People v. Heikkala

• Decision Date: 05 March 1924
• Docket Number: No. 141.,141.
• Citation: 226 Mich. 332,197 N.W. 366
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HEIKKALA.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

226 Mich. 332

197 N.W. 366

PEOPLE

v.HEIKKALA.

No. 141.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 5, 1924.

Exceptions from Circuit Court, Chippewa County; Louis H. Fead, Judge.

Filmore Heikkala was found guilty of manslaughter, and he brings exceptions. Reversed and new trial granted.

Argued before CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.McDonald & Kaltz, of Sault Ste. Marie, for appellant.

A. B. Dougherty, Atty. Gen., and M. M. Larmonth, Pros. Atty., of Sault Ste. Marie, for the People.

CLARK, C. J.

Defendant, on exceptions before sentence, challenges the validity of his conviction of manslaughter on two grounds, that a verdict of guilty ought not to have been directed, and that, being so requested, the judge ought to have instructed the jury relative to the presumption of innocence.

The charge was laid under 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 15234:

‘Any person who shall maim or injure any other person by the discharge of any firearm pointed or aimed, intentionally but without malice, at any such person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than one year; and if death ensue from such wounding or maiming, such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of the crime of manslaughter.’

When arraigned, defendant stood mute, and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court. The facts, as testified to by witnesses, including defendant, were not disputed. We quote from the charge:

‘* * * It becomes my duty, gentlemen, to instruct you to render a verdict of guilty in this case. The court in a criminal case has no right to require a verdict of guilty from the jury-that is to say, has no right to take the verdict without the consent of the jury-but it is the duty of the court to permit the jury to render a verdict. However, gentlemen, I charge you that it is your duty in this case as jurors to render a verdict of guilty.’

The jury retired and returned into court and announced a verdict of guilty.

The right of a trial judge to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal case is a question on which the decisions of this court cannot be harmonized. Cases sustaining, or tending to sustain, such right are People v. Damskey, 180 Mich. 664, 147 N. W. 585;People v. Lyng, 74 Mich. 579, 42 N. W. 139;People v. Ackerman, 80 Mich. 588, 45 N. W. 367;People v. Richmond, 59 Mich. 570, 26 N. W. 770;People v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493, 67 N. W. 550;People v. Kirsch, 67 Mich. 539, 35 N. W. 157;People v. Gardner, 143 Mich. 104, 106 N. W. 541;People v. Neal, 143 Mich. 271, 106 N. W. 857;People v. Schottey, 116 Mich. 1, 74 N. W. 209. For a review of Michigan cases and statement of a rule of other jurisdictions see note, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304. Following cases are instructive: Chamberlin v. Brown, 2 Doug. 120, note; Kempsey v. McGinniss, 21 Mich. 123;Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173;People v. Waldvogel, 49 Mich. 337, 13 N. W. 620. In a late case, People v. Lathers, 223 Mich. 92, 193 N. W. 903, it was held:

‘Under such unqualified command of the court, retirement of the jury served no purpose and was but an idle ceremony. Instead of telling the jury that it was their duty to decide as a matter of law, the court told them it was his duty to order a verdict of guilty, and so commanded. Such mandatory method of divesting the jury of all responsibility in a criminal case, even where it is proper for the court to tell them what their duty is, has more than once been a subject of criticism although, on the theory no miscarriage of justice was apparent, verdicts of that class have been sustained where all the essential facts were undisputed, following the liquor case of People v. Neumann, 85 Mich. 98, where conviction was sustained, but the court there laid down the true rule for the trial court's guidance as follows: ‘The trial judge may, with perfect propriety, state to the jury that the law applied to the facts, which are undisputed, shows the defendant to be guilty of the offense charged, and that it is their duty to so find under the facts and the law. But it has been repeatedly held that he cannot in so many words direct them that they must bring in a verdict of guilty; and that they are at liberty to find otherwise, if they see fit, under the federal Constitution, which guarantees to every accused person--

‘The right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.’ And verdicts have often been set aside when directed by courts in opposition to this right. See United States v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 470, and cases there cited.”

And in People v. Chyc, 219 Mich. 273, 282, 189 N. W. 70, 73:

‘It was the right of the trial court to instruct the jury that under the law as applied to undisputed facts disclosed by the evidence it was their duty to find defendant guilty, ‘unless the jury for some reason apparent on the trial is not able to believe the witnesses,’ and to admonish them as to their plain duty in the premises. While so admonishing the court emphasized by reiteration that the court could not and did not direct a verdict of guilty but it was the right and duty of the jury to determine and say whether defendant was guilty or not guilty under one or both counts. There was no direction of a verdict or coercion violating defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury. It is true there was some intimation of opinion in the instructions given, but it was rather in the nature of an admonition that the undisputed and consistent testimony of unimpeached witnesses should not be lightly disregarded through whim or prejudice, or without some good reason apparent on the trial. The court did not relieve the jury of responsibility by assuming to direct a verdict, but plainly advised it was for them and not the court to determine and declare whether the accused was or was not guilty.'

And in People v. Flemming, 221 Mich. 609, 617, 192 N. W. 625, 627:

‘The court committed no error in instructing the jury that as a matter of law it was their duty under the undisputed testimony to find defendant guilty, if they believed the witnesses who gave it. In so doing he distinctly told them in direct and plain terms which the dullest could not misunderstand that the court could not usurp their province by directing a verdict, but after instructing them as to their duty under the law, if they believed beyond any reasonable doubt the undisputed testimony of the the witnesses, the court could not command what verdict they should render, that the responsibility and right to determine what their verdict should be rested with them.’

And see People v. Doyle, 160 Mich. 423, 125 N. W. 358;People v. North, 153 Mich. 612, 117 N. W. 63;People v. Curry, 163 Mich. 180, 128 N. W. 213,30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 892;People v. Remus, 135 Mich. 629, 98 N. W. 397,100 N. W. 403;People v. Worges, 176 Mich. 685, 142 N. W. 1100;People v. Collison, 85 Mich. 105, 48 N. W. 292;People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, 140 N. W. 648;People v. Rose, 218 Mich. 642, 188 N. W. 417. A...