People v. Hill

• Decision Date: 25 January 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 4-18-0041,4-18-0041
• Citation: 2019 IL App (4th) 180041,429 Ill.Dec. 177,123 N.E.3d 1236
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles D. HILL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (4th) 180041

123 N.E.3d 1236

429 Ill.Dec. 177

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Charles D. HILL, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 4-18-0041

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

January 25, 2019

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In June 2017, the State charged defendant, Charles D. Hill, with one count of unlawful possession of a substance containing less than 15 grams of cocaine. In October 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of cocaine located in his car, and the trial court granted the motion.

¶ 2 On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We reverse and remand.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In May 2017, around 10 a.m., Officer Robert Baker was parked in his squad car on west Route 36 near the 2200 block in Decatur when defendant's Chevrolet Monte Carlo quickly decelerated to well below the speed limit, causing traffic to back up. As the car drove by the officer, he noticed the passenger was reclined in the car with his head mostly obstructed by the side panel, where the seatbelt is attached, referred to by the officer as the "B panel." Having observed the "drastic speed reduction" and the passenger "leaning back very low in the seat," Officer Baker drove from his parked location in order to get a better look at the passenger. He testified he was aware from his experience as a police officer that people wanted on warrants or concerned about rival gang members frequently ride in the same manner he was observing in order to remain concealed. When he pulled up next to the vehicle, he was able to see the hair, face, skin tone, and apparent build of the passenger and believed him to be Duane Lee, a person he knew to be wanted on a traffic warrant. While waiting for a backup vehicle to arrive on the scene, the officer followed the vehicle. He traveled approximately 30 blocks from when he first saw the car until it was ultimately stopped. It took some time to catch up to the car from his parked position, and believing the passenger to be Duane Lee, he wanted another police vehicle in the vicinity before confronting Lee. In addition, he noted that once he activated his lights to effectuate the stop, it took several blocks for the car to actually come to a stop. In his experience, when this occurs during a traffic stop, the occupants of the vehicle may be concealing or attempting to conceal or destroy contraband. In such instances, he said, one of the most serious concerns is whether an occupant is seeking to retrieve a weapon. Officer Baker testified that all of these facts were being considered by him as he sought to effectuate the traffic stop.

¶ 5 Once a backup squad car was near, Officer Baker initiated a stop of defendant's vehicle. Approaching from the passenger side, he asked the passenger to identify himself and step out of the vehicle. Officer Baker, immediately upon making contact with the passenger, smelled the odor of "raw" cannabis. Upon being asked by defendant, the driver, what defendant did wrong, on the in-car video stipulated into evidence, Officer Baker said, "I thought [the passenger] was wanted, is why I stopped you, that's why I stopped you." Directing his attention to the passenger, Officer Baker stated, "[A]ctually, to tell you the truth, I thought you were somebody else." Within a matter of approximately 15 seconds, Officer Baker told the occupants he could smell raw cannabis in the car and said he observed a "bud" in the back seat, stating, "I'll show that to you in a minute." After another police car arrived, defendant was asked to exit the vehicle and, after being patted down, to sit on the curb next to the car. A search of the vehicle produced an unspecified amount of cannabis, described by Officer Baker in response to counsel's question as being "much less than a pound or an ounce." In addition, the officers found "a small rock that tested positive for crack cocaine" under the driver's seat. Again, the specific amount was not identified. Defendant was arrested while the passenger, once identified as someone other than the individual wanted on a warrant, was permitted to walk away.

¶ 6 The State charged defendant by information with unlawful possession of a substance containing less than 15 grams of cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016). In October 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine found in the car, arguing the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop and, alternatively, probable cause to search defendant's car. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, and Officer Baker was the only witness called to testify. At the hearing, Officer Baker said he was able to see the entire left side of the passenger's head and neck when he pulled up alongside defendant's car on the driver's side. He believed the person to be Lee based on the hair, face, skin tone, and apparent build of the person he observed in defendant's vehicle. Officer Baker was familiar with Lee from previous observations of him on the street throughout his time as a police officer, as well as his practice of keeping current on persons wanted on warrants. He explained he did this by regularly reviewing the department's records of wanted people in Decatur and then viewing the most recent photos the Decatur Police Department had on those individuals.

¶ 7 During his testimony, the in-car video was admitted and shown to the court. Based on the testimony and the video, the trial court granted the motion to suppress evidence. In its finding, the court concluded there was no bad faith on the part of the officer in stopping the vehicle and noted how the photographs admitted of both the passenger and Lee were "actually quite similar." The trial court found that, when the officer walked up to the vehicle after effectuating the stop, he "wasn't really certain who was seated in the passenger's seat, i.e. , he was not certain it was Mr. Lee." Further, the court found that, although there was more than a vague similarity between the passenger and Lee, there was "no other corroborating evidence." The court went on to note that, had it found the stop valid, the subsequent search of the vehicle would have been justified. The court granted the motion to suppress as to any evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (eff. July, 1, 2017).

¶ 8 This appeal followed.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 A. Traffic Stop

¶ 11 The State argues the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the stop and search of defendant's car. We agree.

¶ 12 "The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated * * *.’ " Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 8, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution focuses on "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Terry , 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868. "The law is well settled that stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the fourth amendment." People v. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. "[A] police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. The standard for a stop is "reasonable, articulable suspicion." Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). "Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer's suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch" ’ of criminal activity." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). Although clearly "seizures," traffic stops are more like Terry investigative detentions than formal arrests and therefore may be reasonable if initially justified and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. People v. Cummings , 2016 IL 115769, ¶15, 399 Ill.Dec. 210, 46 N.E.3d 248.

¶ 13 We apply an objective standard and consider whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action was appropriate, considering the totality of the circumstances. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). "[R]easonable suspicion determinations must be made on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 14, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. "A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). In determining if there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, there is no bright-line rule, but instead the court is to consider the "totality of the circumstances of each case." Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 18, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092.

¶ 14 A motion to suppress requires a two-part standard of review. Timmsen , 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 11, 401 Ill.Dec. 610, 50 N.E.3d 1092. As to the factual findings, the reviewing court will uphold the trial court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Barker , 369 Ill. App. 3d 670, 673, 311 Ill.Dec. 35, 867 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (2007). This deferential standard of review is...