People v. Hartman

• Decision Date: 18 January 1951
• Docket Number: No. 31629,31629
• Citation: 96 N.E.2d 449,408 Ill. 133
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HARTMAN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 449

96 N.E.2d 449

408 Ill. 133

PEOPLE v. HARTMAN.

No. 31629.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 18, 1951.

Thomas Earl Hartman, pro se.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. and George P. Coutrakon, State's Atty., of Springfield (Lawrence Swinyer, of Springfield, and Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the people.

GUNN, Justice.

Plaintiff in error, Thomas Earl Hartman, filed in the circuit court of Sangamon County what purports to be a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction entered against him August 27, 1946, and for the court to review and set aside said judgment. The circuit court denied this motion, and defendant prosecutes a writ of error to this court. While the motion does not refer to the Post-Conviction Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 38, par. 826, et seq.,) reference is made thereto in the brief as the basis of the right of plaintiff in error to have said judgment of conviction set aside. Since the plaintiff in error filed no common-law record or other record we conclude that he bases his claim to release upon the provisions of said statute, approved August 4, 1949, relating to violation of the defendant's consitutional rights.

The motion, herein designated as a petition, sets forth the following facts: That he was arrested and bound over to the grand jury on April 23, 1946; that he was indicted by the grand jury on July 15, 1946; that on July 19, 1946, he entered a plea of not guilty, and that on August 27, 1946, he changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, and was thereupon sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than five nor more than nine years. It will be noted that his petition does not state the crime with which he is charged, nor does he include all of the facts in connection therewith. The record shows he was indicted for the crime of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon.

In addition to the facts disclosed in petitioner's petition the additional record filed by the Attorney General discloses that on August 16, 1946, the defendant prayed for a continuance, and was granted a continuance until August 27, 1946, on which day he pleaded guilty. The ground upon which he claims he is entitled to a discharge was that there was a violation of his consitutional rights because the State's Attorney failed to bring the petitioner to trial within four months from the date of his commitment. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1949, chap. 38, par. 748.

The record in the case shows that he was indicted on July 15, 1946. He prayed for a continuance on August 16, 1946, which was granted by the court, until the date he pleaded guilty. It thus appears from the record that within the fours months' period within which the law requires a prisoner charged with a crime to be tried, the petitioner prolonged his own imprisonment beyond the four months by procuring a continuance of said trial until the date he pleaded guilty.

The law is well settled in this State that the right of the defendant to be tried within four months of his commitment is waived by the defendant when he seeks and obtains a continuance of his cause to a period beyond the four months' period within which he would otherwise be required to be tried. People v. Stilliman, 391 Ill. 227, 62 N.E.2d 698; People v. Meisenhelter, 381 Ill. 378, 45 N.E.2d 678; People v. Maniatis, 297 Ill. 72, 130 N.E. 323. We have also repeatedly held that where the failure to try the defendant within the time prescribed by the statute is occasioned by the defendant himself, the statute does not apply. People v. Stillman, 391 Ill. 227, 62 N.E.2d 698; People v. Hotz, 261 Ill. 239, 103 N.E. 1007; Healy v. People, 177 Ill. 306, 52 N.E. 426.

It is to be observed that the statute was enacted to give effect to section 9 of the Bill of Rights, securing to an accused in a criminal case a speedy trial. The constitution does not fix the time, and the statute is only intended to implement the provisions of the constitution, but a violation of the statute or of the procedure under the statute does not in itself create a constitutional question. People v. Maniatis, 297 Ill. 72, 130 N.E. 323. The statute under which he seeks relief provides that his petition must show that the proceedings which resulted in his conviction operated as a denial of a substantial right under the constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois.

It is clear that the petition of plaintiff in error does not set forth a denial of any rights under the constitution of the United States, nor does it show any denial of any constitutional right under the constitution of the State of Illinois. It is true that the Bill of Rights in the Illinois constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy trial. (Art. II, sec. 9, S.H.A.) And this constitutional provision has been implemented to a certain extent by the provisions of the statute, which require a person not admitted to bail to be tried within four months of the date of such commitment. The provisions of ...