People v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 04 January 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 30410
• Citation: 80 Mich.App. 481,264 N.W.2d 33
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant. 80 Mich.App. 481, 264 N.W.2d 33
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 33

264 N.W.2d 33

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 30410.

80 Mich.App. 481, 264 N.W.2d 33

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 4, 1978.

Released for Publication April 6, 1978.

[80 MICHAPP 482] Townsend, Haley & Overton by Leonard Townsend, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward R. Wilson, Appellate Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Andrea L. Solak, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BRONSON, P. J., and ALLEN and T. M. BURNS, JJ.

BRONSON, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. He appeals as of right.

The primary evidence against defendant at trial was the testimony of a police officer to whom defendant had confessed. According to that testimony, defendant and two others robbed the decedent, Percy Ward. About a week later, after learning[80 MICHAPP 483] that Ward was going to kill them they "got a plan together". The three lured Ward to a house and beat him. They then drove Ward to an alley, where Ward was shot. Defendant did not admit shooting Ward, but stated that he remained in a car the whole time. Other evidence at trial established the beating of Ward by defendant and two others, that defendant and the others took Ward from the house and that Ward was killed by a shotgun blast to the back of his head from very close range.

Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of first-degree murder aliunde defendant's confession.

Traditionally, the corpus delicti of murder could be established by proof: 1) of a death, and 2) that such death was caused by a criminal agency or instrumentality. People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973); People v. Coapman, 326 Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d 167 (1949); People v. Mondich, 234 Mich. 590, 208 N.W. 675 (1926); People v. Sparks, 53 Mich.App. 452, 220 N.W.2d 153 (1974); People v. Kozlow, 38 Mich.App. 517, 196 N.W.2d 792 (1972). In People v. Allen, supra, however, the Michigan Supreme Court, adopting the opinion of Judge (now Justice) Levin, ¹ held that to establish the corpus delicti of first-degree murder, the prosecutor must introduce evidence of each element of the crime, including evidence of the element distinguishing first-degree from second-degree murder:

"Whatever may be the correct etymological definition of the term 'corpus delicti,' and, although there are quotations in Michigan cases from other authorities to the effect that the corpus delicti of an offense is established upon showing a specified injury and someone's criminality as the source of the injury, the law in this [80 MICHAPP 484] state is clear that the corpus delicti of an offense is not established until the people have introduced evidence from which the trier of fact may reasonably find that acts constituting all the essential elements of the offense have been committed and that someone's criminality was responsible for the commission of those acts.

"Second-degree and first-degree murder are separate offenses. Offenders are subject to significantly different penalties: persons convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced to life imprisonment and may not be paroled; persons convicted of second-degree murder may be sentenced to life imprisonment parolable after ten years imprisonment but, in the discretion of the sentencing judge, they may be sentenced to any term of years, and many are placed on probation. A definitional difference which makes for such a radical difference in the law's view of an offender's culpability and in the punishment to which he may be or must be subjected is clearly an essential element." (Footnote omitted.) 39 Mich.App. at 495-502, 197 N.W.2d 874, 884.

In Allen, the defendant was charged with felony murder. The language of Allen, however, indicates that the more strict corpus delicti rule applies to all first-degree murder:

"Just as the people must establish with evidence the essential element distinguishing second-degree murder from first-degree murder in order to convict an accused person of the aggravated offense, so, too, in order to prove the corpus delicti, that distinguishing element must be established by evidence independent of the accused person's confession. Otherwise the policy underlying the rule requiring that all the elements of the offense be established independently of a confession consistently enforced in many Michigan cases would be eroded in the category of cases where the stakes are the highest, where the accused person has the most to lose and where one would think that the law would be the most solicitous of his rights." (Emphasis in original. Footnote omitted.) 39 Mich.App. at 503-504, 197 N.W.2d at 885.

[80 MICHAPP 485] Nevertheless, this Court subsequently held in People v. Sparks, supra, that where the element distinguishing first-degree from second-degree murder is premeditation and deliberation rather than felony murder, evidence of premeditation is not required under the corpus delicti rule.

The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Sparks in a somewhat ambiguously worded order:

"On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the same hereby is denied, because the appellant has failed to persuade the Court that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. In denying leave, this Court does not wish to be understood as accepting the distinction between felony and premeditated murder in the application of the rule enunciated in People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973), drawn by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case." People v. Sparks, 393 Mich. 135, 224 N.W.2d 481 (1974). ²

We hold that, under People v. Allen, supra, the corpus delicti of first-degree murder includes the element of either an enumerated felony or premeditation. See People v. Oster, 67 Mich.App. 490, 241 N.W.2d 260 (1976); People v. Juniel, 62 Mich.App. 529, 233 N.W.2d 635 (1975). But see People v. Norwood, 68 Mich.App. 730, 243 N.W.2d 719 (1976). Three factors mandate this result. First, as stated above, the language used in Allen was not confined to felony murder. Second, the Michigan Supreme Court in Sparks expressly withheld approval of the distinction between first-degree and felony murder in its order. Third, the rationale behind Allen, [80 MICHAPP 486] which is that the corpus delicti must be established to prevent persons...