People v. Hudson, Cr. 5688

Decision Date20 September 1955
Docket NumberCr. 5688
Citation45 Cal.2d 121,287 P.2d 497
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Paul HUDSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Charles W. Jennings, Lemoore, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

TRAYNOR, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment imposing the death penalty following defendant's conviction of first murder.

The following facts are undisputed: At approximately 2:00 p. m. on July 6, 1954, defendant was drinking beer in a bar, the Black Cat Cafe, in the town of Stratford. Shortly thereafter William Tuttle came into the bar wearing a distinctive black hat. He and defendant engaged in conversation. At that time defendant had no money and Tuttle bought him a beer. Between 2:30 and 3:00 p. m. defendant and Tuttle left the bar together, taking four cans of beer with them. Defendant told the bartender that they were going for a ride. They were next seen sitting together in Tuttle's green 1952 Ford pickup truck, which was parked by a clump of shade trees near the edge of town. Thereafter they went to Tuttle's cabin, which was located in an agricultural labor camp outside pf . stratford. They remained at the cabin for half an hour drinking beer before they started back to town. The drive back was interrupted by Tuttle's wish to urinate. Both defendant and Tuttle alighted from the truck at a point along a rural road. Defendant hit Tuttle on the side of the face with his fist. The blow knocked Tuttle to his hands and knees, whereupon defendant kicked him about the head, and he fell to the ground. Defendant moved him a few feet away from the side of the road but did not hide the boyd. He then took Tuttle's purse and drove away in Tuttle's truck. The body was found three days later. It was in a 'fairly advanced' state of decomposition, but an autopsy showed that death was caused by cerebral concussion and hemorrhage and by a compound fracture of the jaw, both owing to blows about the head and face. In his testimony at the trial, the autopsy surgeon stated that the concussion, hemorrhage, and fracture were combined causes and that one of them could not be singled out as the sole cause of death. Within an hour after having left with Tuttle, defendant returned to Stratford driving Tuttle's truck and wearing Tuttle's black hat. He went into the Black Cat Cafe and paid for the beer that he had purchased on credit earlier in the day before leaving with Tuttle. He also bought drinks for everybody in the bar and bought 24 cans of beer and two hamburgers to take with him. On leaving the Black Cat Cafe, he went across the street to a grocery store, where he was known, and bought a pint of whiskey and some luncheon meat. He put his purchases in Tuttle's truck and started to drive out of town. He stopped at a service station to buy gas and oil for the truck. He drove away and had an accident at the edge of town in which the truck was turned over and his right foot severely cut. He urged two witnesses to the accident not to call an ambulance or the police and stood talking with them until his brother arrived and drove him to his brother's home just outside of Stratford. Defendant stayed there overnight. On the following day, his brother drove him to Corcoran where he took a cab to Fresno. After staying in Fresno overnight, he boarded a bus for Arizona. He ultimately made his way to El Paso, Texas, where he called on the sheriff's office and the highway patrol for help in entering a hospital to obtain treatment for an infection in his injured foot. He was apprehended before leaving the hospital, in which he had registered under his own name, and returned to Kings County to stand trial on charges of murder, robbery, and theft of a vehicle. Vehicle Code, § 503.

Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. In his testimony at the trial, however, he admitted the robbery and the theft of the vehicle. He also admitted that he had struck Tuttle in the face with his fist and that he had kicked him about the head. He explained that he and Tuttle had been discussing the possibility of defendant's buying the truck from Tuttle and that on the way back to Stratford defendant had asked permission to drive in order 'to try it out.' Tuttle gave his permission but when they stopped at the place where the killing occurred they had an argument over Tuttle's complaint that defendant was driving too fast and recklessly. Defendant testified that the blows were the result of this argument and that he did not form an intent to rob until after the attack had ceased: 'Mr. Tuttle gets out of the car on the opposite side of the driver. I got out of the car. I come around to the front of the car and we got in a little argument there. Well like the testimony said that he was going to pass water so when he started to do that I hit him and knocked him down. He was down on all fours, I knew that I was on parole, 1 just out of the penitentiary and I knew that would mess me up right there so I kicked the man and when I kicked him he went on down, and I decided then I got to take his money and get out of here for I haven't got any. So I took his money and from where I left the man when they found the body it was at least ten feet from where I left it. The reason I moved the body from what they say was out from under the wheels of the back of the car was I wouldn't run over him.' (Italics added.)

In rebuttal, the prosecution offered in evidence a pre-trial confession. Defendant objected to its introduction on the ground that it was involuntary in that it had been obtained by the use of a threat by the sheriff of Kings County. Defendant testified that the sheriff threatened to do everything in his power to send defendant's brother to the penitentiary unless defendant confessed. Defendant's brother was mentally deficient and had been in a mental institution, and defendant was anxious to shield him. The sheriff denied making the threat, however, and the trial judge admitted the confession. In the confession defendant admitted the robbery, the theft, and the assault on Tuttle. He also said that he had formed the intent to rob before he and Tuttle had gone to the latter's cabin and thus before any blows had been struck.

On the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant waived a trial by jury. The only evidence introduced was the written opinion of the two psychiatrists who were appointed by the court to examine defendant. They agreed that defendant was legally sane at the time of the crime, and the court found accordingly.

Even if the contested confession is disregarded, the foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the homicide in the perpetration of a robbery, that he was legally sane at the time of the crime, and that he is therefore guilty of murder in the first degree. Pen.Code, § 189; People v. Carnine, 41 Cal.2d 384, 387, 260 P.2d 16. Defendant contends, however, that the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on his theory of the case. He offered the following instruction, which the trial court refused to give:

'If you find that Defendant, Paul Hudson had not fromed an intention to rob William Tuttle until after he struck William Tuttle, dragged his body into the ditch then you are instructed that Willism Tuttle was not killed by Paul Hudson in the perpetratration of or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery.'

In People v. Carnine, 41 Cal.2d 384, 260 P.2d 16, 17, the failure to give such an instruction was held to be prejudicial error because the defendant had testified that 'he never intended to kill Mr. Rosenbaum and did not decide to take the property until after the attack had terminated' and because the other evidence was 'not inconsistent with defendant's testimony that his attack on Mr. Rosenbaum was the result of a sudden quarrel' rather than being the means of effecting a planned robbery or burglary. 41 Cal.2d at pages 388, 391, 260 P.2d at page 19, see also, People v. Kerr, 37 Cal.2d 11, 13-14, 229 P.2d 777. The Attorney General contends, however, that defendant's own testimony 2 demonstrates that the Carnine case is inapplicable 'because (his...

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9 cases
  • People v. Ketchel
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1963
    ...robbers, and the trial judge erred in not submitting to the jury the alternative issue of second degree murder. (People v. Hudson (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 127, 287 P.2d 497.) Finally they contend that 'no matter how weak' their evidence might have been they were entitled to instructions on the......
  • People v. McDonald
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 2015
    ...of the cases cited as authority (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769 ; People v. Hudson (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124-127, 287 P.2d 497 ; see People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 ), the defendant was the actual kille......
  • People v. Carter
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1957
    ...only after attacking him; on the contrary he denied either attacking or robbing him. In each case that he invokes, People v. Hudson, 45 Cal.2d 121, 124-126, 287 P.2d 497, and People v. Carnine, 41 Cal.2d 384, 387-392, 260 P.2d 16, the defendant admitted killing and robbing the victim and re......
  • People v. Slaughter
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 2015
    ...Cal.App.4th 1362, 1381.) Moreover, in each of the cases cited as authority (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371; People v. Hudson (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124-127; see People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691), the defendant was the actual killer. Because the general instructions give......
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