People v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 05 June 1888
• Citation: 17 N.E. 371,109 N.Y. 408
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HAWKINS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

109 N.Y. 408

17 N.E. 371

PEOPLE

v.HAWKINS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 5, 1888.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, Suffolk county.

Indictment for murder. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to death. Appeal was taken directly to the court of appeals, under Laws N. Y. 1887, c. 493.

B. F. Tracy, for appellant.

Wilmot M. Smith and James H. Tuthill, for the People.

DANFORTH, J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. He alleges error on the part of the trial judge- First, in rejecting evidence to show that he was insane when the act was committed; second, in charging the jury; and, these failing, asks for a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is so against the weight of evidence, and against law, that justice requires it. The homicide was committed on the 1st of October, 1887, at the town of Islip. The trial came off on the 5th of December following, and one Dr. Gray, being examined as a witness for the defense, stated that about two weeks before that time he had visited the defendant, conversed with him, and received a history of his case, together with his symptoms. He was then asked by defendant's counsel: ‘ Question. Was there anything that attracted your attention to him in September last? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. What? A. His description of it to me. District Attorney. I do not think it is proper to base a question upon his description of how he was. The Court. The prisoner is a competent witness for himself on that subject. Counsel for Defendant. If the defendant was giving his symptoms to the doctor historically, and without any suggestion on the part of the doctor, it seems to me that that would be more important, and it would be more likely to be truthful and sincere, than any evidence we might bring here now for him. At least it is not subject to the criticism that it has been suggested to him. The Court. I think it is the prisoner's statement, unsworn; that is, he told the doctor so. But the symptoms, as he detailed them, get to the jury without the obligation of an oath. You may prove the symptoms by him, and then put them all in the form of a question to the doctor. I sustain the objection.’ The same point is raised by a similar exception at a later stage of the trial. The ruling of the trial judge is well supported by the reason given by him. The prisoner's declaration in November as to his condition in September was not competent as evidence of his actual condition at that time, nor could it be the basis of a scientific opinion as to whether he was sane or insane at that period. Had the question related to his condition at the time of the interview, the result might be quite different. Everything said or done at a given period serves to disclose the mental state of the actor; but his narration as to what he said, or did, or of his feelings, or bodily ailments, upon a former occasion, furnishes no foundation for an opinion as to his actual state or condition at that time. It is of no higher grade than the declarations of third persons as to a past transaction, and in like manner is inadmissible. The witness was admitted to testify as an expert concerning the mental condition of the person in question, and his opinion would be of value only when founded on facts observed by himself, or proved by other witnesses under the obligation of an oath, or upon hypothetical statements. To a certain extent an expert exercises the functions of a juror. His opinion is his verdict upon the point submitted to him, and must be based on competent evidence. The representations of a sick person of the nature, symptoms, and effects of any malady under which he is laboring at the time of making those representations, are sometimes received as original evidence, but I find no case which allows those representations to be received as evidence of his condition at any other period.

The defendant excepted to that part of the charge in which the word ‘deliberation’ and the word ‘premeditation’ were defined. In general, but explicit, words the learned judge first called the attention of the jury to the distinction between the crime of murder and the crime of manslaughter. Bestating the conceded fact that ‘the defendant fired a shot at his mother,’ he said: ‘If he intended to kill her, he committed murder. But if, under any state of mind, he fired a shot without that intent to kill, then he committed manslaughter;’ and adds: ‘If he committed manslaughter, he committed, as counsel for defense conceded, manslaughter in the first degree.’ The learned judge next explained the degrees of murder; that the first was ‘the taking of human life with deliberation and premeditation;’ and, referring to the temper and disposition of men as exhibited in different individuals, he recognized in some the considerate faculty, and the easy submission of others to the impulse of anger, malice, or other violent passions,-suggesting that the mind of one man is quick and active, enabling him to reach a conclusion as if by instinct, while that of another is sluggish, carrying him along slowly; ‘and therefore,’ he said, ‘it is left to the jury always to determine whether there was in the particular act sufficient deliberation in the mind of the particular individual who is on trial to warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree. When you come to define the word, all that the law requires is this: that there should be some reflection and some thought that precedes the blow. If there is thought, if there is reflection on the act, and if there is a choice and a determination as the result of those mental actions, then there is sufficient deliberation within the law.’ The trial judge then read from the case of People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, the remarks of the learned chief judge of this court in elucidating the meaning of these important qualifying words, and said: ‘You will apply that principle in this case. If you believe the evidence upon the part of the prosecution, there was deliberate preparation for this crime. On the other hand, if you believe the testimony of the prisoner as to the manner in which the crime was committed, I am inclined to think that it would indicate murder in the second degree. But still it goes to you as a question of fact for you to determine.’ The charge was full and comprehensive. No request was made for other instructions; and as to the accuracy of that given, and its support by the evidence in the case, we entertain no doubt.

Upon the remaining point-that which presents the verdict as against evidence, and leading to an unjust judgment-we cannot hesitate. We find it impossible to infer from the evidence that the act of the defendant, and for which he was indicted, was either unpremeditated or unintentional. On the contrary, we are brought by it to believe that the act was one he intended to do. We see throughout the testimony, whether it be that adduced by the people, or that given by the defendant, an intention matured by reflection and carried into execution by means and upon an opportunity procured in pursuance of a defined plan. In its formation there was no haste; in its execution there was no exhibition of passion, emotion, or impulse. His first step was accompanied by falsehood; and, when the transaction was completed, there was no manifestation of remorse. Informed of the suspicion that he had killed his mother, he replied, ‘You cannot prove it.’ In all things he proceeded as calmly as in his narration upon the trial, when he told the story of the murder in a manner described by one of his own witnesses, without ‘a flicker of a muscle, except so far as was necessary to articulate.’ His plan and methods partook of that character. ‘The first thing,’ says the learned counsel for the defendant, ‘the first thing a sane man thinks of when planning a crime is, how may the crime be committed, and the identity of the criminal concealed.’ That this was the thought and intention of the defendant seems not improbable when, with confidence in his precautions, although conscious of his crime, he put the coroner to the proof. He trembled only when the discovery was made known to him, and he was charged with the offense. There was no substantial evidence of his insanity, though insanity was averred, and that question went to the jury. They found him sane, and they disbelieved his story. The record contains nothing which, under any reasonable or fair construction, would allow a different result. He is confirmed in no particular, and every inference warranted by the evidence is opposed to his account of the homicide. The person killed was his mother. Until then she lived at Islip, where she kept house. At 9 o'clock Saturday evening, October 1st, she was in her sitting-room, reading. Her daughter, who had been with her, said ‘Good night,’ and went to bed, leaving her in the room. The other members of the family had already retired, and it does not appear that she was afterwards seen alive by any one save the defendant. The next morning her body, wounded to death by a pistol shot, was found lying by the roadside. The defendant lived at Bay Shore, where he was a clerk in his uncle's store. The two places were about one mile apart. Between 3 and 4 o'clock on the afternoon of Saturday he engaged of S., a stable keeper at Bay Shore, a horse and calash top-buggy, which he desired should be equipped with side curtains, to go, as he then said, to Babylon, to meet Mr. Penny, a friend of his uncle, on the arrival of the late train. About 9 o'clock in the evening he called for the team, paid for it, and drove off. He returned to the stable a...