People v. Holliday, Docket No. 77211
| Decision Date | 12 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 77211 |
| Citation | 144 Mich.App. 560,376 N.W.2d 154 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario HOLLIDAY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., and Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by Mardi Crawford, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and BEASLEY and SIMON, * JJ.
Defendant, Mario Holliday, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, contrary to M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, and felony firearm, contrary to M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and to two years on the felony firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
On May 12, 1983, Donald Dial was shot and killed in the hallway of an apartment building located at 95 East Palmer in the City of Detroit. In his opening statement, the prosecutor advanced the following theory of the case:
The principal witness for the prosecution was 17-year-old Charles Toler, who was with defendant when the shooting occurred. Toler testified that the victim, Donald Dial, unlocked the door to allow both defendant and Toler to enter the apartment building at 95 East Palmer to visit Annie Jean Mason who, according to Toler, was like a stepmother to him. At that time, Dial was coming out of a lady's apartment, trying to go into his apartment. Dial said something to defendant, which Toler did not hear. Defendant turned around and said, "I don't like what you just said", pulled a gun out and shot Dial three times. After the shooting, Toler ran upstairs to Mason's apartment and told the occupants that defendant had just shot Dial.
When Toler was first questioned by the police, he did not tell them that he had seen anything. However, the next day, he gave a statement describing what defendant had done. Defense counsel claimed that, to induce Toler to talk, a police officer told Toler that he could be charged with first-degree murder and that that crime carried a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole. When, on cross-examination of Toler, defense counsel, in the presence of the jury, asked if the police officer told him that murder in the first degree carried a mandatory life in prison without parole, the trial judge advised the jury to "forget anything about punishment" because the jury "had nothing to do with punishment".
On appeal, defendant raises six issues. First, defendant claims that he was denied his right of confrontation when defense counsel was not permitted to question the eyewitness about the possible punishment the witness may have avoided by agreeing to testify.
Except for defendant, Charles Toler was the only eyewitness to the murder of Donald Dial. As indicated, he originally did not tell the police that he saw the shooting, but later gave a statement implicating the defendant. On cross-examination of Toler, defense counsel apparently intended to try to get Toler to testify that the police had told him he could be charged with first-degree murder, and that a conviction carried a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Defense counsel cross-examined Toler in part as follows:
Defendant claims that it constituted a denial of his constitutional right of confrontation 1 when the trial court limited cross-examination of Toler by refusing to allow any further inquiry into the sentence for first-degree murder which, under defendant's theory, the witness avoided by agreeing to testify. Defendant argues that going into the penalty for first-degree murder was necessary so that the jury could fully assess the bias of Charles Toler. According to defendant, instead of instructing the jury to disregard all testimony concerning punishment, the trial court should have instructed the jury that evidence of the penalty for first-degree murder could be used for the limited purpose of assessing the credibility of the prosecution's sole eyewitness, but should be disregarded for all other purposes. In this connection, defendant relied on People v. Bell. 2
The resolution of the issue in this case turns on the adequacy of the scope of cross-examination permitted by the trial court. While the scope of cross-examination is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, that discretion must be exercised with due regard for a defendant's constitutional rights. 3 A limitation on cross-examination which prevents a defendant from placing before the jury facts upon which an inference of bias, prejudice or credibility of a witness may be drawn amounts to an abuse of discretion and can constitute a denial of the right of confrontation. 4 If cross-examination of a prosecution witness has been unreasonably limited, a conviction based upon the testimony of such witness should not be sustained. 5 While failure to permit adequate cross-examination constitutes error, reversal is not always required where the error is harmless or no prejudice results. 6
The primary interest secured by the confrontation clause is the right of cross-examination. 7 The disclosure of a witness's motivation for testifying is an important function of the right of cross-examination. In People v. Bell, supra, we held that it was reversible error for the trial court to bar cross-examination of an accomplice concerning the sentence that was possible when he pled guilty to a lesser offense and agreed to testify. We held that the jury could not fully appreciate the significance of the witness's plea bargain, as it related to his credibility, unless they were informed of the difference in punishment between the plea bargain charge and the crime with which the defendant was charged. Recognizing that the jury should not normally be informed of possible punishment if a defendant is convicted, we permitted introduction of evidence concerning the penalty with a limiting instruction to the jury that the evidence regarding the sentence could only be used to assess the witness's credibility.
In the within case, defendant reasons that under Bell his right of confrontation was denied when he could not fully elaborate to the jury the sentence for first-degree murder that Toler might have faced if he had not agreed to testify. The context of the trial court's ruling in Bell is entirely different than here. In Bell, the witness testifying was an accomplice. Here, there is no evidence to indicate Toler was an accomplice. In Bell, the witness had been charged with armed robbery and had pled guilty to assault with intent to rob and steal while armed. Here, Toler was never charged with any felony because there was no evidence to indicate he was involved. We believe Bell is distinguishable from the within case and, thus, not controlling precedent.
In addition, it must be remembered that in this case the jury was hearing a first-degree murder case against defendant, Mario Holliday, and that it is elementary that the jury was not to be instructed upon or to decide the case upon the fact that first-degree murder carries a mandatory, non-paroleable life sentence.
In one sense, the issue here was whether to permit defense counsel to bring into the case by the back door the fact that first-degree murder carries a mandatory, non-paroleable life sentence and to...
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