People v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 30 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 43965,43965
• Citation: 53 Ill.2d 181,290 N.E.2d 231
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 231

290 N.E.2d 231

53 Ill.2d 181

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 43965.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 30, 1972.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Ronald P. Katz, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane, Robert L. Best, and Mark T. Zubor, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

RYAN, Justice.

The defendant, Eugene Hawkins, was convicted of rape following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to not less than six nor more than ten years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. He has appealed to this court from that conviction.

On November 30, 1968, a 22-year-old housewife was raped in her basement apartment at 1518 West 99th Street in Chicago. A description of the assailant was relayed to all police officers within the immediate area of the attack. Nine days later, a police officer, responding to a call to 1514 West 99th Street, the same building in which the attack in question occurred, saw the defendant standing in the vestibule. He asked the defendant to step outside. When the defendant complied, the officer noticed that the clothes he was wearing, as well as a scar and his other physical features, matched the description that had been given by the victim of the rape.

Defendant, who was 16 years old, was taken to the police station and admonished as to his constitutional rights. In response to certain questions, he made a statement which implicated him in the rape. This statement was subsequently suppressed because it was made prior to the time that the defendant's parents had come to the station. In compliance with the provisions of section 3--2 of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 37, par. 703--2), the police called the defendant's parents, who shortly thereafter arrived at the station. Upon their arrival, Officer Hugh Baletto advised them of the charge that had been placed against their son. This officer testified: 'I advised them that I had advised him of his constitutional rights prior to their arrival, and that he had admitted to me of what had taken place over at 1518 West 99th Street. I then again advised them of his constitutional rights, in his presence. At this time the father went up to the boy and asked him, 'What did you do? " The defendant then confessed to his father in the presence of the police officer.

A delinquency petition was filed in the juvenile division of the circuit court charging the defendant with being a delinquent. Subsequently, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with rape. A motion was thereafter made by the State's Attorney to dismiss the delinquency proceeding and to proceed against the defendant criminally under the indictment. The juvenile court allowed the motion without a hearing.

Relying on Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, the defendant initially contends that he was denied due process of law because of the juvenile court's failure to hold a hearing before relinquishing its jurisdiction over him to the criminal division. In our recent decision in People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill.2d 17, 280 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912, 93 S.Ct. 230, 34 L.Ed.2d 173 (1972), we specifically held that under our statute no such hearing is required and distinguished the provisions of our Juvenile Court Act from that of the District of Columbia to which Kent applied. We stated:

'The statute involved in Kent, however, vested the discretion to waive jurisdiction over the minor in the juvenile court. The Illinois statute does not give the same discretion to the court. Rather the State's Attorney in Illinois is vested with the discretion to determine whether or not to proceed criminally against a juvenile offender, subject only to the right of the judge presiding in the juvenile division to object, in which event the matter is referred to the chief judge of the circuit court for his decision. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 37, par. 702--7(3).) * * * Under our act a due process hearing as prescribed in Kent is not required at this stage of the proceeding.' (Emphasis added.) 51 Ill.2d at 20, 280 N.E.2d at 699.

Our holding in Bombacino is dispositive of this contention.

The defendant next contends that the use of his confession made to his father in the presence of the police officer violated the constitutional safeguards prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. He contends that he did not waive his right to counsel prior to making the confession to his father. We are not concerned with the question of the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel after having received the warnings prescribed in Miranda. We are concerned with whether or not the confession was the product of custodial police interrogation. 'By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers * * *.' (384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.) In numberous cases, it has been held in this court and in other jurisdictions that confessions or admissions made by a suspect in response to interrogation by private citizens are admissible in evidence although the suspect has not been warned or has not waived his rights as required by Miranda. (People v. Morehead, 45 Ill.2d 326, 259 N.E.2d 8, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 251, 27 L.Ed.2d 251; People v. Doss, 44 Ill.2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753; Yates v. United States (5th cir. 1967), 384 F.2d 586; Truex v. State (1968), 282 Ala. 191, 210 So.2d 424; State v. Lombardo (1969), 104 Ariz. 598, 457 P.2d 275; Edington v. State (1967), 243 Ark. 10, 418 S.W.2d 637; Holston v. State (Fla.1968), 208 So.2d 98; Schaumberg v. State (1967), 83 Nev. 372, 432 P.2d 500.) In People v. Brooks, 51 Ill.2d 156, 281 N.E.2d 326, we recently held that statements not induced by the police or an agent of the police are admissible in evidence without such compliance. We stated: 'Miranda specifically excludes from the application of its holding statements freely and voluntarily given without any compelling...