People v. Huntley

• Decision Date: 22 November 1977
• Citation: 401 N.Y.S.2d 31,371 N.E.2d 794,43 N.Y.2d 175
• Parties: , 371 N.E.2d 794 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Hilbert HUNTLEY, also known as Charles Huntley, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 31

401 N.Y.S.2d 31

43 N.Y.2d 175, 371 N.E.2d 794

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Hilbert HUNTLEY, also known as Charles Huntley, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 22, 1977.

Susan A. Powers and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Thomas Geller, Scarsdale and Gail L. Geisinger, Middletown, of counsel), for respondent.

David Rudenstine, for the New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Carl Saks, New York City, of counsel), in response to the amicus curiae brief of the Civil Liberties Union.

JONES, Judge.

We hold that a parolee's constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when his apartment is searched, without a search warrant, by his parole officer if the latter's conduct is rationally and reasonably related to the performance of his duty as a parole officer.

Defendant was paroled on May 10, 1971 while serving a prison sentence for robbery. At the time of the incident here in question he had been directed by Edward O'Neill, his parole officer, to report weekly on Tuesdays. Defendant had telephoned on Tuesday, November 28, 1972. When he came in to see his parole officer the following day he was reminded that he was required to report again on Tuesday, December 5. Defendant failed to report on the 5th and again on December 12 and did not otherwise communicate with his parole officer. On December 13 Officer O'Neill informed his senior officer of defendant's failures to report, and as a result of their conversation the senior officer issued a parole violation warrant. Defendant's former parole officer, Edwin Donnelly, also participated in this conversation and reported that defendant had previously lied about his employment status, that he had received welfare without asking permission, and that his attitude toward parole was not what the parole officers thought it should be.

After reviewing defendant's folder, on December 15, 1972 Officer O'Neill with five other parole officers went to defendant's residence. Two officers remained outside the apartment building, one watching the back windows, another at the front door and side windows. The others went to defendant's ground floor apartment. Officer O'Neill knocked on the door which was promptly opened by defendant who admitted the officers. Defendant was taken into custody, searched and handcuffed, and his apartment was then searched. Officer O'Neill testified that prior to the issuance of the parole violation warrant he had had no knowledge or information as to any connection of defendant with narcotics which might have been a violation of his parole. The officer was, however, suspicious that there might be a gun in defendant's apartment because of the history of weapons in his record. The search revealed .38 caliber bullets near the front door, but no gun was ever found. The searching officers found a hypodermic needle and syringe, 144 glassine envelopes subsequently proved to contain heroin, 49 tinfoil wrappers found to contain cocaine, and an assortment of pills. The police were called and defendant was taken to the precinct station.

Supreme Court denied a motion to suppress the evidence seized from defendant's apartment and in a jury trial defendant was convicted of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. His conviction was upheld at the Appellate Division and he appeals to our court by permission of a Justice of that court. We affirm.

The principal contention advanced for reversal is that the thorough, exploratory search of his apartment without a search warrant constituted a violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

We start with the base proposition that the constitutional prohibition against searches and seizures is addressed only to searches and seizures which are unreasonable (U.S.Const., 4th Amdt.; N.Y.Const., art. I, § 12). Then we immediately agree with defendant that in consequence of his acquiring status as a parolee, he did not surrender his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484).

Proceeding on that predicate we nonetheless observe that in any evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure the fact of defendant's status as a parolee is always relevant and may be critical; what may be unreasonable with respect to an individual who is not on parole may be reasonable with respect to one who is (United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2 Cir., 441 F.2d 1216, 1218). Approached from another perspective, conduct which may be unreasonable with respect to a parolee if undertaken by a police officer may be reasonable if taken by the parolee's own parole officer (cf. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 9 Cir., 521 F.2d 259, 266; United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2 Cir., 441 F.2d 1216, 1219, supra ). In general the standard by which the reasonableness of a search or seizure with respect to a...