Ex parte Dearo

• Citation: 96 Cal.App.2d 141,214 P.2d 585
• Decision Date: 17 February 1950
• Docket Number: Cr. 4429
• Parties: Ex parte DEARO.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 585

214 P.2d 585

96 Cal.App.2d 141

Ex parte DEARO.

Cr. 4429.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 17, 1950.

Bertram H. Ross, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

W. E. Simpson, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, for respondent County of Los Angeles.

SHINN, Presiding Justice.

On March 13, 1949 Albert Dearo was convicted in the city court of the city of San Fernando of violating a city ordinance declaring it a misdemeanor to be drunk in a public place. He was sentenced to the county jail for 180 days. Sentence was suspended and he was placed upon probation for a period of two years upon specified conditions. On October 25, 1949 the city court revoked his probation and he was committed to the county jail to serve the sentence previously pronounced. By this petition in habeas corpus, Dearo seeks to obtain his release upon the ground that the order revoking probation was void and in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California because petitioner was not present in court or represented by counsel and was given no opportunity to be heard in respect to revocation. It is also alleged that petitioner did not in any way violate any of the terms and conditions of probation.

The order revoking probation was based solely upon the report of a probation officer which stated that petitioner had been charged with assault with intent to commit murder and assault with intent to commit robbery, consisting of the attempted robbery of one Talamontes by a gang of eight Mexican boys, in which Talamontes was beaten and shot in the leg; on September 12, 1949, petitioner was found guilty of simple assault, the robbery charge was dismissed, and petitioner was sentenced to serve two months in the county jail. At the time of the probation officer's report petitioner was still serving this sentence. The report stated further that in violation of the express conditions of his probation petitioner had continued to use intoxicating liquor, failed to obtain employment, and continued to associate with 'his same old undesirable companions.'

Section 1203.2 of the Penal Code provides that 'at any time during the probationary period * * * the court may in its discretion * * * revoke and terminate such probation, if the interests of justice so require, and if the court in its judgment, shall have reason to believe from the report of the probation officer, or otherwise, that the person so placed upon probation is violating any of the conditions of his probation, or engaging in criminal practices, or has become abandoned to improper associates or a vicious life.'

The court was authorized to revoke probation solely upon the basis of the probation officer's report. Petitioner had already been sentenced and was not entitled to notice and a hearing. The absence of opportunity to appear and be heard did not violate any constitutional right of petitioner. Probation is not a matter of right; it is an act of clemency, the granting and revocation of which are within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Silverman, 33 Cal.App.2d 1, 5, 92 P.2d 507. Nor are probation proceedings a phase of the criminal prosecution in which the accused has a right 'to appear and defend, in person and with counsel.' Const., Art. 1, sec. 13; People v. Fields, 88 Cal.App.2d 30, 33, 198 P.2d 104. Although a hearing as to revocation should be granted in the interest of fairness and sound judicial administration, if the ex parte showing is less than conclusive, it is a discretionary matter under our probation law and does not go to jurisdiction. It is well settled that where judgment has been duly pronounced and then suspended upon granting of probation, the probation may be revoked without notice and the defendant ordered committed pursuant to the judgment. People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal.App.2d 606, 61 P.2d 352; People v. Scott, 74 Cal.App.2d 782, 784, 169 P.2d 970; see also In re Young, 121 Cal.App. 711, 10 P.2d 154 and cases there reviewed; People v. Hunter, 42 Cal.App.2d 87, 91-92, 108 P.2d 472; People v. Tibbits, 60 Cal.App.2d 335, 337, 140 P.2d 726; cf. People v. Williams, 24 Cal.2d 848, 151 P.2d 244. The court may act informally but it may not act arbitrarily; to be valid the order of revocation must be based upon a factual showing sufficient to justify an exercise of discretion. In re Cook, 67 Cal.App.2d 20, 26, 153 P.2d 578. The granting of probation has always been regarded in California as a matter of grace and forbearance and the revocation of probation as an informal matter in which procedural steps of a trial need not be observed; and the legislature has not changed the law in these respects. To hold, at this late date, that a probationer has a constitutional right to notice and a hearing (trial) would be a repudiation of everything that has been said on the point in previous cases.

