People v. Holloway

Decision Date24 January 1985
Docket NumberNo. 81-2055,81-2195,81-2055
Citation86 Ill.Dec. 536,131 Ill.App.3d 290,475 N.E.2d 915
Parties, 86 Ill.Dec. 536 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry HOLLOWAY and Judy Jackson, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Steven Clark, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Richard J. Faust, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, Jeanette Sublett, Timothy J. Frenzer, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

JOHNSON, Justice:

Defendants, Harry Holloway (Holloway) and Judy Jackson (Judy), were found guilty, in a jury trial, of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)), and each was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. The victim, Alexander Jackson (Alexander), was Judy's husband. Defendants raise the following issues for review: (1) whether the police possessed probable cause to arrest Holloway at 3 a.m. on July 12, 1979, and whether an inculpatory statement and a gun obtained as a result of that arrest should have been suppressed by the trial court; (2) whether exigent circumstances existed for the police to make a warrantless arrest of Holloway in his home; (3) whether Holloway freely and voluntarily made an inculpatory statement to the police; (4) whether Judy freely and voluntarily made an inculpatory statement to the police; (5) whether Holloway and Judy were proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder; (6) whether Holloway committed murder or voluntary manslaughter; (7) whether Judy was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any criminal conduct in regard to the death of Alexander; (8) whether the trial court erred when it refused to allow Holloway's tendered jury instructions on self-defense and voluntary manslaughter; (9) whether the trial court erred when, without any indication that the jury was deadlocked, it gave the Prim instruction; (10) whether the trial court erred in refusing to give Judy's tendered instruction concerning "mere presence;" (11) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Holloway to 40 years; and (12) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Judy to 40 years.

We affirm.

On July 11, 1979, June Hampton was employed as a desk clerk at the Ranch Motel, located at 9201 South Stony Island Avenue, in Chicago. Hampton testified that around 11 p.m., a Yellow cab approached the motel. The passenger, a man (Alexander), registered as Mr. and Mrs. Jackson of 8014 South Champlain, Chicago, and rented room 41. He did not seem intoxicated. The man returned to the cab. Hampton and Verzel Squair, a friend who had been sitting in the lobby, noticed another man who was in the driver's seat of the cab, and a red-headed woman seated in back. The cab drove toward room 41. Ten minutes later, Hampton saw the cab pass the office. Around that time she and Squair heard a man screaming for help. She asked Squair to investigate. Squair saw Alexander, bloody and nude, in the doorway of the room. Squair went back to the lobby to advise Hampton to call the police, which she did. Then Hampton and Squair saw the cab again as it traveled north with the man and the woman who had been observed earlier; the man was driving and the woman was now sitting in the front seat. Squair noticed the cab number on the license plate and the side of the vehicle and informed Hampton. She wrote the number on the back of the registration slip she had prepared for Alexander.

Officers Willie Clay and Jerry Chapman were the first policemen to arrive. Later they were joined by police officers Daniel Swick and JoAnn Ryan. Alexander had three head injuries and two gunshot wounds. Blood was spattered throughout the room, on the walls, in the doorway, and on the bed. An open liquor bottle was on the nightstand, a claw hammer was inside the closet, a pair of women's eyeglasses was on the dressing table, and a man's clothing was in the bathroom. The victim's identification was in a wallet in his trousers.

Officer Swick was given the registration card for the room. He telephoned Judy around 2 a.m. on July 12, 1979, informing her that her husband was dead. Swick also telephoned the Yellow Cab Company which informed him that cab number 1558 was leased to Harry Holloway who lived at an address on East 99th Street, in Chicago.

Officer Swick arrived at Holloway's residence at about 3 a.m. with Officer Ryan and officer John Yucaitis. Although police had time to obtain a warrant, none was issued. Swick knocked on the door, identified himself, and asked Holloway whether cab number 1558 belonged to him. Holloway answered in the affirmative. Swick informed Holloway that his cab might have been used in the commission of a crime. No Miranda warnings were given. Holloway allowed the police to enter his home, and later he agreed to come to police headquarters. He was not handcuffed.

When Officer Swick observed the cab parked in front of Holloway's residence, he noticed a blood smear on the door handle on the driver's door. Swick asked Holloway's permission to drive the cab to the police station. Holloway consented and gave Swick the keys.

