People v. Heineman
Decision Date | 02 June 1914 |
Citation | 211 N.Y. 475,105 N.E. 673 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. HEINEMAN. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
William Heineman was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and, from a judgment of the Appellate Division (157 App. Div. 522,142 N. Y. Supp. 833) affirming the conviction, he appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Myer Nussbaum, of New York City, for appellant.
Charles S. Whitman, Dist. Atty., of New York City (Robert C. Taylor, of New York City, of counsel), for the People.
The defendant was indicted for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree. Section 1050 of the Penal Law defines that crime as follows:
‘Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree, when committed without a design to effect death: * * * In the heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon.’ Consol. Laws, c. 40.
The counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the jury:
‘They must find heat of passion on the part of the defendant before they can convict him of the crime charged.’
The request was refused and the defendant excepted. To understand the full force of the court's ruling other features of the trial must be considered.
At the close of the evidence the defendant's counsel asked the court to direct a verdict of not guilty for the reason, among other things:
‘That the evidence contained nothing to show heat of passion, which is under the statute defining manslaughter a necessary incident to that crime.’
The motion was denied, and the defendant's counsel then summed up to the jury.
After the defendant's counsel had concluded his address the court entered into a colloquy with him at considerable length and said:
There was much more to the same effect. The defendant's counsel excepted to the remarks of the court and moved for leave to withdraw a juror. The motion was denied, and to that ruling there was an exception.
In the charge in chief the court said:
The assistant district attorney said that in order to avoid any argument upon the subject he requested the court to charge that there was sufficient evidence in the case from which heat of passion might be inferred, and that is was not necessary for him to show technical proof of heat of passion. The judge denied the request and said he really did not see that heat of passion had anything to do with the case. To this the defendant's counsel excepted.
The court's final word to the jury was:
The charge taken as a whole, and with what was previously said by the court, directed the minds of the jurors solely to manslaughter in the first degree. The court practically took from their consideration the question whether the defendant might not have been guilty of some lower degree of crime.
[1][2] In my judgment the defendant under the evidence might have been convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. Section 1049 of the Penal Law says:
‘In a case other than one of those specified in sections 1044, 1046 and 1047, homicide, not being justifiable or excussable, is manslaughter.’
The sections referred to are those defining murder in the first and second degrees.
Manslaughter in its two degrees is defined in sections 1050 and 1052. The last subdivision of section 1052 is an omnibus clause and includes all offenses not defined in the preceding subdivisions of the section or in section 1050. The language of the subdivision is:
‘Homicide is manslaughter in the second degree, when committed without a design to effect death: * * * By any act, procurement or culpable negligence of any person, which, according to the provisions of this article, does not constitute the crime of murder in the first or second degree, nor manslaughter in the first degree.’
It appeared upon the trial that the killing occurred at about half past 9 o'clock in the evening on January 1, 1910, in front of 167 West 145th street, in New York City. The defendant, a man of good reputation, 34 years old and married, was going to his home at 151 West 145th street. The defendant had a permit to carry a revolver, and at the time had a revolver in his coat pocket. The place was not brilliantly...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. D'Andrea
...See also People v. Nicoll, 3 A.D.2d 64, 158 N.Y.S.2d 279; People v. Lewis, 282 App.Div. 267, 271, 123 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82; People v. Heineman, 211 N.Y. 475, 105 N.E. 673. The issue before me could be decided on the cited cases with little further comment. However, the precise meaning of the ter......
-
People v. Reynolds
...subdivision 3 of section 1052 of the former Penal Law (People v. Drislane, 8 N.Y.2d 67, 201 N.Y.S.2d 756, 168 N.E.2d 96; People v. Heineman, 211 N.Y. 475, 105 N.E. 673). On the record in this case we also believe it was improper for the prosecutor to impeach the testimony of an important de......
-
People v. Soto
...3, while substituting instructions on the inapplicable provisions of subdivision 2, was improper and erroneous (see People v. Heineman, 211 N.Y. 475, 105 N.E. 673; People v. Drislane, 8 N.Y.2d 67, 201 N.Y.S.2d 756, 168 N.E.2d 96; People v. Reynolds, 35 A.D.2d 529, 313 N.Y.S.2d Finally, whil......
-
People v. Munoz
...for finding defendant innocent of manslaughter, first degree, and yet guilty of manslaughter, second degree. Cf. People v. Heineman, 211 N.Y. 475, 480, 105 N.E. 673, 674; People v. Drislane, 8 N.Y.2d 67, 201 N.Y.S.2d Defendant's reliance upon People v. Huntington, 138 Cal. 261, 70 P. 284, i......