People v. Cummings

• Decision Date: 22 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 115769.,115769.
• Citation: 46 N.E.3d 248
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Derrick A. CUMMINGS, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

46 N.E.3d 248

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant

v.Derrick A. CUMMINGS, Appellee.

No. 115769.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 2016.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Trish Joyce, State's Attorney, of Morrison (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Richard T. Leonard, of the Office of the State Appellate Prosecutor, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Sean Conley, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

Chief Justice GARMAN

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 On April 27, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated this court's judgment in People v. Cummings, 2014 IL 115769, 379 Ill.Dec. 397, 6 N.E.3d 725

(Cummings I ), and remanded the cause for consideration in light of Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Illinois v. Cummings,

––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1892, 191 L.Ed.2d 760 (2015). This court directed the State and defendant to file additional briefs regarding the impact of Rodriguez on this case.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The facts surrounding defendant's arrest are described in detail in our earlier opinion. Cummings I, 2014 IL 115769, ¶¶ 3–10, 379 Ill.Dec. 397, 6 N.E.3d 725

. To summarize, defendant was driving a van registered to a woman named Pearlene Chattic in the city of Sterling. Sterling police officer Shane Bland pulled the van over because there was a warrant out for Chattic's arrest. Bland was unable to see the driver of the van until after he had pulled the vehicle over. Upon approaching, Bland saw defendant was a man and could not have been Chattic. Bland asked defendant for a driver's license and proof of insurance before explaining the reason for the stop. Defendant responded that he did not have a driver's license and Bland cited him for driving while his license was suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d) (West 2010).

¶ 4 The circuit court of Whiteside County granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence, and the appellate court affirmed. People v. Cummings, 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162

. This court affirmed, with two justices dissenting, finding that Bland's license request impermissibly prolonged the seizure of defendant and the van. Cummings I, 2014 IL 115769, 379 Ill.Dec. 397, 6 N.E.3d 725. This court was in unanimous agreement that the initial stop was lawful, because of Bland's reasonable suspicion “the driver was subject to seizure.” Id. ¶ 20. This court also unanimously concluded Bland's reasonable suspicion that the driver was subject to arrest disappeared when he saw that the driver was a man and not Chattic, a woman. Likewise, defendant's production of a license was compelled and not consensual. The case thus presented a fairly narrow issue: whether asking for a driver's license in a lawfully initiated stop, without reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or that the driver is subject to arrest, violates the fourth amendment by impermissibly prolonging the stop.

¶ 5 The majority concluded that, once Bland's reasonable suspicion evaporated, the request for identification was unrelated to the reason for the stop, and it impermissibly extended the stop. Id. ¶ 26. The dissent concluded the request for a driver's license was one of the “ordinary inquir[ies] incident to such a stop” permitted under Illinois v. Caballes, such that it did not impermissibly extend the stop. Id. ¶ 44 (Garman, C.J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)

. The court entered judgment on March 20, 2014. On April 22, the court granted the State's motion to stay the mandate pending its filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which the State filed on August 18, 2014.

¶ 6 While the State's petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015)

. In Rodriguez, the Court considered whether an eight-minute delay after a completed traffic stop, in order to conduct a drug-detecting dog sniff, violates the fourth amendment by impermissibly prolonging the stop. The Court had previously upheld a dog sniff conducted contemporaneously with a traffic stop, so long as it did not prolong the stop “beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission” of the traffic stop. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. It had also upheld unrelated questioning contemporaneous with a traffic stop, so long as it did not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)

. The Rodriguez Court also noted that some lower courts had given officers leeway to conduct a dog sniff at an unrelated traffic stop where the prolonging of the stop was “de minimis. ” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615 (allowing two additional minutes for a dog sniff (citing United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir.1999) )). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rodriguez had concluded the eight-minute delay was only a de minimis intrusion on the defendant's fourth amendment rights.

¶ 7 The Supreme Court rejected that rule allowing de minimis prolonging of a stop and held that the dog sniff, as “a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,’ ” was not part of the officer's “mission” for the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615

(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) ). The Court defined the mission of the stop as “to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop” and to “attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. The safety concerns of the stop include “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly” (id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615 ) and maintaining officer safety, as “[t]raffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1616 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330, 129 S.Ct. 781 ). The mission's safety concerns permit officers to make “ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 ). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. Actions undertaken outside the mission would cause the stop to become unlawful if they “ ‘measurably extend the duration of the stop’ ” without “the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781 ). Thus, the United States Supreme Court drew a bright line against prolonging a stop with inquiries outside the mission of a traffic stop, unless an officer has reasonable suspicion for those inquiries. It also provided firmer guidance as to which inquiries fall within that mission.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Our question on remand is limited to the impact of Rodriguez on our decision in Cummings I. Defendant has not raised any arguments relating to any distinct protection under article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970

that would require a departure from general fourth amendment analysis. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6 ; see generally People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 289–314, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006) (describing this court's limited lockstep approach to synchronizing Illinois's search and seizure protections with the fourth amendment). The sole question is whether, in light of Rodriguez , Officer Bland's request for a driver's license after concluding defendant was not Pearlene Chattic impermissibly prolonged the stop, violating the fourth amendment.

¶ 10 The parties' arguments focus on the Supreme Court's descriptions of the ordinary inquiries of a traffic stop. The State's position is that asking for a driver's license is an ordinary inquiry incident to every lawful vehicle stop, and that Rodriguez thus abrogated our prior holding in Cummings I. Because the stop was otherwise reasonable in accordance with fourth amendment precedent, the driver's license request did not involve the sort of stop-prolonging unrelated criminal investigation prohibited by Rodriguez.

¶ 11 Defendant, focusing on the Rodriguez Court's statement that an officer's mission in a traffic stop “typically” includes checking the driver's license, argues the reason for the stop informs which inquiries would be ordinary for that type of stop. In defendant's view, because Bland pulled him over solely to seek Chattic's arrest, his driver's license would not be part of any ordinary inquiry. Defendant notes the Rodriguez Court's repeated references to enforcement of traffic laws. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1615

(noting that license checks, registration inspection, and checking for outstanding warrants “serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly”); id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (“Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”). In defendant's view, this was a highly atypical traffic stop, having no origin in enforcing traffic laws. The State counters by arguing the only atypical element of this stop was its brevity, and by pointing out that, in practical terms, defendant argues no inquiries could be ordinary inquiries in this stop.

¶ 12 The State additionally notes...