People v. Hazelton

Decision Date05 December 1996
Docket NumberNo. S051561,S051561
Citation14 Cal.4th 101,926 P.2d 423,58 Cal.Rptr.2d 443
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 926 P.2d 423, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8780, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,545 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William Royal HAZELTON, Defendant and Respondent.

Gary T. Yancey, District Attorney, and L. Douglas Pipes, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer and Aaron Singer, Deputy District Attorneys, Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson as amici curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Charles H. James, Public Defender, and Ron Boyer, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.

BROWN, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a "strike" under the "three strikes" provision of Proposition 184. (PEN CODE, § 1170.12.)1 Unlike its legislative predecessor, section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), this portion of section 1170.12 is ambiguous regarding whether it includes out-of-state convictions. We conclude, in light of the unequivocal evidence of voters' intent, that the statute is properly construed to include such convictions.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant William Royal Hazelton was charged with felonies in two separate complaints filed in Contra Costa County in May and August 1994. The first complaint alleged that he had suffered a single prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e), the legislative version of the "three strikes" law. The second complaint alleged that defendant had suffered two prior felony convictions under section 667, subdivisions (d) and (e), one of which was an attempted rape in Nevada. Before these cases were adjudicated, the initiative version of the "three strikes" law, which added section 1170.12 to the Penal Code, was adopted and became operative.

In response to defendant's motion, the trial court ruled that under section 1170.12, defendant's out-of-state prior "may be used for two strike ... [but] not for three-strike purposes." The People's request to reinstate the prior conviction allegation was denied, and they appealed. (§ 1238, subd. (a)(9).)

The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals and reversed and remanded. We granted defendant's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

In March 1994, the Legislature enacted its version of the "Three Strikes and You're Out" law by amending section 667. In general, the legislation provides longer sentences for certain prior serious or violent felonies popularly denoted "strikes." A "two strike" case involves one prior qualifying felony; a "three strike" case involves two or more prior qualifying felonies. Predicate prior felonies are defined in section 667, subdivision (d), as: "(1) Any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state"; "(2) A conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed in California, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison [and] ... includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7"; and "(3) [Certain] prior juvenile adjudication[s]."

A defendant with three strikes, i.e., "two or more prior felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d)," must be sentenced to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment for the current felony conviction, with a In November 1994, the voters adopted Proposition 184, codified as section 1170.12. Section 1170.12, subdivision (b), is virtually identical to section 667, subdivision (d), in defining a "prior conviction of a felony" as: "(1) Any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state"; "(2) A conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed in California, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison [and] ... includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7"; and "(3) [Certain] prior juvenile adjudication[s]." However, in delineating who is eligible for the third strike penalty, section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A) (subdivision (c)(2)(A)), refers to a defendant who has "two or more prior felony convictions, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) ...." (Italics added.) Thus, defendant argues that unlike its legislative counterpart, subdivision (c)(2)(A) does not include out-of-state convictions because it does not expressly refer to section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(2).

                [926 P.2d 425] minimum term generally calculated as the greater of three times the term otherwise provided for each current felony conviction;  twenty-five years;  or the term required by section 1170 for the current conviction, including any enhancements.  (§ 667, subd.  (e)(2)(A), italics added.)   Thus, because the three strikes provision of section 667 refers to all of subdivision (d), and subdivision (d) defines a prior felony conviction as including out-of-state convictions in subdivision (d)(2), there is no question that the legislative version of the three strikes law includes out-of-state convictions for purposes of determining whether someone is eligible for the third strike penalty
                

The case before us involves crimes committed prior to November 1994. It thus arises under the legislative statute (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) rather than under the initiative statute (§ 1170.12). (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 505, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) However, defendant asserts that because section 1170.12 is more lenient than section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), in that it does not include defendant's out-of-state conviction as a third strike, he is entitled to the benefit of this reduced punishment under the principles of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948. We therefore proceed to consider whether subdivision (c)(2)(A) may be properly so construed.

In construing subdivision (c)(2)(A) to determine whether out-of-state convictions are included, "our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the voters who passed the initiative measure." (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 130, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42.) If "the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history." (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.)

Read in the context of section 1170.12 as a whole, the language of subdivision (c)(2)(A) is ambiguous regarding the inclusion of out-of-state convictions in at least two respects. First, the phrase "prior felony convictions, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b)," could be interpreted, as defendant suggests, to refer to the forum in which the prior conviction was obtained, i.e., an adult criminal proceeding in California. This interpretation would, of course, mean that out-of-state convictions, which are described in subdivision (b)(2), would not qualify for subdivision (c)(2)(A)'s third strike penalty.

Alternatively, the same phrase could be interpreted as highlighting the nature of the prior conviction, i.e., a violent or serious felony, that will qualify as a prior felony conviction in a three strikes case. Because section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(2), includes only those out-of-state convictions deemed violent or serious in California, interpreting subdivision (c)(2)(A) to refer to the nature of the former conviction would mean that out-of-state convictions would qualify for the subdivision's third strike penalty.

Second, section 1170.12, subdivision (b), provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law and for the purposes of this For these reasons, the statutory language is ambiguous regarding whether out-of-state convictions are included in subdivision (c)(2)(A). We therefore turn to the initiative's legislative history to determine which of these constructions best effectuates the voters' intent.

                [926 P.2d 426] section, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as" including California convictions (§ 1170.12, subd.  (b)(1)), out-of-state convictions (§ 1170.12, subd.  (b)(2)), and juvenile adjudications (§ 1170.12, subd.  (b)(3)).  Subdivision (b) thus defines a prior conviction for the entire section broadly and without qualification to include out-of-state convictions and juvenile adjudications.  As noted, however, subdivision (c)(2)(A) states that a defendant is eligible for the third strike penalty if he or she has sustained "two or more prior felony convictions, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).  "  (Italics added.)   Subdivision (c)(2)(A), therefore, arguably proffers a different and inconsistent definition to the extent it limits the definition of a prior felony for purposes of the three strikes provision to only adult California convictions.  By concluding that subdivision (c)(2)(A)'s reference to subdivision (b)(1) simply identifies the nature of the conviction and not the rendering forum, this potential inconsistency in definition is avoided.  Even if subdivision (c)(2)(A) could be construed as merely an exception to the more general definition of subdivision (b), there is still a tension between subdivision (b)'s unqualified language and the subsequent presence of such an exception in subdivision (c)(2)(A)
                

The initiative's history demonstrates an unequivocal intent on the part of the voters to adopt a sentencing scheme identical to the legislative version of the three strikes law. 2 The legislative analyst described the initiative as follows: "This measure proposes amendments to state law that are...

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