People v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 09 November 1971
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 191 N.W.2d 371,386 Mich. 269
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven C. HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 371

191 N.W.2d 371

386 Mich. 269

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven C. HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 9, 1971.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Dept., Robert A. Reuther, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Arthur J. Tarnow, State Appellate Defender, Larry R. Farmer, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench, except BLACK, J.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

The principal issue before this Court in this case is whether the defendant Harrison was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The defendant was arraigned in Detroit Recorder's Court on May 24, 1965, for breaking and entering with an intent to commit larceny. After being bound over, a plea of not guilty was entered for him on July 22, 1965, and a trial date of August 31, 1965, was set. The defendant was free on bond until August 24, 1965, when he was arrested for a separate, unrelated charge of breaking and entering.

On August 31, 1965, the defendant's trial on the first charge of breaking and entering, the one involved in this appeal, was adjourned until October 13, 1965, due to the fact that 'No Court available for jury.' On October 13, 1965, the defendant's attorney was permitted to withdraw, and a new trial date of October 21, 1965, was set. The trial date was again adjourned on October 21, 1965, until December 7, 1965. The reason given for this adjournment was 'Try other pending case first.' On December 7, 1965, the case was adjourned until January 24, 1966, with no reason given.

Meanwhile, the defendant was convicted of the second charge of breaking and entering on December 16, 1965, and sentenced to a term of 5 to 10 years imprisonment. Subsequently the trial on the first charge was again adjourned on January 24, 1966, with the reason given as 'def. sentenced in another case--adj. till appeal time expires.' The defendant filed a claim of appeal from his other conviction on March 9, 1966, and on April 15, 1966, the trial of the first charge was adjourned until June 2, 1966, with no reason given for the adjournment. Trial on the first charge finally commenced on June 2, 1966, the defendant was convicted as charged, and a sentence of not less than 9, nor more than 10 years imprisonment was imposed.

The defendant's application for leave to file delayed appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals. This Court granted the defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal on November 24, 1970.

The United States and Michigan Constitutions both require that a criminal defendant be given a speedy trial:

'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, * * *' United States Constitution, Amendment VI.

'Sec. 20. In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial * * *' Michigan Constitution, Article I, Sec. 20.

Michigan statutory provisions require defendants to be given a speedy trial, and allow continuances only when strict necessity is shown on the record:

'768.1 Speedy trial; right of parties, duty of public officers Sec. 1. The people of this state and persons charged with crime are entitled to and shall have a speedy trial and determination of all prosecutions and it is hereby made the duty of all public officers having duties to perform in any criminal case, to bring such case to a final determination without delay except as may be necessary to secure to the accused a fair and impartial trial.

'768.2 Criminal cases; precedence, adjournment, continuance Sec. 2. The trial of criminal cases shall take precedence over all other cases; but this provision shall not be interpreted to mean that trials of civil cases shall not be interspersed between trials of criminal cases triable before a jury at any term of court. No adjournments, continuances or delays of criminal causes shall be granted by any court except for good cause shown in the manner provided by law for adjournments, continuances and delays in the trial of civil causes in courts of record: Provided, That no court shall adjourn, continue or delay the trial of any criminal cause by the consent of the prosecution and accused unless in his discretion it shall clearly appear by a sufficient showing to said court to be entered upon the record, that the reasons for such consent are founded upon strict necessity and that the trial of said cause cannot be then had without a manifest injustice being done.' M.C.L.A. §§ 768.1--768.2 (M.S.A. §§ 28.1024--28.1025). (Emphasis supplied.)

GCR 1963, 503.1 also states the grounds for granting a continuance:

'Rule 503 Continuances.

1. Policy. It is the policy of this rule to encourage the diligent preparation and trial of cases. Continuance for any cause shall not be granted unless a showing is made and the court finds that the grounds for continuance do not arise out of the fault or negligence of the moving party and the court finds that substantial justice more nearly will be obtained.' GCR 1963, 503.1.

The right to a speedy trial means right to trial within a reasonable time. As we stated in Hicks v. Judge of Recorder's Court of Detroit, 236 Mich. 689, 690, 211 N.W. 35:

'In view of this constitutional provision, it becomes necessary to inquire what a speedy trial means. We apprehend it means such reasonable time under all the attendant circumstances as will give the people an opportunity to present its case in court. 16 C.J. 439. A speedy trial does not mean that the respondent is entitled to have his trial commence immediately after being bound over to the trial court. What would be a reasonable time in one case would be perhaps unreasonable in another.' 236 Mich. 689, 690, 211 N.W. 35.

In the instant case, 12 months and 9 days elapsed between the date of the defendant's arraignment and the date that his trial commenced. During that period, his trial date was adjourned on a total of six separate occasions. No reason whatsoever was given for two of those adjournments.

As noted above, M.C.L.A. § 768.2 requires that continuances in criminal cases be granted only 'for good cause shown.' In appeals arising from future trials, this Court will view with great concern adjournments which are not supported by good cause shown on the record.

The adjournment of the case on January 24, 1966, is of the greatest concern to this Court. The reason given for that adjournment was 'def. sentenced in another case--adj. till appeal time expires.'

Pursuant thereto the defendant in this case was advised by his attorney in a letter that the remaining charge against him of breaking and entering would be dismissed if the defendant did not file an appeal from his other conviction. ¹ After the defendant filed such an appeal, a trial date was set for him on the other charge.

An adjournment of one case with notice it would be dismissed if a defendant did not appeal a second case is not good cause for continuance. Furthermore it is constitutionally obnoxious. Such action serves to chill the exercise of a defendant's constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction and will not be tolerated. ²

The People argue that the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial by failing to demand trial or to move to have the charge against him dismissed. This Court has always preserved its right to consider serious errors even in the absence of objection by the party who appeals. Then Justice, now Chief Justice, Thomas M. Kavanagh explained this exercise of supervisory control in People v. Dorrikas, 354 Mich. 303, 316, 92 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1958):

'Ordinarily where no timely objection was made to the introduction of such testimony and no request to charge was made, this Court would not examine the points relied upon for reversal, and except under unusual circumstances we have no disposition to relax this rule. Nevertheless, as in a number of previous cases, this Court, in the exercise of supervisory control over all litigation, has often asserted the right to consider manifest and serious errors although objection was not made by the party who appeals. The inherent power of this Court to prevent fundamental injustice is not limited by what ...