People v. Holford

• Decision Date: 28 June 1965
• Docket Number: Cr. 8724
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 403 P.2d 423 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Lee HOLFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 167

45 Cal.Rptr. 167

63 Cal.2d 74, 403 P.2d 423

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Lee HOLFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 8724.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 28, 1965.

Levy, DeRoy, Geffner, Koszdin & Glow and Richard J. Cantrell, Long Beach, for defendant and appellant.

Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., H. Warren Siegel, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

In reversing defendant's conviction for violation of section 20001 of the Vehicle Code, which condemns as a felony the failure of a driver of a vehicle in an accident resulting in an injury to another person to stop, render aid and leave his identification, ¹ we discuss three issues. First, we hold that the admission of defendant's incriminating statements constituted a violation of his right to counsel under People v. Dorado (1965) 62 A.C. 350, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, and prejudiced the defendant to the extent that we must reverse the conviction. Second, we point out that even if we regard one of the witnesses as an accomplice in the crime, the record demonstrates sufficient corroboration of his testimony to sustain in conviction. Third, we explain why the court on retrial should give an instruction more clearly delineating the requirement that defendant harbor knowledge that an injury resulted from the accident.

On November 25, 1963, at about 4:30 p.m., as Frank Rink drove his automobile in the center lane of Rosecrans Boulevard in Los Angeles, a light blue Dodge automobile, proceeding in the same direction, suddenly moved from the right lane into the center lane, striking his car. The impact threw Rink against the passenger side of his vehicle; his car crossed over the double line and collided head-on with a pickup truck. Rink suffered serious injury.

The Dodge, occupied by a male driver and two other men, continued down Rosecrans Boulevard without stopping and turned onto Paramount Boulevard. Two witnesses observed the license number of the Dodge and reported it to the police.

Later that evening the police arrested defendant. Defendant owned a Dodge automobile which bore the reported license number ² and exhibited paint marks on the bumper. The police took defendant to the police station and there questioned him. During his first interrogation defendant denied that he was at any time on Rosecrans Boulevard. But, according to the testimony of an examining officer, defendant, during a second interrogation on the same evening, stated that after leaving a bar with two companions he drove down Rosecrans Boulevard. Defendant further explained that as he changed lanes he felt a minor jar of his vehicle and heard a slight scraping noise but did not see what had happened. According to the officer, defendant said that after this event, one of the passengers, a Floyd Hathcock, informed him that the automobile which his car had hit had thereafter gone out of control and smashed into another automobile. Defendant further stated that while he began to pull his car over to the side of the road in order to stop, Hathcock and a third occupant, Richard Carlton, encouraged him to leave the scene of the accident. The officer also testified that defendant declared that he left the scene primarily because he had been drinking and felt that he would be fastened with responsibility for the accident.

At the trial defendant testified that after he felt that his car had bumped another vehicle he suggested to his passengers that an accident might have taken place and that they return to the scene of the impact. Hathcock advised, however, that he did not think there had been an accident, although he saw the automobile that they had sideswiped 'swerve a little.' According to defendant, both passengers urged him not to stop, saying that if an accident had occurred, the fact that they had been drinking, even in the absence of fault, would 'get * * * (them) in trouble.' Defendant denied that he had told the police that he knew of the collision.

Hathcock's testimony consisted of assertions that he felt defendant's car hit another vehicle and that he saw the pickup truck swerve but did not see a collision. He stated that defendant suggested that they stop because of the possibility of an accident in which someone may have been injured; Hathcock, however, told defendant not to do so because they had been drinking and thus might be held liable.

An independent witness testified that he heard an audible noise when the two automobiles came into contact with each other and a loud noise when the automobile collided with the pickup truck.

The trial judge, in the presence of the jury, conducted a voir dire examination for the purpose of reaching a determination as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements. The record does not indicate whether, in accordance with constitutional requirements (Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908), the trial court preliminarily found that defendant voluntarily made the incriminating statements. We need not probe this issue, however, since we conclude that the statements should have been excluded upon another ground.

The record does not disclose that prior to rendering the statements defendant was ever advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent or that he had otherwise waived those rights. When, at the police station, defendant gave his statements, the police had already arrested him and had engaged him for the second time in a series of interrogations. A police officer had told defendant that statements of various witnesses indicated that he had committed the crime. Since, under such circumstances the process of interrogation lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, and sicne defendant was under arrest, the accusatory stage, or that stage at which a suspect is entitled to counsel, had matured. (People v. Stewart (1965) 62 A.C. 597, 43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97.) In the absence of any indication that prior to the interrogations defendant had been advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent or that he had otherwise waived those rights, those statements were erroneously admitted. (People v. Dorado, supra, 62 A.C. 350, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361; People v. Stewart, supra, 62 A.C. at p. 606, 43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97.)

Since defendant's statements did not constitute a confession or an admission tantamount to a confession, however, we must consider whether this erroneous introduction constituted such prejudice to defendant as to require reversal under article VI, section 4 1/2 of the California Constitution (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837, 299 P.2d 243). We point out why we have concluded that the erroneous admission of defendant's statements resulted in such prejudice.

Section 20001 of the Vehicle Code penalizes the driver who fails to stop the vehicle which is 'involved in an accident resulting in injury'; previous cases have said that knowledge of injury is an essential element of the crime proscribed by that section (e. g., People v. Mayo (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 527, 534, 15 Cal.Rptr. 366; People v. Blankenship (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 173, 177, 340 P.2d 34; People v. Kuhn (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 109, 112, 292 P.2d 964; People v. Rallo (1931) 119 Cal.App. 393, 398 et seq., 6 P.2d 516; see Garabedian v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 124, 28 Cal.Rptr. 318, 378 P.2d 590). Usually, however, such knowledge must be derived from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the accident. (E. g., People v. Kuhn, supra, 139 Cal.App. 2d at p. 112, 292 P.2d 964.) Yet the driver who leaves the scene of the accident seldom possesses actual knowledge of injury; by leaving the scene he forecloses and opportunity to acquire such actual knowledge. Hence a requirement of actual knowledge of injury would realistically render the statute useless. We therefore believe that criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person. ³

In the instant case defendant's incriminating statement forged an important link in the chain of culpability. Defendant stated that he had been told by Hathcock that the car he had struck had thereafter crashed head-on into another vehicle. Defendant's acknowledgment that Hathcock informed him of the facts of the accident contributed a vital element in establishing that defendant knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury. The impact of the statement becomes even more important in view of the fact that at the trial Hathcock testified that he did not see any car strike the pickup truck.

Having concluded that the admission of defendant's incriminating statement worked prejudicial error, we need not consider defendant's additional asserted reason for its exclusion upon the ground that the prosecution did not sufficiently establish the corpus delicti.

We turn to an explanation of our reasons for rejecting defendant's second contention that the conviction cannot stand because it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of Hathcock, an asserted accomplice. Although we have concluded that Hathcock acted as an accomplice, we find sufficient evidence in the record to corroborate his restimony and to tie defendant into the crime.

A determinative test is framed by section 1111 of the Penal Code: 'A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the...