People v. Hodges
| Decision Date | 16 July 1925 |
| Docket Number | Motion No. 108. |
| Citation | 231 Mich. 656,204 N.W. 801 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. HODGES. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lewis Hodges was placed on probation on pleading guilty to a charge of breaking and entering. On being sentenced for violation of a condition of his probation after the expiration of probationary period, he brings habeas corpus and certiorari. Writs dismissed.
Argued before McDONALD, C. J., and CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, and FELLOWS, JJ. Andrew B. Dougherty, Atty. Gen., O. L. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., and George S. Lovelace, Special Prosecutor, of Muskegon, for the People.
Willard G. Turner, Jr., of Muskegon, for respondent.
On April 9, 1923, Lewis Hodges, who had before that pleaded guilty to a charge of breaking and entering was placed on probation (section 2029 et seq., C. L. 1915). March 16, 1925, the sheriff of the county filed with the clerk an application to have the probation revoked because Hodges had violated the condition of his probation, in that he had upon his plea of guilty been convicted of a criminal offense, that of contributing to the delinquency of one Myrtle Miller, a minor under the age of 17 years. On the same day of the filing of this petition, Hodges was in court, and from the return to the writ of certiorari it appears that the probation officer was ill and unable to appear in court and the hearing on the sheriff's petition was adjourned until April 13 following without bond and upon the promise of Hodges to then appear. He did appear on the 13th and a hearing was had, and he was sentenced on the original charge. Later his present counsel moved to set aside the sentence based on the ground that it was imposed after the period of probation had expired and was, therefore, void. We allowed habeas corpus and certiorari to review this proceeding.
We have spent much time and have examined a large number of cases in an unsuccessful search for a controlling precedent. Before the enactment of probation laws, there was an irreconcilable conflict between the state courts as to the inherent power of courts to suspend sentence. All agreed that the power existed to stay sentence for the purpose of making a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, or to prepare a case for review, or to apply for a pardon, or to satisfy the conscience of the judge as to the proper sentence or for kindred purposes. But upon the right of the court to suspend sentence during good behavior, or with a view of the ultimate discharge of defendant without sentence, there was discord which cannot be harmonized. Among our own cases, see Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 296;People v. Reilly, 53 Mich. 260, 18 N. W. 849;People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 19 N. W. 571;People v. Kennedy, 58 Mich. 372, 25 N. W. 318;People v. Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W. 497. So far as the federal courts are concerned, the question was settled adversely to the exercise of the power in Ex parte United States, Petitioner, 242 U. S. 27, 37 S. Ct. 72, 61 L. Ed. 129, L. R. A. 1917E, 1178, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355, but that case recognizes the power of Congress to pass appropriate legislation. In the margin in that case will be found the citation of a large number of cases from the state courts dealing with the question.
Marks v. Wentworth, 199 Mass. 44, 85 N. E. 81, called to our attention by defendant's counsel, is not helpful to defendant. It has long been the practice in Massachusetts ‘to lay the case on file,’ thus suspending sentence. Of this practice it was said in Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133:
‘Such an order is not equivalent to a final judgment, or to a nolle prosequi or discontinuance, by which the case is put out of court; but is a mere suspending of active proceedings in the case, which dispenses with the necessity of entering formal continuances upon the dockets, and leaves it within the power of the court at any time, upon the motion of either party, to bring the case forward and pass lawful order or judgment therein.’
In both the Dowdican and the Marks Cases, it was pointed out that this could only be done with the consent of the defendant. In the Marks Case the defendant objected, and the writ of mandamus was issued, not to compel his discharge, but to compel disposition of the case either by sentence or...
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