The great preponderance of authority in other jurisdictions is clearly in accord with the rule established in our state that probation is a matter of grace. It necessarily follows that there is no constitutional right to notice and hearing on revocation of probation or suspended sentence. Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569; Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798; People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044; State ex rel. Jenks v. Municipal Court, 197 Minn. 141, 266 N.W. 433; Ex parte Boyd, 73 Okl.Cr. 441, 122 P.2d 162; Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311. Accord: Mincy v. Crow, 198 Ga. 245, 31 S.E.2d 406; Carpenter v. Berry, 95 N.H. 151, 59 A.2d 485; People ex rel. Pasco v. Trombly, 173 App.Div. 497, 160 N.Y.S. 67; In re Weber, 75 Ohio App. 206, 61 N.E.2d 502; Ex parte Haber, 132 N.J.L. 49, 38 A.2d 448; State v. Miller, 122 S.C. 468, 115 S.E. 742. For substantially the same reasons, the prevailing rule is that parole or conditional pardon may also be validly revoked without notice or hearing. In re Smith, 33 Cal.2d 797, 804, 205 P.2d 662; Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146, 45 L.R.A. 502, 82 Am.St.Rep. 17; Pippin v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712; State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N.W. 510, 104 Am.St.Rep. 361; In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 146 P. 1009, L.R.A.1915F, 541; Wright v. Herzog, 182 Md. 316, 34 A.2d 460; Guy v. Utecht, 216 Minn. 255, 12 N.W.2d 753; People ex rel. Hannon v. Warden, 209 App.Div. 521, 205 N.Y.S. 235; Ex parte Paquette, 112 Vt. 441, 27 A.2d 129; 39 Am.Jur., sec. 77, p. 568. But cf. People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118; Fleenor v. Hammond, 6 Cir., 116 F.2d 982, 132 A.L.R. 1241. It is generally recognized by the authorities that while revocation is largely a discretionary matter, the rights of the individual are adequately protected by the availability of habeas corpus to redress wholly arbitrary conduct on the part of the revoking official. See In re Cook, supra.

Our research has disclosed only four jurisdictions in which the right to notice and hearing on revocation of probation has been said to be a constitutional one. Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 P. 713, L.R.A.1918C, 549; State v. O'Neal, 147 Wash. 169, 265 P. 175, following the Lucero case; State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463, denial of hearing held error; and Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So.2d 607, dictum only, Cf. State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970, dictum that due process is met by hearing. In these jurisdictions, probation appears to be regarded not as an act of clemency, but as a substantial judicially established right of the defendant of which he may not be divested without a trial. The rationale of the decisions is not in accord with the views expressed in the California cases and other leading decisions, which we have cited, and we see no occasion to follow them. Many of the cases cited in the annotations, 54 A.L.R. 1471; 60 A.L.R. 1420; 132 A.L.R. 1248, in support of the proposition that notice and hearing are prerequisites to revocation merely hold, without reference to or discussion of constitutional guarantees, that statutes providing for notice and hearing must be followed (see Plunkett v. Miller, 161 Ga. 466, 131 S.E. 170; People v. Enright, 332 Ill.App. 655, 75 N.E.2d 777; Blusinsky v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 395, 144 S.W.2d 1038; People v. Myers, 306 Mich. 100, 10 N.W.2d 323; People v. Hill, 164 Misc. 370, 300 N.Y.S. 532; State v. Burnette, 173 N.C. 734, 91 S.E. 364; State ex rel. Vadnais v. Stair, 48 N.D. 472, 185 N.W. 301; Howe v. State, 170 Tenn. 571, 98 S.W.2d 93; In re Hall, 100 Vt. 197, 136 A. 24, or that failure to give notice and hearing according to ordinary standards of acceptable procedure may constitute reversible error. See People v. Hodges, 231 Mich. 656, 204 N.W. 801; Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748, 181 N.W. 862; Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 38 S.E.2d 479. See also, In re Hall, 78 Okl.Cr. 83, 143 P.2d 833. Such cases, of course, are of no avail to petitioner here, in view of the fact, which must be conceded, that the procedure followed...