People v. Huggins
| Decision Date | 10 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. S037006.,S037006. |
| Citation | 131 P.3d 995,41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593,38 Cal.4th 175 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael James HUGGINS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Peter Gold, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald S. Matthias and Allan Yannow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
An Alameda County jury convicted Michael James Huggins of one count each of murder (Pen.Code, § 187),1 burglary (§ 459), and robbery (§ 211). The jury found true the special-circumstance allegations that defendant committed the murder in the course of, or immediate flight from, burglary, robbery, and rape or attempted rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), (iii), and (vii), now subd. (a)(17)(A), (C), and (G)). The jury also found true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5) and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7). The court, sitting without a jury, found true allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of two serious felonies within the meaning of section 667, along with a third prior felony conviction. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the penalty and the court declared a mistrial. A new jury was impaneled, and it returned a verdict of death. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)
Except for a sentence enhancement for prior convictions under section 667, subdivision (a), which must be set aside (see post, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 660, 131 P.3d at pp. 1051-1052), the judgment is affirmed.
Defendant claims that instructional error at a competency trial before the guilt phase violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as codified in section 1367.
In 1986, while the present criminal charges were pending, defense counsel represented to the court that defendant was either unwilling or, because of mental problems, unable to communicate with him for extended periods. Counsel requested a competency evaluation in Alameda County Municipal Court "to see if that's a matter of willfulness on his part or an inability on his part." The municipal court declared a doubt as to defendant's mental competency, and the Alameda County Superior Court ordered a trial to determine defendant's mental competency.
At the competency trial, which was held before a jury in 1987, expert and lay witnesses presented conflicting testimony about defendant's mental state.
Defendant's witnesses testified that he lacked the capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, or to assist in preparing his defense.
James O. Palmer, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that he administered psychological tests to defendant, but defendant acted so bizarrely that Dr. Palmer "thought it was possible that he was just putting me on." He suspected defendant was malingering at times. But at times defendant would neglect to malinger and Dr. Palmer was able to observe him. When Dr. Palmer administered a Rorschach test, defendant appeared "not [to be] malingering," but instead to be "confused." Dr. Palmer opined that defendant may have given absurd answers to test questions because he admittedly had used phencyclidine (PCP) in jail. Tests that Dr. Palmer administered on a later occasion revealed brain damage. Dr. Palmer concluded that defendant was not competent to stand trial.
John B. Peschau, Jr., M.D., a psychiatrist, testified for defendant that defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Peschau said that during the examination defendant tried to malinger, but that his malingering was an overlay that did not detract from Dr. Peschau's observations of his genuine mental illness. Dr. Peschau agreed that if defendant's behavior were markedly different in jail than when being examined for signs of mental illness, it would suggest malingering. At one point, defendant referred to a nonexistent rug on the floor; Dr. Peschau did not believe that this constituted an attempt to malinger, but could not explain defendant's comment.
Dr. Peschau believed that a criminal defendant has nothing to gain by being found incompetent to stand trial. In any event, Dr. Peschau did not believe that defendant was sophisticated enough to realize he might benefit from malingering.
The People's expert witnesses disagreed with the conclusions of the defense witnesses. Anthony Bitting, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, concluded that defendant was malingering. He described defendant as feigning a catatonic manner toward him in a jailhouse interview. True catatonia would manifest itself differently. Later, when defendant thought he was out of Dr. Bitting's sight, he interacted with other inmates normally; when he saw Dr. Bitting watching him, he reverted to his feigned catatonia. Dr. Bitting stated to defendant that he knew defendant was faking symptoms of mental illness, and told the jury that defendant was not mentally ill. He explained to the jury that even "people . . . whose thoughts are very scrambled . . . . know you're there," and that defendant was playacting.
Lay witnesses testified that defendant's behavior in jail was unremarkable. Defendant told one sheriff's deputy that he was glad to be back from the nearby Highland Hospital so he could resume, in the deputy's words, "talking to normal people or something [of] that nature." The deputy also testified that defendant behaved normally during hours reserved for inmates to socialize outside their cells. But he also testified that defendant was kept on a 15-minute suicide watch, a status held by about 1 percent of the inmates at the jail.
There was additional evidence that defendant feigned symptoms of mental illness or low intelligence to try to avoid standing trial. A different sheriff's deputy testified that defendant had filled out a number of jail commissary order forms accurately and legibly. The forms required defendant to write his name, which he did. Earlier, Dr. Palmer had testified that defendant claimed to be illiterate, and that when Dr. Palmer asked him to sign his name, he printed out the letters "t-e-m-o-d."
A third sheriff's deputy confirmed that defendant interacted normally with other jail inmates.
Maurice Beaulieu, M.D., a psychiatrist and the chief of the psychiatric custody facility at Highland Hospital, testified for the prosecution. Defendant had been sent there for evaluation because he had created a noose in jail and was considered a suicide risk. Defendant claimed to be hearing voices and proclaimed himself "King of the world." To determine if he was inventing symptoms, Dr. Beaulieu placed him on Haldol, "a rather potent antipsychotic medication" that should alleviate genuine hallucinations. Haldol had no effect, and Dr. Beaulieu observed defendant interacting normally with the nursing staff but "selectively speaking about voices when speaking with Dr. [Arend] Boer or myself." Dr. Beaulieu concluded that defendant was malingering. He ordered defendant placed on a suicide watch on his return to jail because he was "very invested in looking as sick as he could, and I felt that . . . he might make some kind of suicide gesture where he could make a mistake and actually harm himself."
Arend Boer, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist on the Highland Hospital staff, also testified for the prosecution. He quickly concluded that defendant was malingering. Defendant "did all kinds of little things that mentally ill people do not do." And defendant "is very street-wise and very prison-wise." Defendant exaggerated abnormal behavior when taking the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test. Dr. Boer concluded that defendant "is competent and he is willfully, volitionally thwarting the [penal] process." Dr. Boer testified on cross-examination that defendant might have a degree of mental illness, but that it was secondary to his feigning symptoms to avoid prosecution.
As stated, a jury found defendant competent to stand trial.
I. Claim of Instructional Error
Defendant asserts that the trial court's oral instruction to the jury at the competency hearing denied him due process of law and did not conform to subdivision (a) of section 1367, which, at the time of trial, provided: (As amended by Stats.1980, ch. 547, § 7, pp. 1509-1510.)2
The standard jury instruction based on section 1367 was CALJIC No. 4.10, which, at the time of trial, stated:
The trial court instructed the jury in language that, according to the reporter's transcript, differed...
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