People v. Huey

• Decision Date: 02 April 1956
• Docket Number: No. 82,82
• Citation: 75 N.W.2d 893,345 Mich. 120
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Clarence HUEY, alias Clarence Huie, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 893

75 N.W.2d 893

345 Mich. 120

The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Clarence HUEY, alias Clarence Huie, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. 82.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 2, 1956.

Michael A. Guest, Detroit, for appellants.

Thomas M. Kavanagh, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

Before the Entire Bench.

SHARPE, Justice.

Upon leave being granted, defendant, Clarence Huey, appeals from a conviction and sentence based upon an information charging him with being a part of a conspiracy to violate the provisions of the State cigarette tax act, being P.A.1947, No. 265, C.L.1948, § 205.501 et seq., as amended by P.A.1949, No. 312, and by P.A.1951, No. 78, Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. and Stat.Ann.1951 Cum.Supp. § 7.411(1) et seq.

Count one of the information charges defendant and fourteen others as follows:

'* * * on the 1st day of July, A.D.1947, and on divers other days and dates up to and including the 21st day of February, A.D.1953, at the said City of Detroit, in said County, and/or other municipalities in the County of Wayne, did unlawfully and wickedly, maliciously and feloniously conspire, combine, confederate and agree, together and with each other and with divers other persons, and to and with William Maskeny, Durell Meadows, John A. Perrella, Stuart Goike, Arthur Hitchens, Dominic LeDuca and Thomas Maskeny, to violate the provisions of Act 265 of the Public Acts of 1947, as amended, to-wit, to unlawfully possess, acquire and transport and sell to others for resale, thousands of cases of cigarettes of a wholesale value in excess of fifty dollars, to-wit, approximately five million dollars without having and obtaining licenses and permits as wholesalers, secondary wholesalers, transporters, and unclassified acquirers, and to unlawfully possess, acquire, transport and offer to sell thousands of cases of cigarettes of a wholesale value in excess of fifty dollars, without having and obtaining the necessary licenses and permits therefor; and to possess, acquire, transport and offer for sale the said cigarettes in original manufacturer's shipping cases, not marked with the name and address of the person making the first purchase of said cigarettes in this State; and to possess, acquire, transport and offer to sell the said cigarettes without keeping a complete and accurate record of the purchase and acquisition of said cigarettes; and to possess, acquire, transport and offer to sell the said cigarettes without keeping a written statement of the name and address of both the seller and the purchaser, date of delivery, quantity, name and price paid for said cigarettes; and without keeping and furnishing purchase orders, invoices and bills of lading, and to evade the payment of cigarette taxes to the State of Michigan in an amount of approximately one million dollars; contrary to Section 750.505, C.L.1948, and contrary to Sections 205.501, 205.504, 205.505, 205.506 and 205.509, C.L.1948.'

One of the co-conspirators was dismissed as a defendant prior to trial, another plead guilty prior to trial, and the prosecution dismissed a third at the conclusion of the trial.

In the course of the trial the lower court ruled that the testimony disclosed two separate and distinct conspiracies. The court ruled that the conspiracy here involved was concluded as of December 15, 1951, and that the subsequent conspiracy involved defendants, Sam Frontiera, Anthony Palazzola and Ernest Brown, only. Appellant was therefore charged with participation in the first conspiracy.

It appears that during the closing argument to the jury the assistant prosecutor made the following statement, 'no one has taken the stand and said they worked in a legitimate business.' Thereupon, defense counsel asked for a mistrial, which was denied by the court. In his instructions to the jury, the court instructed them as follows:

'None of the defendants have taken the stand, which is their right and privilege, as it is not incumbent on any defendant in any case to prove his innocence; on the contrary, it is incumbent on the People to prove the guilt of each and every defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, because, every defendant, no matter what the case may defendant, no matter what the innocent, unless proven to the contrary, to be a person of good character.'

The jury returned a verdict of guilty against defendant Huey on the first count. Six defendants were acquitted by the jury, four defendants were found guilty on both counts, and another defendant was found guilty on the second count. Defendant herein was later sentenced by the court. In his appeal defendant urges that the testimony given during the trial did not disclose beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was an active participant in the conspiracy.

It is the rule in this State that conspiracy may be established by circumstances and may be based on inferences, see People v. Garska, 303 Mich. 313, 6 N.W.2d 527. Moreover, it is not necessary to a conviction for conspiracy that each defendant have knowledge of all of its ramifications or know all of the conspirators, see People v. Cooper, 326 Mich. 514, 40 N.W.2d 708. In People v. Heidt, 312 Mich. 629, 646, 20 N.W.2d 751, 758, we quoted with approval from a paragraph of the headnotes in Allen v. United States, 7 Cir., 4 F.2d 688, as follows:

"One knowing that others have combined to violate law, who cooperates knowingly to further object of conspiracy, becomes a party thereto, though he is not acquainted with each of the other conspirators, and may know but one of them."

In People v. McKenna, 282 Mich. 668, 674, 276 N.W. 718, 720, it is said:

'* * * Defendant is justified in his argument that, 'The circumstances relied upon by the people in the case at bar are meager indeed,' but we do not agree with his contention that they are 'so utterly lacking in probative force as to justify even an inference of appellant's guilt.'

'We think, on the contrary, that a case was made out by the people. No testimony was offered by the defendant. There is enough testimony in the record from which reasonable inferences may be drawn to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime. See People v. Martin, 235 Mich. 206, 209 N.W. 87, and People v. Weyonen, 247 Mich. 308, 225 N.W. 552.'

And in People v. Cooper, 326 Mich. 514, 40 N.W.2d 708, this Court held, inter alia, that a person may be a party to a continuing conspiracy by knowingly cooperating to further the object thereof, and that it is not necessary to a conviction for conspiracy that each defendant have knowledge of all of its ramifications, and that it is not necessary to a conviction for conspiracy that one conspirator should know all of the conspirators or participate in all of the objects of the conspiracy. Counsel for appellant seeks to have this Court take over the functions of the jury and decide questions of fact already determined by the jury under proper instructions. As was said in People v. Heidt, 312 Mich. 629, syllabus 17, 20 N.W.2d 751:

'One knowing that others have combined to violate law, who cooperates knowingly to further the object of the conspiracy, becomes a party thereto, though he is not acquainted with each of the other conspirators and may know but one of them.'

We have in mind that the record shows that there was a conspiracy to violate a statute regulating the traffic of cigarettes for the purpose of collection of a tax thereon. The question now before us is to determine whether there was competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the conviction of defendant. The evidence is undisputed that defendant operated a restaurant on Gratiot Avenue in the City of Detroit with an office in the basement of the restaurant; that neither defendant nor Sam Frontiera had a license from the cigarette tax division of the Department of Revenue of the State of Michigan, and that Sam Frontiera was the leader of the group involved in the conspiracy. It also appears that defendant's restaurant was the headquarters where the group met and transacted business.

The record shows that there was testimony from Durell Meadows that he was paid $50 a trip by Sam Frontiera for bringing a load of contraband cigarettes into Michigan; that payment was sometimes made at defendant's restaurant.

Arthur Hitchens testified that defendant paid him once for hauling cigarettes into Michigan, but didn't know whether Sam Frontiera left the money with defendant to pay him.

Dominic Le Duca testified that he...