People v. Hunt
| Decision Date | 12 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | 11798. |
| Citation | 39 A.D.3d 961,2007 NY Slip Op 03024,833 N.Y.S.2d 731 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. JAMES HUNT, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (McGill, J.), rendered January 7, 2000, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree, assault in the second degree, sexual abuse in the third degree and unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree.
In 1999, defendant was charged in an indictment with numerous crimes arising out of his conduct with respect to three alleged victims (hereinafter victims A, B and C). Defendant was alleged to have kissed victim A, a 14-year-old minor, for the purposes of his own sexual gratification, and to have provided her with beer and marihuana. He allegedly sexually assaulted victim B in a bathroom at a party in the City of Plattsburgh, Clinton County. Finally, victim C alleged that defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse at a party at the same house in Plattsburgh. County Court denied defendant's motions to sever the counts relating to each separate victim as improperly joined. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree, assault in the second degree, sexual abuse in the third degree and unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree. County Court denied defendant's subsequent motion to, among other things, set aside the verdict, and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 9¼ years in prison. Defendant later moved for resentencing, which was granted, and County Court imposed an additional five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals and we now affirm.
Initially, defendant argues that County Court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the counts relating to the separate victims. Although the charges in the indictment involved three different victims and were based upon incidents that occurred months apart from one another, the charges were statutorily joinable as offenses "defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently ... the same or similar in law" (CPL 200.20 [2] [c]; see People v Nickel, 14 AD3d 869, 870 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 834 [2005]). Moreover, each of the victims testified separately regarding her encounter with defendant, the court's instructions distinguished between the charges and the jury found defendant not guilty of, among other things, all charges relating to victim B. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that County Court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the counts at issue (see CPL 200.20 [3]; People v Nickel, supra at 870; People v Monte, 302 AD2d 687, 688 [2003]; People v Kelly, 270 AD2d 511, 512-513 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 854 [2000]).
We further reject defendant's argument that County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after he alleged that the jurors were improperly influenced by an external source. Specifically, although defendant's prior reckless driving conviction had been deemed inadmissible at a Sandoval hearing, the widow of a man who was killed in the car accident resulting in that conviction allegedly told other spectators that defendant had "killed [her] husband." Inasmuch as this individual was also seen inquiring about an injured juror's foot and entering an elevator with a juror, defendant speculated that she may have negatively influenced the jury and thereby deprived him of a fair and impartial trial. In response, County Court reiterated its instructions to the jurors that they had a duty to report any contact with anyone regarding or related in any way to the case, and inquired whether any of the jurors had any such contact. None of the jurors responded. In the absence of any evidence that the jurors were actually exposed to or adversely influenced by the alleged contact with the individual in question, we agree with the People that the court's inquiry and curative instructions were sufficient to ensure that defendant was not prejudiced and the motion for a mistrial was properly denied (see People v Knorr, 284 AD2d 411, 412 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 903 [2001]; People v Williams, 264 AD2d 745, 746 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 831 [1999]; People v Lyon, 134 AD2d 909, 910 [1987], lv denied 71 NY2d 970 [1988]; cf. People v Rivera, 26 NY2d 304, 307-308 [1970]).
Finally, we are unpersuaded by defendant...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. McCray
...misconduct do not demonstrate a “ ‘flagrant and pervasive pattern’ of misconduct” warranting reversal ( People v. Hunt, 39 A.D.3d 961, 964, 833 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2007],lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 771, 872 N.E.2d 884 [2007], quoting People v. McCombs, 18 A.D.3d 888, 890, 795 N.Y.S.2d 10......
-
People v. Sudler
...as to deprive defendant of a fair trial ( see People v. Guay, 72 A.D.3d 1201, 1203-1204, 898 N.Y.S.2d 353 [2010]; People v. Hunt, 39 A.D.3d 961, 963, 833 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 771, 872 N.E.2d 884 [2007] ). Thus, defendant did not establish that his attor......
-
People v. St. Ives
...the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law" (CPL 200.20[2][c] ; see People v. Hunt, 39 A.D.3d 961, 962, 833 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 771, 872 N.E.2d 884 [2007] ; People v. Nickel, 14 A.D.3d 869, 870, 788 N.Y.S.2......
-
People v. Sorrell
...88 A.D.3d 1154, 1158, 931 N.Y.S.2d 727 [2011],lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 863, 938 N.Y.S.2d 871, 962 N.E.2d 296 [2011];People v. Hunt, 39 A.D.3d 961, 963–964, 833 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2007],lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 771, 872 N.E.2d 884 [2007] ). Defense counsel's objections were sustained to th......