People v. Holmes
| Decision Date | 22 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014NY019942.,2014NY019942. |
| Citation | 997 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Table) |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Larry J. HOLMES, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Criminal Court |
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney, by ADA Jaime Perrone, for People.
The Legal Aid Society, by Vaneskha Hyacinthe, Esq., for Defendant.
Defendant, charged with Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 135.05 ) and Obstructing Government Administration in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 195.05 ), moves to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient. For the reasons set out below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.1 Sealing is stayed for 30 days.
On the night of March 13, 2014, Police Officer Thomas Sullivan arrived at a Manhattan apartment pursuant to a radio run. From outside the door he could hear the complainant, Evilla Roebuck, crying and the defendant yelling. Sullivan knocked loudly and announced, “Police Department.” When Ms. Roebuck said, “What do you want,” Sullivan replied that he needed to speak to her and ordered her to open the door.
Ms. Roebuck replied that she was “fine,” but was still crying. Sullivan again demanded that she open the door so that he could “make sure that everyone in the apartment is okay.” Defendant refused to open the door, confirming that everyone in the apartment was “okay.” Sullivan persisted in demanding entry, without success.
He then overheard Ms. Roebuck say, Defendant told her to open the door after he went out on the fire escape, while Sullivan continued to demand entry. Defendant told Sullivan that they did not need the police and that everyone in the apartment was going to sleep. Ms. Roebuck was still crying.
Eventually, Ms. Roebuck opened the door. She had lacerations and abrasions on her face
. Defendant was in a back room of the apartment; he and Ms. Roebuck were the only civilians present.
Defendant was arraigned on March 14, 2014, on a Misdemeanor Complaint charging him with two counts of Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law §§ 120.00(1) and (2) ), Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 135.05 ), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 110/120.00(1)) and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26(1). The Court set bail and a motion schedule and Adjourned the case to March 19 for conversion.
On March 19, 2014, the People filed a Superseding Information charging the defendant with the same five counts, along with one count of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 195.05 ). The Court, however, concluded that the Information converted only Count 3, Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, and Count 4, Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree.
Defendant posted bail and filed the instant motion to dismiss in court on April 10, 2014. On May 20, the People filed a written response, and the Court Adjourned the case to July 22 for decision. The matter has been sub judice since May 20.
The Information, sworn to by Officer Sullivan provides that:
At 12:00AM, Evilla Roebuck ... opened the door. I observed that Ms. Roebuck was in an excited state in that she was crying, had tears in her eyes, and her eyes were red and puffy. I also observed that Ms. Roebuck had lacerations and red abrasions on her face
. I further observed the defendant standing in the back room of the apartment. I further observed that Ms. Roebuck and the defendant were the only two people in the apartment at the time, besides myself and the other responding police officers.
The Information alleges that both the defendant and the complainant to admit the police into an apartment, defying an officer's request that he be admitted so that he could ascertain that everyone in the apartment was “okay.” The Court concludes these facts do not sufficiently make out a prima facie case of the “restraint” element of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, under Penal Law § 135.05. Nor do they make out a prima facie case of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree; there is no basis for concluding that defendant obstructed an “authorized” governmental action.
A Misdemeanor Information serves the same role in a misdemeanor prosecution that an Indictment serves in a felony prosecution: It ensures that a legally sufficient case can be made against the defendant. People v. Dumay, –––N.Y.3d ––––, 2014 WL 2515692 (June 5, 2014) ; People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 138–39, 517 N.Y.S2d 927, 930–31, 511 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1987). Accordingly, a Misdemeanor Information must set forth “nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof.” People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228–29, 906 N.E.2d 381, 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (2009) (citing People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677, 679, 685 N.Y.S.2d 409, 708 N.E.2d 165(1999) and CPL 100.40(1)(c) ). This is known as “the prima facie case requirement.” Kalin, 12N.Y.3d at 229, 906 N.E.2d at 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the Information allege facts that would prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115, 512 N.Y.S2d 652, 657, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1986). Rather, the Information need only contain allegations of fact that “give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.” People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S2d 88, 91, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (2000). A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the Information to a “fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading,” id., assume that those allegations are true, and consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. CPL §§ 100.40, 100.15 ; People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747, 944 N.Y.S2d 715, 721–22, 967 N.E.2d 1160, 1166–67 (2012). See also Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 360, 717 N.Y.S2d at 91, 740 N.E.2d at 236. Under these standards, the Information here is facially insufficient as to both counts.
A person is guilty of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, Penal Law § 135.05, when he “restrains another person.” “Restrain” means:
[T]o restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined “without consent” when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
Penal Law § 135.00. The facts alleged in the Information do not make out a prima facie case of restraint. Here, there are two possible victims of an unlawful imprisonment: the police officer or the complainant. The Information alleges no facts that would support a finding of “restraint” as to either.
With respect to the officer, while it is true that the defendant—and the complainant too, although she apparently was not charged—refused to admit the officer, that is not an unlawful “restraint.” This refusal did not “restrict” the officer's “movements” by either “moving him from one place to another” or by “confining him.” While the officer would clearly have preferred to be inside the apartment, as opposed to outside of it, his movement was not restricted. He was free to go any place he wished, and was not in any way “confined” to the hallway outside the apartment door.
Nor is there any allegation that the officer was kept outside the apartment by “physical force, intimidation or deception.” The Information...
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