People v. Hassil

• Decision Date: 04 December 1930
• Docket Number: No. 20136.,20136.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HASSIL.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

341 Ill. 286

173 N.E. 355

PEOPLE

v.HASSIL.

No. 20136.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 25, 1930.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1930.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; T. F. Ehler, Judge.

Sophie Hassil was convicted of unlawfully and willfully, without lawful consideration, receiving part of earnings of female person from practice of her prostitution, and she brings error.

Affirmed.

Louis Greenberg and Abel B. Kretske, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., and John A. Swanson, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson and John Holman, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

EDMUNDS, C.

Sophie Hassil, plaintiff in error, was tried and convicted in the municipal court of Chicago under an amended information in which it was alleged that on or about December 24, 1928, she unlawfully and willfully did knowingly, without lawful consideration, take, accept, and receive the sum of $25 from Hélen Karczewska, a female person, which $25 was a part of the earnings of Helen Karczewska from the practice by her of prostitution. The court overruled a motion in arrest of judgment and sentenced plaintiff in error to six months in the house of correction and to pay a fine of $300 and costs. The judgment provided that in default of payment of the fine and costs, plaintiff in error after the expiration of the term of imprisonment should stand committed in the house of correction until the fine and costs should have been worked out at the rate of $1.50 per day or until the fine and costs were paid or she discharged according to law. A writ of error to review the record has been sued out of this court under the contention that the Pandering Act, under which conviction was had, is unconstitutional.

Convictions under the Pandering Act (Cahill's Rev. St. 1929, c. 38, pars. 475-478) have been upheld by this court in number of cases, in some of which its constitutionality has been subjected to attack. People v. Braun, 246 Ill. 428, 92 N. E. 917,20 Ann. Cas. 448;People v. Jacobson, 247 Ill. 394, 93 N. E. 417;People v. Van Bever, 248 Ill. 136, 93 N. E. 725;People v. Boykin, 298 Ill. 11, 131 N. E. 133;People v. Armour, 307 Ill. 234, 138 N. E. 661. The first argument made against it in the case at bar is that section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, giving power of Congress to coin money and punish counterfeiting, deprives the state Legislatures of power to restrict the circulation of money; that the right of a citizen of the United States to dispose of, in any way he sees fit, United States money owned by him cannot be abridged by a state Legislature, and that ‘the struggle and sacrifices which have been made through the ages to establish personal freedom would be for naught if personal liberty could be encroached upon in the manner as it is intended by the statute under consideration.’ Following the manner of approach adopted by the court in L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 578, 20 S. Ct. 788, 791, 44 L. Ed. 899, where the question was presented as to the power of the city of New Orleans to prescribe by ordinance certain limits without which no woman of lewd character should dwell, it is pertinent to inquire who is and who is not complaining. Nothing as to deprivation of personal rights is here heard from the prostitute who earned the money and held it for disposition. The complaint that the prostitute could not use her money as she saw fit is voiced by one who merely held her own hand out to receive what the prostitute handed over. There is no basis in the record for according consideration to the argument thus advanced. L'Hote v. New Orleans, supra; Press v. Woodley, 160 Ill. 433, 43 N. E. 718;Mundt v. Glos, 231 Ill. 158, 83 N. E. 135;Clark v. Shawen, 190 Ill. 47, 60 N. E. 116;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994. So far as it might be construed to involve a claim that the rights and privileges of plaintiff in error are unlawfully curtailed because she is forbidden to accept from one engaged in an outlawed traffic, money representing the fruits of such traffic, it is clearly untenable. In the language of the court in the L'Hote Case: ‘One of the difficult social problems of the day is what shall be done in respect to those vocations which minister to and feed upon human weaknesses, appetites, and passions. * * * They affect directly the public health and morals.’ Where the public interest is thus involved, preferment of that interest may extend even to the destruction of the property interest of the individual. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568. Considered in relation to the evil against which it is directed, the statutory provision here drawn into question is an undeniably proper exercise of legislative power. L'Hote v. New Orleans, supra; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 S. Ct. 992, 1257,32 L. Ed. 253;Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S. Ct. 584, 71 L. Ed. 1000;People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, 122 N. E. 155;City of Chicago v. Shaynin, 258 Ill. 69, 101 N. E. 224,45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 23.

[5] Plaintiff in error next contends that the charge as laid in the amended information is predicated upon an amended statute which violates section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution of Illinois because embracing in the amendment a nonrelated subject. The argument seems to be that the portion of the statute making it unlawful for any person knowingly, without lawful consideration, to take, accept, or receive any money or other thing of value from any female person from the earnings of her prostitution does not define any act which constitutes pandering. The statute is entitled, ‘An act in relation to pandering to define and prohibit the same, to provide for the punishment thereof, for the competency of certain evidence at the trial therefor, and providing what shall not be a defense.’ Following the indication of its title, it proceeds to define what shall constitute the crime of pandering, and the acts charged in the within information are enumerated, along with others, as constituting that crime. There is no merit in the contention. State v. Pippi, 59 Mot. 116, 195 P. 556. To uphold her position, plaintiff in error cites and relies upon State v. Thibodeaux, 136 La. 938, 67 So. 973. The title of the statute there involved was similar to the one here. However, in that case there was an indictment containing two counts, one of which charged the placing of a woman in a house of prostitution and the other of which charged transporting for prostitution. The only acts charged were with defendant himself, and it was admitted that it was not intended that the woman should have relations with others. The court held that the statute...