City of Seattle v. Stone

• Decision Date: 27 January 1966
• Docket Number: No. 37997,37997
• Citation: 67 Wn.2d 886,410 P.2d 583
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Clifford A. STONE, Appellant,

Page 886

67 Wn.2d 886

410 P.2d 583

The CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Clifford A. STONE, Appellant,

No. 37997.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

Jan. 27, 1966.

Clifford A. Stone, pro se.

A. L. Newbould, Corp. Counsel, William L. Parker, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, for respondent.

WEAVER, Judge.

This case involves the constitutionality of a portion of § 21.66.180 of Seattle Ordinance No. 91910, the traffic ticket ordinance of the City of Seattle.

Defendant, who appears pro se, appeals from a judgment and sentence dated November 6, 1964, which finds him

guilty of 20 overtime parking violations on the streets of the City of Seattle and (he) is sentenced to pay a fine of $186.00.

The judgment further provides:

That defendant pay costs in this Court (Superior) to be taxed and stand committed to the City Jail upon his failure fully to comply with this judgment; * * *.

The following is the Entire statement of facts before us. The formal heading is omitted.

I.

That the City of Seattle and defendant Clifford A. Stone stipulated as to certain facts recited in the judgment and sentenced dated Nov. 6, 1964.

II.

That no witnesses appeared in court and the case was heard on the stipulated facts.

III.

That no evidence was introduced.

It is apparent that the statement of facts is meaningless unless read in conjunction with the stipulation contained in the judgment and sentence. The stipulated facts are: 'that the defendant owns a (designated vehicle); that this vehicle was issued 20 citations for overtime parking at various times on the streets of the City of Seattle and that the defendant was not present when the car was cited by members of the Seattle Police Department.'

Defendant makes a three-pronged attack upon the judgment and sentence. We first consider his argument that § 21.66.180 of Seattle Ordinance 91910 violates due process of law. The ordinance provides that:

Every person in whose name a vehicle is registered (licensed) shall be responsible for any parking or angle parking of said vehicle and for all offenses other than moving violations under this code. It shall be no defense that said vehicle was illegally parked or angle parked or used by another, unless it be shown that at such time said vehicle was being used without the consent of the registered (licensed) owner thereof: Provided, that the lessee of a commercially rented or leased vehicle alone shall be responsible for any parking or angle parking of such vehicle and for all violations of this code committed while the vehicle is being leased or rented, if the registered (licensed) owner of such vehicle furnished the Traffic Violations Bureau with a copy of the renting or leasing contract stating the name and address of the renter or lessee. (Italics ours.)

In its defense, counsel for the city urges that we read into the first sentence of the ordinance the words 'prima facie' before the word 'responsible,' as other courts have done. At this point we cannot do so in view of the unambiguous language of the second sentence which does not allow the defense of authorized use. The ordinance clearly imposes vicarious criminal liability upon the owner of an automobile without allowing him to defend on the ground that one whom he permitted to use the car was actually the offender.

Our review of the authorities discloses that the statutes and ordinances which make automobile owners responsible for parking violations fall into two general classes. First, there are those which Provide that the fact of violation and ownership together raise a Prima facie rebuttable presumption that the owner committed the offense. City of Columbus v. Webster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 164 N.E.2d 734 (1960); City of St. Louis v. Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 221 S.W.2d 468 (1949); Commonwealth et al. v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 122 S.W.2d 1006 (1938); People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248 (1938) and People v. Gibman, 38 Cal.App.2d Supp. 773, 100 P.2d 370 (1940), are illustrative of this type of ordinance or statute. The ordinances and statutes involved in the above cases do not make any inferred fact conclusive. The presumption of vicarious responsibility may be rebutted.

The second class of ordinances and statutes omits any reference to a prima facie presumption. This category declares that whenever an automobile is parked illegally, the registered owner shall be subject to the penalty for the violation. On their face, the ordinances or statutes impose absolute liability. Courts have, however, construed them to mean that only a Prima facie responsibility is established; thus the owner may avoid conviction by showing that he did not in fact commit the violation. City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill.App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802 (1943); Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934). See also annotation 'Inference or presumption that owner of motor vehicle was its driver at time of traffic, driving or parking offense,' by W. E. Shipley, 49 A.L.R.2d 456 (1956) for summaries of cases cited herein.

Clearly the Seattle ordinance, supra, is not of the first class mentioned. The second sentence--'It shall be no defense * * *'--removes it from the second category.

This leaves the question whether a conclusive presumption of guilt, upon a showing of ownership and violation, is consistent with due process. Even if the presumption be rebuttable, there must be some rational and reasonable connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. See United States v. Romano, 86 S.Ct. 279, slip opinion, Nov. 22, 1965, and cases cited. Common experience dictates that there is a rational connection between proof of registered ownership of an automobile and a prima facie presumption that it was parked by the owner. The inference is not an arbitrary one. Counsel have not cited, nor has our research disclosed, a statute or ordinance that goes as far as that portion of the second sentence of 21.66.180 of Seattle Ordinance 91910 preceding the proviso, cited supra, unless it be the ordinance considered in People v. Forbath, 5 Cal.App.2d Supp. 767, 42 P.2d 108 (1935), or People v. Hoogy, 277 Mich. 578, 269 N.W. 605 (1936), or Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934).

In Forbath, supra, the Los Angeles ordinance made it unlawful for the registered owner 'to allow, permit or suffer' any vehicle registered in his name to be illegally parked. The ordinance was construed to mean that unless the defendant Knew that his car was being parked during the time it was being parked And unless such parking was at least passively acquiesced in by him, he could not be found guilty.

In Hoogy, supra, although the ordinance created only a prima facie presumption of responsibility arising from the registered ownership of an automobile illegally parked, the ordinance was held invalid because it was drafted in such a manner that the ordinance required the accused to take the stand and testify.

The exact holding of Ober is not clear to us. The case involved an 'allow, permit or suffer's ordinance. No evidence was presented as to who parked the car. The court upheld the conviction stating that the owner has a responsibility to see that the traffic regulations are not violated by his act or the act of another. If that was all the court stated, it...