People v. Hirschfeld
| Citation | 282 AD2d 337,726 N.Y.S.2d 3 |
| Parties | (A.D. 1 Dept. 2001) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Abraham Hirschfeld, Defendant-Appellant. 3886 : FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT |
| Decision Date | 19 April 2001 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Amyjane Rettew - for respondent,
Irving Anolik - for defendant-appellant.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J. at initial denial of suppression hearing; Ira Beal, J. at subsequent denial of suppression hearing, jury trial and sentence), rendered August 1, 2000, convicting defendant of criminal solicitation in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 1 to 3 years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant's various challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that defendant's conviction was based upon legally sufficient evidence. Moreover, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and there is no basis for reversal in the interest of justice.
The evidence warranted the conclusion that defendant, through an employee serving as an intermediary, hired an unidentified individual to kill defendant's business partner. There is no basis upon which to disturb the jury's determinations concerning credibility. The credible testimony of the intermediary was corroborated by defendant's tape-recorded admissions to his secretary, who was cooperating with the prosecution (see, People v Breland, 83 N.Y.2d 286, 292-294). Further corroboration was found in various circumstantial evidence including damaging statements made by defendant in his Grand Jury testimony and his statements to the news media. The record clearly establishes defendant's homicidal intent and does not support defendant's argument that he was convicted on the basis of "rash," "thoughtless" or "eccentric" utterances.
Contrary to defendant's unpreserved argument, the fact that the killer for hire remains unidentified does not affect the sufficiency or weight of the evidence in this case. The intermediary never learned the name of the prospective assassin, and never saw this person because the conversations and transfers of cash took place through a car's slightly opened tinted window. However, the People were not required to prove this person's identity (see, People v Taylor, 74 A.D.2d 177, 179, lv denied 50 N.Y.2d 1005), and the totality of the evidence led to the inescapable conclusion that defendant criminally solicited that individual.
Defendant did not make an unequivocal request to represent himself, and to the extent that he made any such request, that request was abandoned. His motion to proceed pro se was not "unequivocal" because it was made in the context of numerous delaying tactics and complaints about defendant's former counsel, and was couched in terms of defendant's allegedly being constrained to represent himself in event that the court denied him time to retain...
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