People v. Hollman
| Citation | 590 N.E.2d 204,581 N.Y.S.2d 619,79 N.Y.2d 181 |
| Parties | , 590 N.E.2d 204 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Troy HOLLMAN, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gregory SAUNDERS, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 20 February 1992 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
In People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562, we set out a four-tiered method for evaluating the propriety of encounters initiated by police officers in their criminal law enforcement capacity. If a police officer seeks simply to request information from an individual, that request must be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality. The common-law right of inquiry, a wholly separate level of contact, is "activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion" (People v. De Bour, supra, at 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562). Where a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a particular person was involved in a felony or misdemeanor, the officer is authorized to forcibly stop and detain that person. Finally, where the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime, an arrest is authorized.
In the two cases before us, we revisit De Bour in order to clarify the difference between a request for information and the common-law right of inquiry. Because the two terms on their face are so close in meaning, the legal significance we intended each to have has become obscured. The result has been inconsistency in the evaluation of markedly similar police encounters.
We are convinced that the four-part De Bour analysis still has vitality. Each progressive level, however, authorizes a separate degree of police interference with the liberty of the person approached and consequently requires escalating suspicion on the part of the investigating officer. We conclude, as a general matter, that a request for information involves basic, nonthreatening questions regarding, for instance, identity, address or destination. As we stated in De Bour, these questions need be supported only by an objective credible reason not necessarily indicative of criminality. Once the officer asks more pointed questions that would lead the person approached reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing and is the focus of the officer's investigation, the officer is no longer merely seeking information. This has become a common-law inquiry that must be supported by a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot.
On November 4, 1989, Richard Canale, an undercover narcotics officer on duty at the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City, observed the defendant Troy Hollman coming down an escalator. The defendant was carrying an orange bag and appeared to be looking around the lower level of the terminal as he descended. When he reached the bottom, he looked around again and then went back up the escalator.
A few minutes later, Canale again observed defendant coming down the escalator, this time with a companion, who was carrying a black knapsack. Canale continued to watch the defendant and his companion. The two spoke briefly in front of a men's room, and then separated, standing 10 feet apart with the defendant's orange bag placed on the ground between them. The two maintained these positions for approximately 20 minutes. The defendant retrieved his bag, went into the men's room, and was followed by his companion. After the two exited the men's room, they resumed their positions. About 15 minutes later, they boarded a bus. The defendant placed his orange bag in the overhead rack two or three seats up from the seat which he eventually took for himself. The defendant's companion placed his bag directly above his seat, but defendant reached up and pushed his companion's bag closer to his own bag. The two sat together in the rear of the bus.
Canale approached the two men, identified himself as a narcotics officer and requested their permission to ask a few questions. At this time, Canale was either standing in front of, or kneeling upon, the seat directly in front of the defendant and his companion. A second officer was located behind Canale.
Canale asked the two if they were traveling together and the defendant answered that they were not and that they had just met. The officer then asked them where they were headed; the defendant said he was going to Virginia, while his companion stated that he was going to "Carolina." Finally, Canale asked where the defendant had checked his luggage. The defendant replied that they did not have any luggage or carry-on bags. When addressed directly, the defendant's companion gave the same answer. The two denied that the orange bag and the black knapsack belonged to them. The officer asked other passengers whether the bags belonged to them. When they too denied ownership of the bags, the officer opened them, finding less than an ounce of crack cocaine in a sneaker box in the orange bag and empty plastic vials and some white powder in the knapsack.
Hollman was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees, criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The defendant moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that the search and seizure had been unlawful. A suppression hearing was conducted on March 5, 1990, and the defendant's motion was denied. The suppression court concluded that Canale's observations were sufficient to provide him with a founded suspicion that criminality might be afoot, which entitled him to make an inquiry.
After the defendant's suppression motion was denied, count one of the indictment, charging criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, was dismissed and defendant pleaded guilty to third degree possession in full satisfaction of the indictment. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the judgment of the lower court. On appeal, the defendant argued that Canale's conduct constituted a seizure that needed to have been supported by reasonable suspicion of an actual or imminent crime. The Appellate Division determined that this argument was unpreserved, but reached it in the interests of justice and found the officer's conduct to have been proper. The court found that the officer's questions constituted a request for information that needed to be supported only by an objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of criminality. Finally, the court concluded that the orange bag had been abandoned. A Judge of this Court granted the defendant's application for leave to appeal.
On February 1, 1989, Officer Canale, this time accompanied by two other officers, was stationed near Platform 68 at the Port Authority Bus Terminal. Buses departing from this platform head for Baltimore, Washington and Virginia. Canale observed the people standing in line for the 5:00 P.M. bus. The bus began boarding at approximately quarter to five. The defendant joined the line at about five minutes to five. The defendant was carrying a zippered gym bag. According to Canale, in contrast to the other passengers, who were casual in demeanor, the defendant appeared nervous, scanning the interior of the boarding area and at one time giving his place in line to another passenger.
Canale observed the defendant for approximately five minutes. When the defendant approached the bus, he caught Canale's eye, hesitated slightly, and entered the boarding area. Canale approached the defendant, with the other two officers standing two to three feet behind him. He identified himself as a narcotics officer, and asked the defendant if he could speak to him. Defendant agreed and stepped off the line. Canale asked him where he was going, and he replied that he was going to Baltimore. When Canale asked him the reason for his trip, the defendant answered that he was going to visit family. Canale then asked the defendant if he could search his bag. The defendant said yes. The officer repeated the question and the defendant again said yes. According to Canale, the defendant looked around rapidly during this conversation, speaking rapidly and in a broken voice. The officer opened the bag and inside a sneaker found a brown paper bag that contained a plastic bag of cocaine powder and another plastic bag containing 38 vials of cocaine.
The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree. The defendant moved to suppress the drugs on the ground that the search and seizure had been unlawful. A suppression hearing was held on June 12, 1989, and the defendant's motion was denied. The court found that Canale's approach and questioning constituted a request for information and was permissible. The court further found that the defendant had consented to the search of his gym bag.
After his suppression motion was denied, the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction, with one Justice dissenting. The Appellate Division agreed that Canale's encounter with the defendant had been a request for information and not a common-law inquiry and...
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