People v. Henson

• Decision Date: 01 August 2022
• Docket Number: S252702
• Citation: 13 Cal.5th 574,513 P.3d 947,296 Cal.Rptr.3d 331
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cody Wade HENSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

13 Cal.5th 574

513 P.3d 947

296 Cal.Rptr.3d 331

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Cody Wade HENSON, Defendant and Appellant.

S252702

Supreme Court of California.

August 1, 2022

Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, Robert Whalen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Douglas O. Treisman, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent.

C. Matthew Missakian, Long Beach, and Stephen K. Dunkle, Santa Barbara, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

Penal Code ¹ section 954 provides in relevant part: "[1] An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense[,] or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, and [2] if two or more accusatory pleadings are filed in such cases in the same court, the court may order them to be consolidated." As is evident from our insertion of numerals into the text, the quoted portion of section 954 includes two main clauses joined by the conjunction "and." (See People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 36, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 332 P.3d 1187 [recognizing these distinct clauses in § 954 ].) The first clause addresses joinder of related offenses in a single pleading, and for convenience, we will refer to it as the "joinder clause." The second clause addresses court consolidation of separate pleadings, which we will refer to as the "consolidation clause."

In this case, the question before us is whether and under what circumstances a trial court can consider more than one preliminary hearing record in ruling on a motion under section 995 to set aside the information for lack of probable cause to support the commitment order. (See § 995, subd. (a)(2).) But in order to resolve that question, the parties and the Court of Appeal offer three different interpretations of section 954. The People argue that section 954 ’s joinder clause authorizes a district attorney to file a single information combining related offenses that were the subject of separate preliminary examinations. By contrast, the Court of Appeal majority concluded that section 954 ’s consolidation clause provides the district attorney with that authority. Third, defendant argues that a single information combining related offenses that were the subject of separate preliminary examinations is unauthorized absent a court-issued consolidation order — and no such order was obtained in this case.

We conclude that section 954 ’s joinder clause permits a district attorney to file a single information in the circumstances presented here, provided, as is true here, that the applicable time constraints are satisfied. We further conclude that when, as here, related offenses are properly joined by the district attorney, a trial court is permitted to consider more than one preliminary hearing record in ruling on a section 995 motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reversed the trial court's order of dismissal, although we do not employ the Court of Appeal's reasoning.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts are not the subject of significant dispute, and we take them largely from the Court of Appeal opinion.

A. The Complaints, the Commitment Orders, and the Information

On March 7, 2016, a felony complaint was filed at the Fresno County Superior Court and assigned case number F16901499 (magistrate case 1499).² The complaint charged defendant with: (1) unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle after having suffered three prior vehicle theft convictions ( Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ; § 666.5 ); (2) receiving stolen property (a motor vehicle) after having suffered three prior vehicle theft convictions ( §§ 496d, subd. (a), 666.5 ); (3) resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer or an emergency medical technician ( § 148, subd. (a)(1) ); and (4) possession of burglary tools ( § 466 ). The offenses were all alleged to have occurred on March 4, 2016, and defendant was further alleged to have served two prior prison terms ( § 667.5, subd. (b) ). Defendant was arraigned on the complaint on March 8, 2016, and he was released on bail.

On May 19, 2016, a different felony complaint was filed at the Fresno County Superior Court, and it was assigned case number F16903119 (magistrate case 3119). The complaint charged defendant with: (1) two counts of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle after having suffered three prior vehicle theft convictions ( Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ; Pen. Code, § 666.5 ), (2) two counts of receiving stolen property (a motor vehicle) after having suffered three prior vehicle theft convictions ( §§ 496d, subd. (a), 666.5 ); and (3) resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer or an emergency medical technician ( § 148, subd. (a)(1) ). The offenses were all alleged to have occurred on May 17, 2016, and defendant was further alleged to have served two prior prison terms ( § 667.5, subd. (b) ) and to have committed the May 17 offenses while released on bail in magistrate case 1499 ( § 12022.1 ). Defendant was arraigned on the latter complaint on May 24, 2016.

The preliminary hearing in magistrate case 3119 took place on November 16, 2016. The magistrate held defendant to answer on all charges, and arraignment on an information was scheduled for December 1, 2016. The preliminary hearing in magistrate case 1499 took place six days later, on November 22, 2016. The magistrate again held defendant to answer on all charges, and arraignment on an information was again scheduled for December 1, 2016.

On November 29, 2016, within 15 days of both commitment orders (see §§ 739, 860 [imposing a 15-day time limit]), the People attempted to file a single combined information bearing both magistrate case numbers, with magistrate case 3119 designated as the lead case.³ Counts 1 through 4 of the combined information tracked the charges upon which defendant was held to answer in magistrate case 1499, and counts 5 through 7 reflected the charges upon which defendant was held to answer in magistrate case 3119. The information was initially rejected by the clerk's office. On the face page of the information, a file stamp bearing the date "November 29, 2016" is crossed out by hand, and the cross-out is initialed, suggesting that someone in the clerk's office raised a question about the form of the pleading. The same information was then filed two days later, on December 1, 2016 (still within 15 days of both commitment orders), and the word "CONSOLIDATED" was written by hand above the word "INFORMATION."⁴

B. Objection to Combined Information at the Arraignment

Defendant was scheduled to be arraigned on the joint information on the same day as its filing, but a complication arose regarding defendant's representation. The public defender's office had earlier declared a conflict in magistrate case 3119, but not in magistrate case 1499, and therefore "conflict counsel" had been appointed to represent defendant in magistrate case 3119. But the filing of an information initiates a new proceeding that is institutionally distinct from the magistrate proceeding, and therefore defense counsel is appointed anew at the arraignment on an information. (See Lempert v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170–1171, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 700 ; see also § 987.1.) Because the information filed in this case combined the charges from the two magistrate proceedings, and because the public defender's office had declared a conflict in magistrate case 3119, the deputy public defender requested a continuance to make a conflict determination.

At the hearing a week later, on December 8, the deputy public defender stated that her office would need to "conflict off" the case if the two magistrate cases were combined into a single trial court case. Conflict counsel then asked whether the arraignment judge was willing to hear her oral objection to the information. Conflict counsel took the position that the charges from the two magistrate cases could not be combined into a single information without a consolidation order. In response, the arraignment judge expressed his view that the Penal Code permitted the People to file joint pleadings without leave of the court. After some discussion, the matter was continued for another week.

At the hearing on December 15, conflict counsel again argued that a consolidation order was required to combine charges from different magistrate cases. The arraignment judge then sought guidance from conflict counsel as to the proper vehicle to bring the issue before the court, noting that at an arraignment the law only permits a defendant to enter a demurrer or a plea.⁵

The arraignment judge stated that he was "not unsympathetic" to conflict counsel's argument, but he did not know how the issue could be raised except by entering a plea and then filing a motion to sever (see § 954 ), or by demurrer on the ground of improper joinder (see § 1004, para. (3)). In response, conflict counsel asked the court simply to reject the information as filed. But the court denied that request.

The public defender's office then declared a conflict, and conflict counsel was appointed to represent defendant as to all the charges in the information. Defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The judge set a trial date "[o]n case [sic ] ending 119 and 499 that are filed together in one information."⁶

C. Defendant's Section 995 Motion

Conflict counsel next filed a section 995 motion requesting that the court set aside the information at least in part. Section 995 requires the arraignment court, upon motion, to set aside an information if, among other things, "the defendant had been committed without reasonable or probable cause." ( § 995, subd. (a)(2)(B) ; see People v. Superior Court (Jurado) ...