People v. Hoogy, 114.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1936
• Docket Number: No. 114.,114.
• Citation: 269 N.W. 605,277 Mich. 578
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HOOGY.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

277 Mich. 578

269 N.W. 605

PEOPLE

v.HOOGY.

No. 114.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 9, 1936.

Proceeding by the People of the State of Michigan against Joseph Hoogy. From an order dismissing the complaint and discharging defendant and from an order denying motion to set aside such order of dismissal and for an order reinstating the complaint, the People appeal, seeking an order in nature of mandamus requiring the trial court to set aside the order of dismissal and to proceed with the hearing of the case.

Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed.

Appeal from Recorder's Court of Detroit; Thomas F. Maher, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except POTTER, J.

Raymond J. Kelly, Corp. Counsel, and Nathaniel H. Goldstick and Arthur Barkey, Assts. Corp. Counsel, all of Detroit, for the People.

George A. Kelly, of Detroit, for appellee.

NORTH, Chief Justice.

This case raises the question of the constitutionality of a traffic ordinance of the city of Detroit, being Ordinance 115-C, section 4, as amended by Ordinance 350-C. The pertinent ordinance provisions are hereinafter quoted. A complaint was filed against Joseph Hoogy by a Detroit police officer charging Hoogy with unlawfully parking his car on a street where parking was prohibited during specified hours. At the trial the officer testified that the car belonging to defendant Hoogy was parked on Joy road in the city of Detroit at about 4:45 p. m. on April 8, 1936, at a place where signs were posted prohibiting parking between 7 a. m. and 9 p. m. The officer also testified that he ascertained through the records of the secretary of state's office that this automobile, bearing license W-53558, was owned by the defendant. Defendant's counsel admitted such ownership. Corporation counsel who was prosecuting the suit rested on the above record, and thereupon defendant's counsel moved that the complaint be dismissed and a verdict of not guilty returned for the following reasons:

‘(1) The burden is upon the people to prove that the defendant parked his car at the place alleged in the complaint.

‘(2) The court can draw no inference that the defendant knew and allowed his vehicle to be illegally parked.

‘(3) The court should rule as a matter of law that Ordinance No. 350-C, under which this complaint is made, is unconstitutional.’

Thereupon the court ruled as follows: ‘The people having failed to show by affirmative evidence that the defendant parked his motor vehicle in violation of the law, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed. I find that Ordinance No. 350-C, under the terms of which an owner of a motor vehicle is prima facie guilty of a violation of the traffic ordinance, unless such owner affirmatively shows that the violation was not committed by him, is unconstitutional and void.’ The corporation counsel filed a motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and for an order reinstating the complaint and that the court proceed with the trial. This motion was denied. Appellant seeks mandamus to require the trial court to set aside the order of dismissal and to proceed with the hearing of the case.

Notwithstanding some testimony was taken, the court's ruling in reality was based solely on his holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Appellant asserts that the ordinance is valid and that under its provisions a prima facie case was made against the defendant. The sole question for review is the constitutionality of the ordinance. Its pertinent provisions read: ‘In any proceeding for violation of the provisions of Ordinance No. 115-C of the Ordinances of the City of Detroit, and all amendments thereto, commonly known as the ‘Traffic Ordinance,’ or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to the provisions of said ordinance, the registration plate displayed on such motor vehicle shall be evidence which...