People v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 16 June 1959
• Docket Number: Cr. 2916
• Citation: 171 Cal.App.2d 362,340 P.2d 679
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnnie Carey HUGHES, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 679

340 P.2d 679

171 Cal.App.2d 362

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnnie Carey HUGHES, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 2916.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

June 16, 1959.

Robert W. Anderson, Oroville, for appellant.

The Attorney General, by Lloyd Hinkelman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

VAN DYKE, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment declaring appellant guilty of murder of the first degree, and fixing his punishment a life imprisonment, and from an order denying a new trial. Appellant contends: (1) That the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial statements into evidence; in giving an instruction offered by the People; in refusing to give an instruction requested by him; and (2) that the verdict of the jury found him guilty of second-degree murder only. He asks a reversal and a new trial or, in the alternative, a reduction to a judgment of second degree.

It is unnecessary to give a detailed statement of the facts surrounding the killing. It will suffice to say that appellant killed one Frances Grubbs, by shooting her through the chest with a pistol during a dispute between them wherein he had demanded that she go with him to his home, which demand she refused. On the evidence the jury could have found either first or second-degree murder.

As to duress and coercion which he contends were used in extracting statements the record shows the following: Appellant, a 24-year-old Negro, raised in Georgia, and educated through the eleventh grade in its schools, testified on voir dire as follows: He was arrested about 3 or 3:30 on the morning of May 3d shortly after the killing of Frances Grubbs. He was taken to the Butte County jail and kept in the company of one or more deputy sheriffs until 6 o'clock that night. Most of the time he was not allowed to smoke. He was questioned up to 1:30 in the afternoon and had been given no rest during that period. About 1:30 he was taken to the morgue where deceased's body was and was kept there about an hour and a half. Over his protest the officers insisted that he be in the same room with the body and look at it. When he refused to look at the body, a deputy sheriff took his head and twisted it so that he was directly facing the corpse. (This was admitted by the deputy.) He first closed his eyes but later looked at the body. He was questioned continuously at the morgue and was kept there until about 5:30 P.M. He was scared because he did not know what the officers were going to do to him. He was tired and did not know what he had told them or what he was saying. On May 5th he was taken to the district attorney's office and there in the presence of a police captain his statement was taken on a tape recorder. He was still scared. If he had not been treated as he was, he would not have made a statement and the statement he gave was not given of his own free will. The district attorney more or less put words in his mouth, asking him, 'Now ain't that right?' and 'Now ain't that right what I am telling you?' He could not remember everything that he said to the district attorney. No one forced him to give the statement but he was led into making it and got no chance to say anything to the district attorney because that official would say to him, 'Ain't that right?' He was scared throughout the interview and did not know but what he was going to be subjected to the same treatment as in the morgue. He did not know whether or not the officers were going to take him out and beat him up and was afraid that if he did not talk something would happen to him. It appears from the record that on the element of premeditation and motive for killing, his statements were largely suggested in such manner as to leave him little to say save to affirm the wording of the questions addressed to him. For example:

'Q. Were you pretty much in love with this girl? A. Yes, I was.

'Q. And actually, was your whole thought one that when you pulled the trigger you said well if she is not going to go with me she is not going to go with anybody, was that, I mean, I want to know the truth, is that the truth? A. That's right.'

As opposed to appellant's testimony on voir dire there was ample testimony from the several officials involved that all statements he made were free and voluntary; that he was not subjected to denial of food, rest, or smoking; that no force or threats of any sort were used against him nor inducive promises made to him.

The situation presented by the record is one where the preliminary ruling of the trial court that the statements were admissible is sufficiently supported. The court properly left the issue of freedom from duress to the jury under appropriate instructions. The record does not support the assignment of error charged. People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal.2d 870, 151 P.2d 251; People v. Crooker, 47 Cal.2d 348, 354-355, 303 P.2d 753.

Appellant charges error in the giving of the following instruction offered by the People: 'A confession is not voluntary when it has been obtained by any kind or degree of violence, abuse or threat, or by any coaxing, cajoling, or menacing influence which induces in the mind of the defendant the belief or hope that he will gain some advantage by making a confession, provided that any such inducement by which the confession is obtained originates either from a law enforcement officer or in the presence of such an officer, under circumstances from which the accused might reasonably be expected to assume that the inducement is authorized by the officer.' Appellant challenges this instruction because it omitted any reference to 'psychological coercion or duress.' Appellant cites People v. Baldwin, 42 Cal.2d 858, 867, 270 P.2d 1028, and People v. Loper, 159 Cal. 6, 20, 112 P. 720, wherein the importance and effect of psychological coercion and duress is discussed. In view of appellant's background and his testimony concerning his fear of what might be done to him it might have been well to mention the matter of psychological coercion and duress but we think that the jury were sufficiently and properly instructed. Instructions given were taken from California Jury Instructions (CALJIC).

Appellant contends that the court erred in rejecting his proposed instruction, reading as follows: 'If you find from the evidence that the defendant gave a statement to the Sheriff of Butte County on May 3, 1958, that for about 10 1/2 hours before giving such statement he was subjected to coercion and duress by said Sheriff's deputies; that he gave such statement because of such coercion or duress; that on May 5th, 1958, he gave another statement to the District Attorney, that at the time of giving such statement to the District Attorney he was still acting under the coercion and duress to which he was subjected on May 3, 1958, then you will find that the latter statement was not a voluntary statement, and you will disregard it in arriving at your verdict.' Appellant points out that this instruction emphasizes the factor of fear duration once fear is induced and no instruction given did so. But that fear endures for a time is matter of common knowledge. The jury needed no instruction on that matter.

The remaining assignment of error has to do with the form of the verdict first returned by the jury. The verdict found appellant guilty 'as charged in the information.' Section 1157 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

'Whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime which is distinguished into degrees, the jury, or the court if a jury trial is waived, must find the degree of the crime of which he is guilty. Upon the failure of the jury or the court to so determine, the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty, shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree.'

Appellant contends that by the jury's verdict, read and construed with the code section, he was convicted of second-degree murder and the judgment must be modified accordingly; that all proceedings after receipt of the verdict were nullities. The People argue that the verdict received was merely informal, was intended to be and was a verdict of first-degree murder and was properly corrected to so show.

In order to properly discuss this issue we must refer to the record. Agreeably to Sections 190 and 190.1 of the Penal Code the court first tried the issue of guilt. The evidence addressed to that issue was closed, the case was argued, and the jury was instructed. The following then occurred:

'The Court: You will be given five separate verdicts. You will return only one of them. I think they are self explanatory. In the order in which they are in my hand, and I can assure you it is not the order of significance, and frankly, I have no opinion as to what your verdict should be, but you have--the first one here is a verdict of guilty as charged in the information, which is a charge of first degree murder. If after considering the evidence and the law that should be your verdict you would use that form. The second one is a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. If he was not guilty of murder in the first degree and your deliberation indicated, under the definitions of the law, the evidence proved him guilty as required by law of second degree murder, you would use that form. The other two are voluntary manslaughter which has been defined and involuntary manslaughter which has been defined and of course a verdict of not guilty. As I say of the five you will use only one of those verdicts.'

After a period of deliberation the jury returned to the courtroom and requested that ...