People v. Heil

• Decision Date: 16 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 49748,49748
• Citation: 71 Ill.2d 458,376 N.E.2d 1002,17 Ill.Dec. 673
• Parties: , 17 Ill.Dec. 673 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Sterling HEIL, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1002

376 N.E.2d 1002

71 Ill.2d 458, 17 Ill.Dec. 673

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Sterling HEIL, Appellee.

No. 49748.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 16, 1978.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Clyde L. Kuehn, State's Atty., Belleville (Donald B. MacKay and Melbourne A. Noel, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, and James E. Hinterlong and Linda M. Vodar, State's Attys., App. Service Commission, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Rosborough, Deputy State App. Defender, and John H. Reid, Asst. State App. Defender, Mt. Vernon, for appellee.

GOLDENHERSH, Justice:

In a bench trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County, defendant, Sterling Heil, was convicted of the offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 1401(b)), sentenced to three years' probation and fined $500. The appellate court reversed (49 Ill.App.3d 55, 7 Ill.Dec. 675, 364 N.E.2d 966), and we allowed the People's petition for leave to appeal.

The indictment upon which defendant was tried was returned on February 7, 1974, and on February 28, 1974, defendant made a demand for speedy trial (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b)). On October 23, 1974, defendant filed, and the circuit court allowed a "petition for discharge based on statutory right for speedy trial." On the following day the People filed a motion "to set aside and expunge order granting defendant's petition for discharge." On October 25, 1974, defendant's bail was discharged and the circuit clerk issued a check refunding the bail deposit to defendant's attorney. Following a hearing held on October 29, 1974, the circuit court allowed the People's motion, vacated its original order, and set the case for trial.

In reversing the judgment, the appellate court held that although at the time when it considered the People's motion to vacate the order of discharge the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, that "Once the trial court entered the appealable order of discharge, it was binding and conclusive of the matter which had been in controversy and it operated to preclude a readjudication thereof." 49 Ill.App.3d 55, 60, 7 Ill.Dec. 675, 679, 364 N.E.2d 966, 970.

The People contend that for a period of 30 days following the entry of its order the circuit court was vested with plenary power to vacate, modify or reconsider that order. It argues that although, concededly, the order discharging defendant was appealable, public policy "favors the correction of errors at the trial level."

Defendant contends that the hearing on the People's motion resulted in a retrial and readjudication of the issues decided by the original order and that the People, rather than filing a motion to set aside the order discharging defendant, should have sought appellate review. He argues that the People "either declined or neglected to present all its evidence and case law" at the time of the original hearing and that the piecemeal approach followed here "is both repugnant to the efficient administration of justice and fundamentally unfair to the defendant." Alternatively, defendant argues that "the trial court lacked the power to vacate its discharge order where it had previously been executed in its entirety."

The relevant statutes, and the rules promulgated by this court, demonstrate the intent that in criminal as well as civil matters the circuit court be given the opportunity to reconsider final appealable judgments and orders within 30 days of their entry. (See, e. g., Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, pars. 116-1, 116-2, 1005-8-1(d); 58 Ill.2d Rules 604(d), 605(b), 606(b).) We have examined the authorities cited by defendant in support of his contention that the only avenue open to the People was that of appeal, and find them clearly distinguishable. In none of these cases did the court consider the question presented here. People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill.2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878, involved an indictment based upon the same circumstances and evidence concerning which an order had previously been entered quashing a search warrant and suppressing evidence. People ex rel. MacMillian v. Napoli (1966), 35 Ill.2d 80, 219 N.E.2d 489, involved a situation factually similar to Taylor, and People v. Quintana (1967), 36 Ill.2d 369, 223 N.E.2d 161, involved a later reindictment for the same offense for which the defendant had previously been discharged for failure to accord him a speedy trial. We find nothing in these cases which would support the contention that a party entitled to appeal from an order entered by the circuit court should be deprived of the opportunity to seek correction of the alleged error by means of a motion timely filed in the circuit court.

Defendant's alternative argument is based on the contention that because the order of discharge "had previously been executed in its entirety" the circuit court was without jurisdiction to vacate it. It is true that in earlier decisions of this court it was held that when a judgment had been "executed," the court was without power to set it aside even within the 30-day period during which it admittedly had jurisdiction to review and modify its orders. (See People v. Lance (1962), 25 Ill.2d 455, 456, 185 N.E.2d 221; People v. Wakeland (1958), 15 Ill.2d 265, 269, 154 N.E.2d 245.) This rule was first enunciated in People ex rel. Lucey v. Turney (1916), 273 Ill. 546, 113 N.E. 105. Although at that time the statutes provided for the filing of a motion for new trial (Hurd's Rev.Stat.1913,...