At the police station, around 3:15 a.m., Officer Swick advised Holloway of his Miranda rights prior to speaking with him. He and Holloway talked for 30 to 45 minutes. Holloway was not handcuffed. Swick did not strike or threaten Holloway nor did he see anyone strike or threaten him. Holloway never indicated that he did not wish to answer questions. He never said he desired to have a lawyer present, and he did not ask to make a telephone call. Swick did not notice any bruises on Holloway. The latter did not complain of mistreatment, and he never asked to be allowed to take medicine or said he had diabetes. Holloway did not have anything to eat or drink and took no medication. No one lied to Holloway about evidence inculpating him.

Officer Swick asked Holloway his whereabouts on the previous evening. Holloway stated that he started driving about 7 p.m. and described his "fares." He drove his last fare to a motel at 94th and Stony Island, then drove around for about 20 minutes and then went home. When asked, Holloway denied that he had been to the Ranch Motel. Swick showed Holloway the front of the registration card with the Jacksons' name and address. Holloway stated that Alexander was his friend but denied taking him to the motel. Then Swick showed him the back of the card on which his cab number was noted. Holloway admitted that he picked up Alexander at 80th and Cottage Grove and drove him to a motel at 94th and Stony Island. Alexander went into the motel but returned to the cab, stating that no air-conditioned rooms were available. Alexander asked Holloway to drive him to the Ranch Motel. Holloway dropped him off in front of the motel and drove away. Holloway denied that he drove into the motel grounds and stated that only two people were in the cab. Swick told Holloway that he had been seen at the motel; Holloway denied that he was there. During this interview, Swick noticed what appeared to be bloodstains on Holloway's shirt. The latter explained that he had been eating barbeque but agreed to remove his clothes so that the nature of the stains could be determined. Swick confiscated Holloway's shirt, T-shirt, pants, shoes, and a ring. Swick found currency which appeared to be bloodstained in Holloway's pockets.

Holloway agreed to let Swick search the cab and gave him the keys. Swick recovered from the cab a bag with 22 bullets in it and a pouch containing insurance papers. Swick did not ask Holloway's permission to open either the bag or the pouch and no consent form was signed for the search of the cab. On July 12, 1979, Swick never saw Holloway handcuffed.

Around 6 a.m. on July 12, 1979, Judy was brought to the police station by an officer. Swick interviewed her in the presence of Officer Ryan. Swick offered Judy a drink but she refused. She was not handcuffed and did not say she felt ill. Swick again informed Judy of her husband's death and asked her his whereabouts on the previous evening. Judy said her husband was with her until 7 or 7:30 p.m. when he left to visit his sister on the West Side. Swick asked Judy whether she knew Harry Holloway. She said she had known him for 5 years. Earlier, on that evening, he had been at her home for dinner and drinks with her and her husband. Swick showed Judy the eyeglasses that had been recovered from the motel. She acknowledged them as her own. He asked her how they came to be in the motel room. Judy said that while she and her husband were jogging the glasses fell off her face; her husband had picked them up and put them in his pocket.

Dennis McGuire, a Chicago police officer, was assigned to the homicide when he reported for work at 8 a.m. on July 12, 1979. He was working with his partner, John Yucaitis. He discussed the case with Officer Swick and he was informed of the results of preliminary interviews. No arrest or search warrants were issued in connection with the case. McGuire had conversations with Holloway around 9:45 a.m., 11:30 a.m., and in the afternoon. At the first interview, Holloway was advised of his Miranda rights. McGuire presented a consent to search form to Holloway and explained it. Holloway signed the form. McGuire never saw anyone strike or threaten Holloway and he had no bruises. Holloway did not say he had diabetes and needed medication or that he wanted to see a physician. He never said he wanted a lawyer. Holloway was not sweating, trembling or exhibiting abnormal physical conditions. McGuire never saw Holloway eat or sleep.

McGuire interviewed Judy three times--at about 9:50 a.m., 11:30 a.m., and 12:25 p.m. McGuire introduced himself before their first interview and advised Judy of her Miranda rights, which she said she understood. During their conversations,...

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