People v. Hunter, Docket Nos. 121306
| Decision Date | 30 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | 121345 cons.,Docket Nos. 121306 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Kevin HUNTER, Appellant The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Drashun Wilson, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Katie Anderson and Meredith N. Baron, Assistant Appellate Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellants.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 In these consolidated appeals we consider the temporal reach of two legislative enactments: (1) an amendment to section 5–130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) ( 705 ILCS 405/5–130 (West 2016) ), which, inter alia , eliminated armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses, and (2) the new juvenile sentencing provisions codified in section 5–4.5–105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–105 (West 2016)), which, inter alia , give the trial court discretion not to impose otherwise mandatory firearm sentencing enhancements. The appellate court rejected defendants' arguments for retroactive application of these statutes to their cases that were pending on direct review when the statutes became effective and affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences. People v. Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 62, 73, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246 ; People v. Wilson , 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16, 407 Ill.Dec. 84, 62 N.E.3d 329. We affirm the judgments of the appellate court, albeit for different reasons.
¶ 4 In June 2011, the State charged defendant Kevin Hunter with aggravated vehicular hijacking ( 720 ILCS 5/18–4(a)(4) (West 2010)), aggravated kidnapping ( 720 ILCS 5/10–2(a)(6) (West 2010)), and armed robbery ( 720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2) (West 2010)), all while armed with a firearm. The charges arose out of an incident the previous month in which Hunter and two unidentified men robbed Steven Maxwell of personal property including his vehicle and kidnapped him, all at gunpoint. At the time of the offenses, Hunter was 16 years old.
¶ 5 The version of section 5–130(1)(a) of the Act then in effect provided as follows:
Pursuant to this statute, Hunter was tried in adult court.
¶ 6 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Hunter was convicted on all three counts. The trial court sentenced Hunter to 21 years on each count—the 6–year minimum for a Class X felony, plus the mandatory 15–year firearm enhancement—to be served concurrently. See 720 ILCS 5/18–4(b) (West 2010); 720 ILCS 5/10–2(b) (West 2010); 720 ILCS 5/18–2(b) (West 2010); 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–25(a) (West 2010). Hunter appealed.
¶ 7 While Hunter's case was pending in the appellate court, Public Acts 99–69 and 99–258 became effective.1 Both Public Acts adopted new, identical sentencing provisions applicable to defendants under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense. Pub. Act 99–69, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–105); Pub. Act 99–258, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–105). Subsection (b) of the new sentencing provisions directs that the court "may, in its discretion, decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing enhancement based upon firearm possession, possession with personal discharge, or possession with personal discharge that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person." 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–105(b) (West 2016).
¶ 8 Public Act 99–258 also amended section 5–130(1)(a) of the Act, raising the age for automatic transfer to adult court from 15 years to 16 years and eliminating armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses. Pub. Act 99–258 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) ( 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) ).
¶ 9 In supplemental briefing in the appellate court, Hunter argued that the amendment to the Code and the new sentencing provisions in the Act applied retroactively and that his case should be remanded for a discretionary transfer hearing, as well as a new sentencing hearing. The appellate court held that neither provision applied retroactively and rejected Hunter's other claims of error, thus affirming his convictions and sentence. Hunter , 2016 IL App (1st) 141904, ¶¶ 20, 22, 62, 73, 80, 407 Ill.Dec. 1, 62 N.E.3d 246. We allowed Hunter's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).
¶ 11 In October 2012, defendant Drashun Wilson was indicted for attempted first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/8–4(a) (West 2012)) and aggravated battery with a firearm ( 720 ILCS 5/12–3.05(e)(1) (West 2012)) in connection with the September 23, 2012, shooting of Floyd Fulton. At the time of the offenses and indictment, Wilson was 17 years old and, under the Act, was tried in adult court. See 705 ILCS 405/5–120 (West 2012). Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Wilson was found guilty of both offenses. The jury also found that Wilson personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to another person. After merging the aggravated battery conviction into the attempted murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Wilson to 31 years' imprisonment—the 6–year minimum for a Class X felony, plus the minimum mandatory 25–year firearm enhancement applicable where the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1)(D) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–25(a) (West 2012). Wilson appealed.
¶ 12 While Wilson's case was pending in the appellate court, Public Acts 99–69 and 99–258 became effective. In supplemental briefing, Wilson argued that he was entitled to be resentenced under section 5–4.5–105(b) of the Code, under which the trial court could decline to impose the firearm enhancement. The appellate court held that section 5–4.5–105(b) applied prospectively only. Wilson , 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 16, 407 Ill.Dec. 84, 62 N.E.3d 329. The appellate court rejected Wilson's other claims of error and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. ¶¶ 1, 28, 35, 43, 46–47.
¶ 13 We allowed Wilson's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016)) and consolidated Wilson's and Hunter's appeals for review.
¶ 15 Whether the statutory amendments at issue here apply retroactively to defendants' cases presents an issue of statutory construction. As such, our review proceeds de novo . People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc. , 2015 IL 117193, ¶ 27, 390 Ill.Dec. 105, 28 N.E.3d 758 ; People v. Amigon , 239 Ill. 2d 71, 84, 346 Ill.Dec. 63, 940 N.E.2d 63 (2010).
¶ 17 We consider first the amendment to section 5–130(1)(a) of the Act, adopted in Public Act 99–258. As noted above, the amendment changed the requirements for automatic transfer of a juvenile to adult court, by raising the minimum age from 15 years to 16 years and by eliminating armed robbery while armed with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking while armed with a firearm from the list of automatic transfer offenses. Hunter was charged with both of these offenses. Relying on People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346, Hunter argues that the amendment to section 5–130(1)(a) applies retroactively to his case, and because the offenses with which he was charged are no longer qualifying offenses for automatic transfer to adult court, he requests remand to the juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing but for purposes of sentencing only. Hunter does not challenge his conviction.
¶ 18 Howard was decided after we granted Hunter's petition for leave to appeal. There, we addressed the retroactivity of the amendment to section 5–130(1)(a) adopted in Public Act 99–258. Although Howard involved the change in the minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court, rather than the change in the list of automatic transfer offenses that is at issue here, both changes appear in the same section of the Act. Thus, Howard informs our analysis in this case.
¶ 19 In Howard , the defendant, who was 15 years old, was indicted on multiple offenses, including first degree murder. The charges against defendant were brought in adult court, pursuant to section 5–130(1)(a) of the Act ( 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) (West 2014)). Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 4, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346. While the defendant's case was pending in the trial court, Public Act 99–258 became effective. The defendant argued that his case must proceed in juvenile court because he no longer met the minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court. The trial court agreed and transferred the cause to juvenile court. The State sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to rescind the transfer order. We denied the writ. Howa...
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...brief was filed, our supreme court addressed the exact question at issue here in People v. Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358, and definitively resolved the issue unfavorably to defendant's position. Defendant acknowledges this fact in his reply brief, conceding the a......
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