take a polygraph test.

¶ 10 In the same unmarked police vehicle, Detective Forberg transported defendant to a polygraph facility located at 1819 Pershing Road. Again, he did not believe she was handcuffed. The polygraph examiner presented defendant with a consent form containing Miranda warnings, and defendant signed it. Next to each warning appears the letter, “y.” The examiner conducted the polygraph test without Detective Forberg present and asked defendant questions about Williams' death. The test [364 Ill.Dec. 906]

[977 N.E.2d 815]

revealed “some deception” relating to defendant's knowledge of the identity of Williams' killer. According to Detective Forberg, the examiner told him that defendant then implicated her boyfriend Kevin O'Neil as the person who killed Williams. Following the polygraph, Detective Forberg relayed its results to defendant and questioned her about the events leading up to her discovery of Williams' body. Defendant then implicated herself, O'Neil, and the aforementioned unknown prostitute, whom she identified as Adreana (also Adrina), and defendant stated she was to serve as the “lookout.” At this point, Detective Forberg terminated the interview.

¶ 11 Detective Forberg testified that he had not recorded any of these interviews and had not advised defendant of her Miranda rights because she was merely a witness in the homicide investigation and not a suspect until she implicated herself.

¶ 12 Following the close of this evidence at the motion to suppress, defense counsel argued that section 103–2.1 of the Code rendered any inculpatory statements made during the April 20–21 interview inadmissible and therefore any statements made thereafter inadmissible, as well. Counsel argued defendant was in custody when she was transported to Area 2 for questioning and placed in a locked room with police aware of her outstanding warrant. He argued a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.

¶ 13 At this point, the trial judge noted that while there was no dispute defendant was in custody for her pending probation violation, he was uncertain that one could say she was in custody for Williams' murder. The State conceded defendant was in custody on the warrant, but argued defendant was not in custody for the murder because she was a mere witness, not a suspect, rendering the statute inapplicable in its view.

¶ 14 Defense counsel responded the evidence suggested otherwise since the police were only interested in what defendant had to say about the murder, not her probation violation, but most stridently maintained that whether defendant made the statement while in custody for murder or for the probation violation was of no moment because the statute prohibited admission of any statement “made as a result of a custodial interrogation” likely to elicit incriminating evidence. Counsel further argued the officer's subjective view of the accused's status was immaterial for determining custody.

¶ 15 The court noted that polygraph examinations were “part of normal police investigations” and, as in this case, “[n]ot every police facility has all of the equipment lined up.” The court then stated it was “at a loss to find [a] remedy.” The court noted that “[t]here may have been some indications that it should have been videotaped,” “[b]ut to suppress it outright for what I consider to be a non willful act is a remedy that's never been done before.” The court stated it was not prepared to do so. The court noted that the defense was free to argue at trial about the absence of a videotaped statement in order to attack the officer's credibility.

¶ 16 B. Motion to Suppress Part II: Invocation of Right to Counsel

¶ 17 From April 30 to May 2, 2007, defendant was interrogated by police....