People v. Holmes

• Decision Date: 08 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 106934.,106934.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Andre HOLMES, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

919 N.E.2d 318

235 Ill.2d 59

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Andre HOLMES, Appellant.

No. 106934.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 8, 2009.

Edwin A. Burnette and Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Public Defenders of Cook County, Chicago (Eileen T. Pahl, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

This appeal involves the procedural framework governing interlocutory appeals under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)), first recognized by this court in People v. Taylor, 50 Ill.2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1971). This framework, commonly referred to as the Taylor rule, requires a party seeking review of an order appealable under Rule 604(a)(1) to appeal or file a motion to reconsider within 30 days. People v. Williams, 138 Ill.2d 377, 394, 150 Ill.Dec. 498, 563 N.E.2d 385 (1990). An exception to the Taylor rule permits review beyond that time frame only when there is a material change in the facts that could not have been presented earlier with due diligence. Williams, 138 Ill.2d at 394, 150 Ill.Dec. 498, 563 N.E.2d 385. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault. The circuit court of Cook County denied the State's motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of defendant's prior sex-crime convictions, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1).

Rejecting defendant's jurisdictional challenge based on the Taylor rule, the appellate court majority applied the exception to the rule, reviewed the merits of the State's appeal, and reversed the trial court's exclusion of one of defendant's convictions. 383 Ill.App.3d 506, 507, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045. The dissenting justice argued the exception to the Taylor rule did not apply and, therefore, the State's appeal should have been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 383 Ill.App.3d at 519, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045 (Cunningham, J., dissenting).

Defendant appeals, challenging the majority's interpretation and application of the Taylor rule and its exception. Alternatively, defendant argues the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's order excluding evidence of one of his convictions. We hold the State's interlocutory appeal was barred by the Taylor rule and the appellate court therefore lacked jurisdiction. We vacate the appellate court's judgment and dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

The State alleged that on December 28, 2002, the victim, J.B., and defendant, who were high school acquaintances, talked inside J.B.'s parked Ford Expedition. After J.B. told defendant she did not want to have a romantic relationship with him, defendant became "enraged," grabbed her neck, and choked her. Defendant told J.B. he had a knife and ordered her to remove her clothes. Defendant then forced J.B. to the backseat of his vehicle and sexually assaulted her.

After the assault, defendant threatened to kill J.B. if she refused to meet his father. Defendant took control of J.B.'s vehicle and drove her to his father's house, introduced her to his father, and told his father they planned to marry. Defendant then allowed J.B. to leave in her vehicle. J.B. immediately drove to a police station and reported the assault. After speaking to police officers, J.B. was taken to a hospital where she was examined and a sexual assault kit was completed. J.B. sustained vaginal tears consistent with a sexual assault and contusions and abrasions consistent with a physical assault. The following day defendant was arrested and J.B. identified him as her attacker in a police lineup. An analysis of J.B.'s sexual assault kit revealed DNA evidence matching defendant's DNA profile.

During pretrial proceedings, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of defendant's 1996 conviction for attempted forcible rape and his 1994 conviction for sexual battery. At a hearing on the motion, defendant argued that evidence of his prior convictions would unfairly prejudice his case and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. Defendant further argued J.B. "had a previous false outcry of rape against a Cleveland Browns NFL football player" and was receiving child support payments from that individual.

Responding to the trial court's questioning, the State denied any knowledge of J.B. making a prior rape allegation because defendant had not yet provided his discovery. Defendant explained "[t]here's some sort of civil settlement for child support through this NFL player." Following the hearing, the trial court denied the State's motion and excluded the evidence of defendant's prior convictions.

Defendant later requested supplemental discovery from the State on the approximate dates and locations of any previous reports of assault, battery, sexual assault, or rape involving J.B., including any incident in Illinois or Ohio. In the State's answer to defendant's request, J.B. indicated the only report or case occurred in Ohio sometime between 1989 and 1992, and involved her then-boyfriend, D.C., who had punched J.B. in the face. J.B. reported the incident to police officers, and her boyfriend was arrested, but J.B. did not pursue a complaint.

Sometime after J.B. denied making a prior rape allegation, defendant obtained a police report showing J.B. claimed she had been raped in 1995. J.B. became pregnant as a result of the incident and gave birth to the child. J.B. also received child support payments from the man she accused of raping her. Defendant indicated he intended to cross-examine J.B. with this information.

After learning of J.B.'s prior rape allegation and defendant's intentions to impeach J.B. with that information, the State filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's earlier order excluding evidence of defendant's other crimes. The State's motion to reconsider was filed approximately 23 months after the original exclusion order. The State argued the trial court should reconsider its original order in light of the "newly tendered discovery" of J.B.'s prior rape allegation. Alternatively, the State argued if the trial court denied the motion to reconsider, it should also bar defendant from introducing evidence of J.B.'s prior rape allegation.

The trial court denied both the State's motion to reconsider and its request to bar evidence of J.B.'s prior rape allegation. The State then filed a certificate of substantial impairment and an interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)).

On appeal, the State argued the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it refused to admit evidence of defendant's other sex-crime convictions. Defendant responded the appellate court should dismiss the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Taylor rule because the State failed to appeal or seek reconsideration of the trial court's exclusion order within 30 days. Defendant alternatively asserted the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded his prior convictions.

The appellate majority first found that a material change in the facts warranted application of the Taylor rule's exception to consider the State's interlocutory appeal. 383 Ill.App.3d at 514, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045. Although the majority rejected the State's position that evidence of J.B.'s prior rape allegation constituted a material factual change, it nevertheless sua sponte found that J.B.'s "denial" of her prior rape allegation constituted a material change in the facts sufficient to invoke the exception. 383 Ill.App.3d at 514, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045. In making this determination, the majority concluded J.B.'s "failure to disclose a prior report of sexual assault, even after defendant filed supplemental discovery to uncover it, is relevant to her motive and bias in making the current allegation against defendant." 383 Ill.App.3d at 514, 322 Ill. Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045.

The majority then reviewed the trial court's exclusion of defendant's prior convictions and affirmed the exclusion of his 1996 conviction for attempted forcible rape, but reversed the exclusion of his 1994 conviction for sexual battery. 383 Ill.App.3d at 515-19, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045. The dissenting justice asserted the exception to the Taylor rule was inapplicable because J.B.'s denial of a prior rape allegation did not constitute a material change in the facts and the State failed to show due diligence. 383 Ill. App.3d at 519-20, 322 Ill.Dec. 126, 890 N.E.2d 1045 (Cunningham, J., dissenting).

We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant contends the appellate court improperly considered the State's interlocutory appeal because it was barred by the Taylor rule. Specifically, defendant asserts the State's motion to reconsider the exclusion order, filed almost two years after the order, was untimely, contravening the Taylor rule. Defendant further asserts the State failed to establish the necessary showing of due diligence and a material change in facts required to invoke the exception to the Taylor rule. Alternatively, defendant argues the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's exclusion of his 1994 conviction.

We first address defendant's jurisdictional challenge based on the Taylor rule and Rule 604(a)(1). As a preliminary matter, we reject defendant's position that the State forfeited its arguments supporting the majority's finding of jurisdiction by not raising them in the underlying proceedings. Forfeiture has no application here because the issue involves a jurisdictional question and we have an independent obligation to review it. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 231 Ill.2d 370, 387, ...