People v. Holman

• Decision Date: 10 July 2013
• Docket Number: E054989
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Laura Michelle HOLMAN, Defendant and Respondent.

214 Cal.App.4th 1438

155 Cal.Rptr.3d 164

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Laura Michelle HOLMAN, Defendant and Respondent.

E054989

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed March 29, 2013

Review Denied July 10, 2013

Affirmed.

See 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 110 et seq.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elaine M. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed. (Super.Ct.Nos. RIF10000006, RIF152972 & RIF147618)

Paul E. Zellerbach, District Attorney, and Matt Reilly, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

McKINSTER, J.

This is a People's appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing the restitution fines originally imposed on defendant and respondent Laura Michelle Holman. Defendant had several different cases and charges, for which she was on probation through a drug court program. Eventually, defendant successfully completed her court-ordered drug treatment program, and the court terminated probation early. The court dismissed all the pending cases, and suspended or dismissed all the imposed fines, including any restitution fines that had not been fully paid. The People now appeal, contending that the trial court erred in suspending, or dismissing, or otherwise terminating the unpaid restitution fines. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2008, a felony complaint was filed in case No. RIF147618, charging defendant with sale or transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), passing a counterfeit bill (Pen.Code, § 475, subd. (a)), misdemeanor charges of sale or transportation of marijuana, and possession of a controlled drug without a prescription. The complaint alleged that these charges constituted a violation of defendant's probation. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a single count, the possession of methamphetamine charge. The court granted probation for 36 months and imposed various fines and fees, including payment of a restitution fine of $200, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The payment of the restitution fine was made a condition of defendant's probation.

In February 2009, the People filed a petition to violate defendant's probation based on a new drug charge. Defendant admitted the probation violation, and was reinstated on probation with the provision that 90 days of custody time would be added to the terms. Later that year (Aug. 2009), defendant again admitted violations of probation, but was reinstated on probation.

In September 2009, the court arraigned defendant in case No. RIF152972, which alleged one felony count of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and a violation of the probation in case No. RIF147618. The day after her arraignment, defendant agreed to plead guilty to the possession of methamphetamine charge; the proceedings were suspended and defendant was again admitted to 36 months' probation, including a condition that she pay a restitution fine of $200 under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Defendant's conditions of probation under case No. RIF152972 also included provisions that she complete a drug and alcohol treatment program, and that she be evaluated for eligibility to participate in diversion under Proposition 36.¹ In case No. RIF147618, defendant admitted the probation violation and was reinstated on probation on the same terms and conditions as before, with the addition of an extra 30 days of actual custody.

In January 2010, the People filed a new complaint in case No. RIF10000006, alleging two counts of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen.Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), as well as a violation of probation in defendant's other cases. In February 2010, defendant agreed to plead guilty to the new theft-related charges. The court imposed the upper term of three years on count 1, and a concurrent term of three years on count 2. Execution of sentence was suspended, and defendant was granted formal probation for 36 months. Added to her terms of probation was the requirement that she complete the ROC program (Recovery Opportunity Center); this term was added to the terms of defendant's probation in case Nos. RIF147618 and RIF152972 as well. The agreements that defendant executed to enter the ROC program included an advisement that, “I understand that upon successful completion my attorney can file a 1203.4 to allow me to withdraw my plea and enter a not-guilty plea. If the Court grants my attorney's motion, this will allow for a possible dismissal or reduction in the charges that brought me to this program.”

Defendant's probation in case No. RIF10000006, as with defendant's previous cases, included a term that she pay a restitution fine of $200, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). In all three probations, the court ordered the payment of all fines and fees suspended, pending defendant's participation in the ROC program.

With the exception of a setback in the early months of the program, defendant progressed well and was promoted to the successive phases of the program in due course. She was consistently cooperative with the ROC staff and peers. She began attending school and working part-time. On September 14, 2011, defendant graduated from the ROC program, and the drug court terminated her probation early. The minutes in each case recited that the court ordered “all fines suspended,” and granted the defense motion under Penal Code section 1203.4, setting aside defendant's guilty pleas in each case, and entering a plea of not guilty. The court thereupon dismissed the cases.

At the hearing, the court inquired, “is there a motion by the Defense?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes, your Honor. Make the same motion to stay and suspend all fines and fees and dismiss all of her cases pursuant to 1203 on the ROC contract.” The prosecutor, however, stated, “Same objection as to the fines and fees.” The court implicitly overruled the People's objection and granted the defense motion “to set aside your pleas, dismiss the charges, and terminate probation, and suspend all fines and fees.”

The People filed a notice of appeal from the ruling suspending all fines and fees.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

The issue presented is whether the trial court had the authority or discretion to suspend, or dismiss, or otherwise do away with or terminate the restitution fine with respect to each of defendant's cases. The issue turns on the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and, thus, presents essentially an issue of law, which we review de novo. “[W]hen the propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal.” ( People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 772.) “Questions of statutory interpretation are, of course, pure matters of law upon which we may exercise our independent judgment.” ( Jones v. Pierce (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 736, 741, 245 Cal.Rptr. 149.) Accordingly, the standard of review is de novo.

II. The State's Claim is Not Forfeited

Preliminarily, defendant contends that the People are precluded from raising the restitution fine suspension issue, because it was not preserved for appeal by a proper objection below. As already noted, the trial court had inquired whether “there [is] a motion by the Defense,” to which defense counsel had responded, “Yes, your Honor. Make the same motion to stay and suspend all fines and fees and dismiss all of her cases pursuant to 1203 on the ROC contract.” The prosecutor raised the “Same objection as to the fines and fees.”

Defendant urges that the prosecutor's objection was insufficient to preserve the matter for appeal. We reject the argument for several inter-related reasons.

First, the objection that was made was sufficient to satisfy the purposes of the “specific objection” rule. “The critical point for preservation of claims on appeal is that the asserted error must have been brought to the attention of the trial court.” ( Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 649, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 501.) As to claims of error in the admission and exclusion of evidence, for example, “ ‘The reason for the requirement is manifest: a specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.’ ” ( People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) In addition, “a ‘contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would “permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.” ’ ” ( Ibid.) As the California Supreme Court stated in Partida, “Thus, the requirement of a specific objection serves important purposes. But, to further these purposes, the requirement must be interpreted reasonably, not formalistically. ‘Evidence Code section 353 does not exalt form over substance.’ [Citation.] The statute does not require any particular form of objection. Rather, ‘the objection must be made in such a way as to alert the trial court to the nature of the anticipated evidence and the basis on which exclusion is sought, and to afford the People an opportunity to establish its admissibility.’ ” ( Id. at pp. 434–435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.)

Here, the only matter or ruling in issue was the suspension or dismissal of the fines and fees. That was, in turn, the sole matter to which the People object...