People v. Houze

• Decision Date: 20 May 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 73717
• Citation: 425 Mich. 82,387 N.W.2d 807
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick HOUZE, Defendant-Appellee. 425 Mich. 82, 387 N.W.2d 807
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 807

387 N.W.2d 807

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick HOUZE, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 73717.

425 Mich. 82, 387 N.W.2d 807

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 6, 1985.

Decided May 20, 1986.

John D. O'Hair, Pro. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief, Civil and Appeals, Timothy A. Baughman, Principal Atty., Detroit, for people.

Sobel, Giovanni, Colton & Shifman, by Vincent D. Giovanni, Birmingham, for defendant-appellee.

BOYLE, Justice.

While I agree with the result reached by Justice Cavanagh, I write separately to clarify that, in my view, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common access area from which the police viewed the criminal activity and to avoid leaving the impression that because People v. Dugan, 102 Mich.App. 497, 302 N.W.2d 209 (1980), is distinguished, it is approved.

This Court expressly adopted the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard, for purposes of Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 11, in People v. Smith, 420 Mich. 1, 360 N.W.2d 841 (1984), and found that the rationale of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), was equally applicable to the protection offered by the Michigan Constitution.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), held that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures in areas where a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rejecting previous concepts of property, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment protects "people--and not simply 'areas,' " Katz, supra, 353, 88 S.Ct. 512. In a later case, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1743, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), the Court reiterated:

"The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. 'The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.' Katz, 389 US at 353 (quoting Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 304 [87 S.Ct. 1642, 1648, 18 L.Ed.2d 782] (1967)). '[E]ven a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon.' Rakas v Illinois, 439 US [128, 144, n. 12; 99 S.Ct. 421, 431, n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ]."

Therefore, I find that in this case there was no intrusion on protected interests sufficient to constitute a search within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment or Const 1963, art. 1, Sec. 11.

Reversed and remanded.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and BOYLE and BRICKLEY, JJ., concur.

ARCHER, J., not participating.

CAVANAGH, Justice, concurring.

The question presented to this Court is whether the trial court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges against him. Defendant argued that the arresting officers trespassed upon his land and made a search and seizure without a warrant which violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure as provided by the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 11; U.S. Const. Am. IV. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision granting defendant's motion to suppress. We would reverse.

On November 14, 1982, officers of the Detroit Police Department received the following radio dispatch: "North of Glendale stripping of an automobile in progress. Subjects were taking the parts of that car to the garage, rear of 2379 Leslie." The officers proceeded to the alley where they found a Cadillac which had been "stripped" (had certain parts removed). The officers then approached the garage at 2379 Leslie, approximately three-quarters of a block away. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Brown testified as to the relative locations of the stripped Cadillac and the garage:

"Q. Where is this location of this Cadillac in the alley in the relation to that garage?

"A. Straight down the street. It would be north of that garage. Straight down the street about three-quarters of a block. You can stand in the street in front of the garage and look straight down and you can see the car." (Emphasis added.)

The police proceeded down the alley from the stripped Cadillac to the garage. According to Officer Brown's testimony, he and his partner walked onto defendant's property and proceeded to the walk-in door on the side of the garage. There were lights on inside the garage, and there was an opening of approximately one square foot through which the officers could see defendant and three others removing the parts of a black Chevrolet. The officer testified that the trunk lid had already been removed from the car and the individuals in the garage were in the process of removing the car's left rear door. The officers then entered the garage, ran a check on the vehicle identification number and determined that it had been stolen. At that time they arrested the four men in the garage. Defendant was charged with receiving and concealing stolen property over $100.

At trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence offered against him. The trial court reluctantly granted defendant's motion.

"The Court has reviewed the motion, brief in support of the motion as well as the case submitted by Mr. Giovanni: People versus Dugan found at 102 Michigan Appeals 497 [302 N.W.2d 209 (1980) ].

"Based on the Dugan case, the Court has no alternative but to grant the defendant's motion to suppress with respect to Patrick Houze.

* * *

"[T]he Dugan case is controlling. It is the law in this State and even though this Court is in disagreement with the analysis in Dugan, it's my responsibility to follow the law.

"So, accordingly, the evidence will be suppressed against Mr. Houze."

Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals majority, in affirming, relied largely on People v. Dugan:

"Specifically, the judge noted that while in his opinion the police had probable cause to suspect that a crime was being committed, this fact did not excuse a warrantless entry on defendant's property. The trial judge relied upon the holding of this Court in People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497; 302 NW2d 209 (1980).

"On review, the ruling of the trial judge must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. People v Grimmett, 97 Mich App 212; 293 NW2d 768 (1980). We find no mistakes in the ruling below and affirm."

The dissent would have reversed, noting that the officers had probable cause to search defendant's garage once the anonymous tip had been verified by the discovery of the stripped Cadillac in the alley. Moreover the informant's tip, corroborated by the finding of the stripped vehicle, was sufficient for the officers to obtain a warrant under the "totality of the circumstances" standard promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). However, the dissent did not believe that a warrant would be necessary under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. In the present case, "[t]he officers were justified in stopping the commission of a crime and seizing evidence before it could be destroyed. The search and seizure was reasonable and therefore constitutional."

As both the trial court and the Court of Appeals decisions rested largely on the case of People v. Dugan, supra, this Court has found it necessary to reexamine Dugan in considering the present appeal. In Dugan, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convictions for receiving or concealing stolen property over $100. The Court based its decision on the following findings of fact:

"In the instant case, Officer Gregory Thompson testified that on the morning of January 29, 1978, he contacted Mr. Charles DeBruyne who reported that a snowblower had been taken from his garage. Mr. DeBruyne reported further that he had followed a set of snowblower tracks from his garage, through an alley, to the rear of a house on East Outer Drive. Officer Thompson testified that he then followed the tracks and an accompanying set of footprints to the rear of the house he had been told about, at which point the tracks and footprints continued through a hole in the fence at the rear of the house and into the garage. Officer Thompson then testified that he walked around to the front of the house where he observed a set of footprints leading from the garage to the front door. He then entered onto the property and went to the open garage door where he observed a snowblower that matched the description given by Mr. DeBruyne. On checking further, he verified that the serial number on the snowblower matched the serial number given by Mr. DeBruyne. The officer testified that he then returned to the front of the house where he radioed for his sergeant. Shortly thereafter, the defendant exited from the front of the house, at which time Officer Thompson asked the defendant to stop and told the defendant that he wanted to talk to him. The defendant replied that if the officer did not have a search warrant he should stay off the property and then headed toward the garage. Officer Thompson again entered onto the property, following the defendant and ordering him to stop. Officer Thompson asked the defendant where he was going, to which the defendant replied that he was going to the garage to get his snowblower. Officer Thompson then stepped between the defendant and the snowblower. The defendant on several occasions demanded that the officer leave the property unless he had a warrant and the officer replied several times that he did not need a warrant because he had probable cause and was protecting a crime scene. Defendant then went into the house and returned with another young man, who [sic] the officer estimated to be between 15 and 17 years of age. Defendant then stated that they were going into the garage but Officer Thompson would not allow them to touch the snowblower. The officer had radioed for...