People v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 20 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95CA0242,95CA0242 |
| Parties | 21 Colorado Journal 227 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arealous E. HUGHES, Defendant-Appellant. . V |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Laurie A. Booras, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for DefendantAppellant.
Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.
Defendant, Arealous E. Hughes, appeals from the judgments entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft and vehicular eluding and the sentence imposed for these convictions. His primary contentions on appeal challenge the interpretation and constitutionality of the direct filing provisions of The Colorado Juvenile Justice System Act, §§ 19-2-805 & 19-2-806, C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.) (repealed and reenacted as §§ 19-2-517 & 19-2-518, C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.)), as they have been applied to him. He also alleges certain trial errors. We affirm.
The charges here arose when a police officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop after defendant failed to signal for a right turn. Defendant slowed and pulled close to the curb, but did not stop. When the officer activated the siren, defendant sped away from the curb, and led the police officer on a short chase that reached speeds of fifty miles per hour. The chase ended when defendant's car collided with a police vehicle, injuring the officer inside.
Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offense. Pursuant to § 19-2-805(1)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.), the prosecutor moved to file against defendant directly in district court on the ground that, in addition to first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft and vehicular eluding, defendant was also charged with first degree assault on a police officer, a crime of violence. Upon trial, defendant was convicted of the former offenses, but was acquitted of the assault charge.
For his convictions for aggravated motor vehicle theft and vehicular eluding, the district court sentenced defendant as an adult to the Department of Corrections for concurrent six and three year terms. Because he had been acquitted of the charge of first degree assault on a peace officer, defendant contends that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his case and, therefore, was required to remand his case to the juvenile court for sentencing. We disagree.
Section 19-2-805, the statute applicable here, provides that:
(1)(a) A juvenile may be charged by the direct filing of an information in the district court or by indictment only when:
....
(II) The juvenile is fourteen years of age or older and:
(A) Is alleged to have committed a felony enumerated as a crime of violence pursuant to section 16-11-309, C.R.S.
Thus, by the plain language of § 19-2-805(1)(a)(II)(A), it is the allegation of the commission of the offense of first degree assault and not, as defendant contends, the conviction for that offense, that triggers the district court's subject matter jurisdiction here. The General Assembly has determined that the seriousness of allegations alone is sufficient to subject a juvenile over the age of 14 to the jurisdiction of the district court. See People v. Davenport, 43 Colo.App. 41, 602 P.2d 871 (1979) (); see also People v. Hernandez, 690 P.2d 263 (Colo.App.1984) ().
Here, the first degree assault charge was bound over after a preliminary hearing and, thus, provided the basis for the district court's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, § 19-2-805(2), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.) provides that:
Whenever criminal charges are filed by information or indictment in the district court pursuant to this section, the district court shall sentence the juvenile as follows
....
Under this statutory scheme, if, as here, jurisdiction is properly vested in the district court, that court is precluded from remanding a defendant's case to the juvenile court for sentencing. Once charges are directly filed in district court against a juvenile which include and are based on allegations of a crime of violence, the sentencing of that juvenile for any conviction resulting from those charges must be done by the district court.
Defendant points out that in a different subsection--s 19-2-805(1)(a)(IV), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.), which provides for direct filing when a juvenile defendant previously has been the subject of a direct filing--if the defendant is found not guilty in a trial of the offense that was the subject of the first direct filing, the second direct filed case must be remanded to the juvenile court.
However, defendant's argument notwithstanding, this subsection is different from § 19-2-805(1)(a)(II)(A). First, it contains clear and precise language requiring a remand which is noticeably absent in § 19-2-805(1)(a)(II)(A). Secondly, it demonstrates that the General Assembly was aware of its option to require a remand to juvenile court and specifically decided the circumstances under which that should occur. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386 (Colo.1995) ().
These distinctions are not arbitrary. If jurisdiction is triggered specifically because of the existence of an earlier direct filing, it is logical to divest the district court of jurisdiction in the later case if the basis for jurisdiction--the case underlying the first direct filing--is dismissed. Conversely, it is logical not to include a requirement that the case be remanded to the juvenile court should an acquittal occur when, as here, the triggering event for the district court's jurisdiction is the seriousness of the allegations against the juvenile.
Defendant contends that, if the statutory scheme is interpreted to require that he be sentenced as an adult, it violates constitutional principles of equal protection. His theory is that equal protection is violated because "other juvenile defendants similarly situated [have] the opportunity to have the district court dispose of their cases as would a juvenile court or to have the district court [remand] the case to the juvenile court for sentencing." We disagree.
Equal protection of the laws guarantees that similarly situated persons will receive like treatment. People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 (Colo.1986). As long as a fundamental right is not at stake and the legislative scheme is not based either on a suspect classification or a gender-based classification, the test for determining if there is an equal protection violation is whether the classification is reasonable and bears a rational relationship to legitimate state objectives. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo.1993).
Defendant does not argue that the legislative scheme is based on a suspect classification or on a gender-based classification. And, despite defendant's contention to the contrary, there is no fundamental right to be treated as a juvenile that requires a review of the classifications here under a standard of strict scrutiny. See People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo.1982) (); People in Interest of D.G., 733 P.2d 1199 (Colo.1987) (). Accordingly, we apply a rational basis standard of review.
Pursuant to § 19-2-805(2), as pertinent here, a district court is required to sentence a juvenile who is convicted of charges directly filed in district court either:
(a) As an adult; or
(b)(I) To the youthful offender system in the department of corrections in accordance with section 16-11-311, C.R.S., if the juvenile is convicted of an offense described in [the pertinent provisions] of this section; except that, if a person is convicted of a class 1 or class 2 felony, any sexual offense described in part 4 of article 3 of title 18, C.R.S., or a second or subsequent offense described in [pertinent subsections] for which such person received a sentence to the department of corrections or to the youthful offender system, such person shall be ineligible for sentencing to the youthful offender system.
(c) Pursuant to the provisions of this article [i.e., as a juvenile], if the juvenile is less than sixteen years of age and is convicted of an offense other than a class 1 or class 2 felony or a crime of violence as defined under section 16-11-309, C.R.S.
Although this section determines which court has jurisdiction to sentence a juvenile, it does not eliminate the court's ability to otherwise exercise any statutorily authorized discretion. For example, if sentenced as an adult in district court, a juvenile can be sentenced to incarceration within the statutory sentencing range for the crime. Alternatively, if applicable, the juvenile could also be sentenced to a community corrections program, a specialized restitution or community service program, or to a home detention program, or could be granted probation, or have his or her sentence suspended. See § 16-11-101, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) & § 16-11-101(1), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.).
Nonetheless, defendant claims that this statutory scheme, as it applies to him, violates the equal...
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