People v. Hylton

• Decision Date: 25 March 1988
• Citation: 529 N.Y.S.2d 412,139 Misc.2d 645
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Craig HYLTON, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 412

529 N.Y.S.2d 412

139 Misc.2d 645

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Craig HYLTON, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term,

Nassau County, Extraordinary Part 32.

March 25, 1988.

Denis Dillon, by Joy Watson, Dist. Atty., Mineola, for the people.

Joel S. Ezra, New York City, for defendant.

MARIE G. SANTAGATA, Justice.

The defendant has moved this Court by Omnibus Motion (supplemental to the Stipulation in Lieu of Motions completed by defense counsel and Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Fitzgerald on January 11, 1988) for the following relief: 1) inspection of the Grand Jury minutes; 2) dismissal of the indictment by reason of the "unconstitutionality of CPL § 190.50(4) as applied to Article I, Section 6 of the constitution of the State of New York" on the ground that the defendant was deprived of due process as a result of the District Attorney's refusal to allow defendant's witnesses to testify before the Grand Jury unless they executed waivers of immunity pursuant to CPL § 190.45; and 3) an order precluding the District Attorney from using at trial any statements allegedly made by the defendant on the ground that the District Attorney has failed to adequately provide the defendant with notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30.

The following constitutes the decision of this Court on each of defendant's requests:

1) Inspection of the Grand Jury minutes is granted to the extent that the Court has examined same. The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was proper and legally sufficient to support all of the crimes charged in the indictment or any lesser included offenses. CPL § 210.20(1)(b).

2) Defendant's motion for dismissal of the indictment on the ground of "unconstitutionality of CPL § 190.50(4)" is denied.

The defendant contends that CPL § 190.50(4) deprives the defendant of due process of law under both the constitution of the State of New York [Article I, Section 6] and the Constitution of the United States of America [Amendment 14]. More specifically, the defendant argues that because of the discretionary power vested in the District Attorney by CPL § 190.50(4), two witnesses were prevented from testifying in his behalf before the Grand Jury which handed up the instant indictment. That subdivision permits the District Attorney to demand that defendants' witnesses waive their immunity before giving evidence to the Grand Jury. The defendant contends that such authority "... impairs and interferes with the independent, investigatory power of the Grand Jury and its ability to properly and fairly inquire into the factual circumstances surrounding its investigation". It is argued that this perceived ability of the District Attorney to, "... by design, ... prevent the Grand Jury from carrying out its sworn function of investigating 'otherwise infamous crime[s]' ..." violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal Constitutions.

"Due process of law" is not a rigid or technical legal rule, capable of a structured and precise definition applicable in the same way to every factual situation. ( Peo. v. Colozzo, 54 Misc.2d 687, 691, 283 N.Y.S.2d 409, aff'd 32 A.D.2d 927, 303 N.Y.S.2d 348; Peo. v. Molina, 121 Misc.2d 483, 492, 468 N.Y.S.2d 551, citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230). Rather, it is a flexible concept, which embraces that which is fundamentally fair, just, and right under the particular facts and circumstances of a given case. ( Peo. v. Colozzo, supra, 54 Misc.2d at 691, 283 N.Y.S.2d 409, citing Wolfe v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183; Peo. v. Molina, supra, 121 Misc.2d at 492, 468 N.Y.S.2d 551, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484; Peo. v. Brown, 125 Misc.2d 132, 134-135, 479 N.Y.S.2d 113, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78). Stated in other words, the "concept of 'due process' embraces the general principle that the government shall abide by standards of procedural fairness which have been traditional in Anglo-American Law." ( Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc.2d 373, 377-78, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419).

The prosecution of a "capital or otherwise infamous crime" by Grand Jury indictment is a part of that Anglo-American legal tradition. ( Peo. v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 104, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447). However, functionally and procedurally, a Grand Jury proceeding is not, and never was, equitable with a trial by a petit jury of one's peers. (See, for example, Peo. v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 26, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990; Peo. v. Brewster, 63 N.Y.2d 419, 422, 482 N.Y.S.2d 724, 472 N.E.2d 686; Peo. v. Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 394, 426 N.Y.S.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d 1140). The two proceedings perform distinctly different functions. The procedural "due process" standard applicable to one is therefore distinctly different from the standard applicable to the other. The two may not fairly be equated, nor measured one against the other.

A jury trial is designed to ultimately determine an accused's guilt or innocence. A Grand Jury proceeding performs an investigatory/accusatory function, as well as the vital function of safeguarding the innocent from unfounded accusations. ( Peo. v. Pelchat, supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 104, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447; Peo. v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 594, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 384 N.E.2d 656). In order to fulfill its dual function, the Grand Jury is accorded "broad investigative powers" ( Peo. v. Lancaster, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at 25, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990; Matter of Stern v. Morgenthau, 62 N.Y.2d 331, 336, 476 N.Y.S.2d 810, 465 N.E.2d 349). Moreover, in general, the People are allowed a "wide discretion" in the presentation of their case to that body. ( Peo. v. Lancaster, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at 25, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990; Peo. v. Rockwell, 97 A.D.2d 853, 854, 469 N.Y.S.2d 252). Finally, the Grand Jury proceeding is not, and never was intended to be, adversarial in nature. ( Peo. v. Lancaster, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at 26, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990, Peo. v. Brewster, supra, 63 N.Y.2d at 422, 482 N.Y.S.2d 724, 472 N.E.2d 686). Thus, what may be deemed fundamentally fair at the Grand Jury may differ radically from the fundamental fairness concept appropriate to the trial.

The Court of Appeals appears to define fundamental fairness at the Grand Jury as requiring only, (1) that the Grand Jury "... be well informed concerning the circumstances of the case before it ..." ( Peo. v. Lancaster, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at 25, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990; Peo. v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 40, 476 N.Y.S.2d 50, 464 N.E.2d 418); and (2) that the Prosecutor meet an obligation of "... fair dealing to the accused and candor to the courts;" to, in short, "... see that justice is done." ( Peo. v. Pelchat, supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 105, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447. In applying this standard, the Court has held that the standard is not violated in instances where the Grand Jury has not been instructed on the law with the same degree of precision as is required at a jury trial ( Peo. v. Calbud, supra, 49 N.Y.2d at 394, 426 N.Y.S.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d 1140; where the Grand Jury has not been instructed on such matters as "mitigating defenses" which might have reduced the gravity of the offense ultimately charged ( Peo. v. Lancaster, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at 30, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990; Peo. v. Valles, supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 39, 476 N.Y.S.2d 50, 464 N.E.2d 418); and where the Grand Jury has not been presented with evidence which tends to exculpate the defendant ( Peo. v. Lancaster, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at 26, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990. See also, Peo. v. Townsend, 127 A.D.2d 505, 511 N.Y.S.2d 858; Peo. v. Isla, 96 A.D.2d 789, 466 N.Y.S.2d 16; Peo. v. Hill, 122 Misc.2d 895, 897, 471 N.Y.S.2d 826; Peo. v. Filis, 87 Misc.2d 1067, 1068-1070, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988).

Based upon the foregoing, it cannot be said that the implementation of the provisions of CPL § 190.50(4) in this case violated the standard of fundamental fairness set forth by the Court of Appeals for Grand Jury proceedings. First, whether the potential testimonies of the defendant's two witnesses be considered "mitigating" or "exculpatory", the highest court of this state has held that such evidence need not be presented at the Grand Jury stage. "Due process" is not violated by a failure to present such evidence to the Grand Jury. ( Peo. v. Filis, supra, at 1069, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988)....