People v. Hoerle
| Decision Date | 12 July 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 611,611,1 |
| Citation | 3 Mich.App. 693,143 N.W.2d 593 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney HOERLE, Defendant-Appellant. Cal |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Philip A. Gillis, Detroit, for appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor Gen., Lansing, Samuel H. Olsen, Prosecuting Atty., Wayne County, Detroit, for appellee.
Before LESINSKI, C.J., and T. G. KAVANAGH and WATTS, JJ.
Although the late Judge Watts heard oral arguments on the above matter, he took no part in the decision in this case.
On December 5, 1958, the defendant struck William McEvoy several times with a sledge hammer, and as a result of these blows McEvoy died on December 10. The defendant was arrested on December 5 and taken to the police station and the prosecutor's office where he made a formal statement.
On December 30, 1958, the prosecutor filed a petition in the juvenile division of the Wayne county probate court alleging that the defendant was within the provisions of C.L.1948 and C.L.S.1961 § 712A.1 et seq., as amended (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 27.3178 (598.1) et seq.) and that on the 5th day of December did violate a law of the state by killing William McEvoy in the city of Detroit, thereby committing the crime of murder.
This petition was brought on for hearing on February 3, 1959, and a notation on the complaint dated that day recites: 'Petition amended in court to change charge to be murder in the second degree, and petition to read murder in the second degree.'
The petition concludes: 'I therefore, pray that the said facts and circumstances be investigated and that such disposition be made of said matter as the court may direct.'
On the same day the court entered its order which recited that the petition had been filed alleging that the defendant did commit murder in the second degree; that he is over the age of 15 years having attained that age on May 24, 1958, and is accused of an act the nature of which constitutes a felony, and ordered: '* * * that the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Probate Court in and for the county of Wayne, Michigan in this matter be and is hereby waived to the Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit. * * *'
On the next day, February 4, 1959, the defendant was arraigned in recorder's court on a charge of 'murder languishing' which is murder in the first degree. He stood mute and examination was set and later waived by his appointed counsel. On July 28, 1959, he was permitted to plead guilty to second degree murder and on August 14, 1959, was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On December 24, 1963, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty was filed and a hearing had thereon. The motion was denied and on leave granted, this appeal was taken.
It is claimed as error that the prosecutor's petition for a waiver was granted by the juvenile court only for the purpose of trial on the charge of murder in the second degree, and hence the charge of murder in the first degree on which the defendant was tried, exceeded the court's jurisdiction.
The prosecutor claims that the juvenile court can either waive or not waive jurisdiction, and if he waives it may not be conditioned or limited.
The appellant claims that the juvenile court can and did limit and condition his waiver for the prosecution only of the offense in the nature of the particular felony his examination and investigation indicates.
The appellant here also claims that where a waiver is obtained under circumstances indicating it was obtained with the understanding that the prosecution would be for a particular felony, it has no effect--indeed it is not a waiver at all--for some other purpose.
'In any case where a child over the age of 15 years is accused of any act the nature of which constitutes a felony, the judge of probate * * * may, after investigation and examination * * * waive jurisdiction; whereupon it shall be lawful to try such child in the court having general criminal jurisdiction of such offense.' C.L.1948 § 712A.4 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 27.3178 ...
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...misapprehension, persuasion, promises, inadvertence, or ignorance." That language was relied on by our Court in People v. Hoerle (1966), 3 Mich.App. 693, 143 N.W.2d 593, where the original charge was second-degree murder. The juvenile division waived jurisdiction and the defendant was arrai......
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State v. Walton
...prosecution of Randolph on two different criminal charges that had not originally been filed in juvenile court"); People v. Hoerle, 3 Mich.App. 693, 143 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1966) (stating that a waiver to permit prosecution for one offense is not waiver to permit prosecution for a greater one)......
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D.D.A. v. State
...But see Miller v. Quatsoe, 348 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.Wis.1972) (waiver only effective as to specific charge alleged); People v. Hoerle, 3 Mich.App. 693, 143 N.W.2d 593 (1966) (waiver for one offense does not allow prosecution for greater offense); Gibson v. State, 47 Wis.2d 810, 177 N.W.2d 912, ......
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