People v. Horan
| Decision Date | 16 June 1920 |
| Docket Number | No. 12965.,12965. |
| Citation | 293 Ill. 314,127 N.E. 673 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. HORAN. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; C. A. Williams, Judge.
John Horan was convicted of carrying a concealed loaded revolver contrary to Criminal Code, § 54d, and he brings error.
Reversed.
George W. Blackwell, of Chicago (Richard E. Westbrooks, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Maclay Hoyne, State's Atty., of Chicago, and Sumner S. Anderson, of Charleston (Edward E. Wilson, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
The plaintiff in error, John Horan, was charged in an information filed in the municipal court of Chicago with a violation of section 4 of the act entitled ‘An act to regulate the traffic in deadly weapons and to prevent the sale of them to minors' (Laws of 1881, p. 73), which appears as section 54d of the Criminal Code in Hurd's compilation of statutes, by carrying on his person, concealed, a loaded revolver. He waived a trial by jury, and was tried and found guilty and fined $175. Judgment was entered for the fine and costs, and he was ordered committed to the house of correction until the fine and costs should be worked out at $1.50 per day, or until he should be discharged according to law.
The information was presented and sworn to by Thomas Kelleher, and, the information having been examined by the court, leave was granted to file it. Thomas Kelleher was not the state's attorney or his assistant, but section 27 of the act creating the municipal court (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 37, § 290) provides that all criminal cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment other than in the penitentiary may be prosecuted by information of the Attorney General or state's attorney or some other person, but before an information is filed by any person other than the Attorney General or state's atterney one of the judges shall examine the information, and may examine the person presenting the same and require other evidence, and satisfy himself that there is probable cause for filing the same, and so indorse the same. The act was complied with in every particular, and the court did not err in permitting the information by Thomas Kelleher to be filed.
The court permitted an attorney who was not the state's attorney or his assistant to prosecute the information, but the same section 27 provides that in the municipal court, which took the place of justices of the peace, criminal cases in which the punishment is by fine only may, in the discretion of the court, be prosecuted by complainant as provided by law for the prosecution of criminal cases before justices of the peace, where it is not essential that the prosecution should be by the Attorney General or state's attorney.
It was insisted in the municipal court, and was the ground for motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, that section 4, supra, violates section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution because the subject of carrying concealed weapons is not included within the title, which relates only to the regulation of traffic in deadly weapons and the prevention of their sale to minors. Section 56 of the Revised Criminal Code of 1874, as amended in 1879 (Laws 1879, p. 114), provides that whoever shall carry concealed weapons or in a threatening manner display any pistol, knife, slung-shot, brass, steel, or iron knuckles or other deadly weapon, shall be fined not exceeding $100. But the prosecution of the plaintiff in error was not for a violation of that section. Section 1 of the act under which he was prosecuted forbids either the possession or sale, loan, hire, or barter of any slung-shot, metallic knuckles or other deadly weapon of like character, and as to these weapons the prohibition of traffic is absolute. Section 2 forbids the sale, gift, loan, hire, or barter, except by a father, guardian, or employer, to any minor of any pistol, revolver, derringer, bowie knife, dirk, or other deadly weapon of like character capable of being secreted upon the person. This is a qualified prohibition of a sale to a minor, and the regulation of traffic in deadly weapons would include a prohibition of sale to some particular class of individuals, such as minors. Section 3 is a regulation of the traffic in deadly weapons by retail dealers, and contains no limitation or restriction upon such sales, but requires the dealer to keep a register containing the date of sale or gift, the name and age of the person to whom the weapon is sold or given, the price of the weapon, and the purpose for which it is purchased or obtained, and the register is to be kept open for the inspection of the public. These sections impose no restriction or limitation upon the traffic in deadly weapons, except the prohibition contained in the first section and the qualified prohibition in the second section. Section 4, which the plaintiff in error was charged with violating, is as follows:
‘Whoever shall carry a concealed weapon upon or about his person of the character in this act specified, or razor as a weapon, or whoever, in a threatening or boisterous manner, shall display or flourish any deadly weapon, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined in any sum not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200).’
Section 6 provides that section 4 shall not apply to peace officers or persons called to their assistance.
The constitutional provision is that no act shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. The object of the provision is that the title shall give information of the subject of legislation with which the act deals, and it prevents the inclusion in an act of unrelated matters not fairly expressed in the title. While an act must have a single object clearly expressed in the title, the provision is to be liberally construed, as has been stated in numerous decisions. People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994;People v. Nellis, 249 Ill. 12, 94 N. E. 165. The title may be in very general terms, but it must be so comprehensive as to reasonably include every provision of the act.
The subject of the act in question as expressed in the title is the regulation of traffic in...
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