People v. Haydon

• Citation: 106 Cal.App.2d 105,234 P.2d 720
• Decision Date: 15 August 1951
• Docket Number: Cr. 2745
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HAYDON.

Page 720

234 P.2d 720

106 Cal.App.2d 105

PEOPLE v. HAYDON.

Cr. 2745.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 15, 1951.

Hearing Denied Sept. 13, 1951.

John Mark Chargin, San Jose, Irving S. Rosenblatt, Jr., and Tobriner & Lazarus, all of San Francisco, amicus curiae, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Winslow Christian, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BRAY, Justice.

This appeal presents the question of whether section 72 of the Penal Code was repealed pro tanto by the enactment of section 101 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. Stats.1935, p. 1226, Deering's General Laws, Act 8780d.

Record.

Defendant was convicted of the crime of felony, to wit, violation of section 72 of the Penal Code, in that with intent to defraud he wilfully presented for payment a false and fraudulent claim for California unemployment insurance and received payment thereon. He does not attack the sufficiency of the evidence, but contends that the later enactment of section 101(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act constituted a pro tanto repeal of section 72 of the Penal Code.

Is Section 72 of The Penal Code Repealed Pro Tanto?

Section 72 of the Penal Code, enacted in 1872, provides: 'Every person who, with intent to defraud, presents for allowance or for payment to any state board * * * any false or fraudulent claim * * * is guilty of a felony.'

Section 101 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, as amended, Stats.1943, p. 3051, provides: 'It is a misdemeanor: (a) Wilfully to make a false statement or representation or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact to obtain, increase, reduce, or defeat any benefit or payment under the provisions of this act * * *.'

Respondent concedes that if the two provisions are in conflict section 101(a) must prevail as it is the later and more specific provision. Such conflict is clearly shown by an examination of the two sections. Section 72 makes it a felony to (1) present a false claim (2) to a state officer or board authorized to pay the claim if genuine (3) with intent to defraud. Section 101(a) makes it a misdemeanor to (1) wilfully submit a false claim or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact affecting any payment to be made under the provisions of the act (2) to the California Employment Stabilization Commission (a board authorized to pay the claim if genuine) (3) to obtain a payment under the act. Bailed down, section 72 deals with one who makes a false claim to a state board with intent to defraud. Section 101(a) deals with one who wilfully makes a false claim to the particular state board to obtain, increase, reduce or defeat any benefit or payment under the act. Section 7(1) of the Penal Code defines 'wilfully': '* * * when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage'. 'The word 'knowingly' imports only a knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act or omission within the provisions of this code. It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission'. Penal Code, § 7(5). In comparing merely the words 'with intent to defraud' with the words 'knowingly' and 'wilfully,' there is a difference of meaning and the latter do not necessarily include the former. However, if a person wilfully or knowingly submits a claim, knowing it to be false, to the commission for the purpose of obtaining, increasing, reducing or defeating any benefit under the act, he necessarily does so to defraud. He evidences a purpose or willingness to present a false claim to affect the payment under the act and hence is presenting such claim with intent to defraud. Again, one who presents a false claim with intent to defraud is wilfully and knowingly presenting such false claim with intent to obtain, etc., a benefit or payment under the act.

That the Legislature specifically was providing penalties for all false claims made in relation to unemployment relief appears from an examination of article 8 of the act, sections 100 to 102, headed 'Penalties.' Section 101 sets forth the offenses. In addition to the offenses set forth in subdivision (a) there are five other types of offenses which can be committed. Section 101.6 provides a catch-all. It reads: 'Every person who wilfully violates any provision of this act or any rule or regulation promulgated or published by the commission in accordance with this act, is guilty of a misdemeanor.' Section 102 provides that one half of all fines collected for violations of the provisions of the act shall be paid to the state treasury to the credit of the unemployment fund, and one-half to the treasurer of the jurisdiction in which the offense is prosecuted. Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature was intending to provide that all offenses in violation of the provisions of the act were to be made misdemeanors so that half of the fines therefrom would go into the unemployment fund, and the other half to the city or county where the prosecution took place. Under section 72 of the Penal Code no fines could be imposed. Penal Code, § 18. 'In the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature, and in the construction of the instrument the intention of the parties, is to be pursued, if possible; and when a general and [a] particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.' Code Civ.Proc., § 1859.

Respondent urges the application of certain other principles of statutory construction, such as the requirements that the courts are reluctant to find that a statute has been repealed by implication, and that a law should not be construed as impliedly repealing a prior law unless no other reasonable construction can be applied. Having those principles in mind, still section 72 of the Penal Code has been repealed pro tanto by section 101(a). While the latter section may be broader than section 72, a person submitting a false claim with intent to defraud is included therein. Respondent argues that one making a false representation which he believes to be true would be guilty of a misdemeanor under section 101(a) but not liable under section 72. We doubt this statement. A person making a false representation which in good faith he believes to be true is not doing so wilfully or knowingly. While he is not required to know the unlawfulness of the act to come within the definition of 'knowingly' or 'wilfully' he certainly must know that his statement is false or untrue.

The reasoning in People v. Armstrong, 100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 852, 224 P.2d 490, 494, where the court found that a violation of section 101(a) constituted an offense necessarily included in petty theft, applies here. There the court pointed out that to constitute a violation of section 101(a) 'There must be an intent to defraud, i. e., an intent to obtain a payment (property) wrongfully' and that 'The false statement must be used for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud, i. e., obtaining the payment' and that these two elements are the same elements going to make up the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses.

Respondent contends that the situation here is analogous to that in connection with section 499b of the Penal Code and section 503 of the Vehicle Code. Section 499b provides that any person, who shall without the permission of the owner take any automobile for the purpose of temporarily using or operating it, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 503 of the Vehicle Code provides that any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his own, without the owner's consent and with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of his title to or possession of such vehicle is guilty of a felony. In People v. Neal, 40 Cal.App.2d 115, 104 P.2d 555, it was held that there is a distinction between these two sections in that under section 499b, the so-called 'joyride' statute, there need be no proof of intent to deprive the owner of his title or possession either temporarily or permanently; while under section 503 such proof is necessary. A violation of section 499b occurs when a person, without the consent of the owner, takes a vehicle for the purpose of temporarily using or operating it, whether or not he intends to deprive the owner of its possession or title. People v. Zervas, 61 Cal.App.2d 381, 142 P.2d 946; People v. Bailey, 72 Cal.App.2d...